The case involved Robert Warner challenging Aetna's termination of his long-term disability benefits under an ERISA employee welfare benefit plan sponsored by his former employer. Aetna ended the benefits after determining that Warner had refused to participate in an approved rehabilitation program, as permitted by the plan terms during the initial 24-month period of disability. The court reviewed the decision under an arbitrary and capricious standard adjusted by a sliding scale to account for Aetna's conflict of interest as both claims administrator and insurer. Finding the decision reasonable and supported by the administrative record, the court ruled in favor of the defendants and upheld the termination of benefits.
This case concerns the conduct of plaintiffs' counsel in a civil action against the City of Oklahoma City. Counsel failed to appear at a scheduled status conference despite prior notice, did not contact the court afterward to explain the absence, and submitted an untimely response to the court's show cause order without addressing the delay. The court decided to issue a public reprimand against counsel, to be published in the Federal Supplement and retained for potential future reference. The core reasoning was that the combination of missing the conference, failing to provide a timely explanation or apology, and submitting a late response without justification amounted to inexcusable lapses in professional diligence.
The case involved Oklahoma hospitals participating in Medicare that sought to reopen their notices of program reimbursement (NPRs) to obtain additional disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments after a prior ruling invalidated a regulation limiting such payments to days of actual Medicaid reimbursement rather than eligibility. The hospitals had timely requested reopening under 42 C.F.R. § 405.1885 but were denied based on HCFA Ruling 97-2, which applied the new interpretation only prospectively to pending appeals. The court determined that it had mandamus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 to compel the Secretary to direct fiscal intermediaries to reopen and reconsider those NPRs falling within the three-year reopening window under 42 C.F.R. § 405.1885(b) when Ruling 97-2 was issued, because the prior regulation was void ab initio and the mandatory reopening provision applied. It rejected arguments based on finality and Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, emphasizing that the hospitals had pursued the available administrative reopening avenue and that only timely NPRs would be affected.
The case involves CMI Corporation's motion under Rule 60(b)(6) to reduce an $11.6 million damages award to Standard Havens Products on a patent infringement counterclaim concerning the '146 Patent, based on the Federal Circuit's intervening decision in Lans v. Digital Equip. Corp. The court certified its intent to grant the motion upon remand from the pending appeal, finding that the new precedent applies because it requires actual notice of infringement from the patentee itself under 35 U.S.C. § 287(a). The core reasoning was that notice from a related corporate entity (Cedarapids) did not suffice when Standard Havens Products held the patent rights at the relevant time, and the appeal's pendency allowed reconsideration without finality concerns.
This case involved a dispute over insurance coverage under a business owners’ liability policy issued by State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company to Midwest Computers & More. The insured sought coverage to defend and indemnify against a lawsuit alleging negligent computer services that caused loss of use of computers and loss of stored data. The court granted summary judgment to the insurer, holding that it had no duty to defend or indemnify. Although the court found that loss of use of tangible property constituted covered “property damage,” a policy exclusion applied because the damage occurred before the insured’s work was completed, so the completed operations hazard did not provide coverage. The parties agreed the matter was governed by Oklahoma law, and the court resolved the coverage issue as a matter of law on cross-motions for summary judgment.
This case involves products liability and negligence claims by Jill Hagy, on behalf of herself and her injured husband, against American Honda Motor Co. and related entities, alleging defects in a three-wheeled all-terrain vehicle that caused an accident in 1994. It is the third lawsuit filed after prior state and federal actions (Hagy I and Hagy II) were dismissed without prejudice. The court denied the defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings, to dismiss, to stay, and to strike portions of the complaint. The core reasoning was that undisputed facts from the state court record showed the refiling was timely under Oklahoma's savings statute (12 O.S. § 100) following the dismissal of Hagy II, which had been filed within the original two-year limitations period; federal abstention doctrines did not apply absent a pending state proceeding; and Rule 12(f) does not authorize striking claims or parties based on an alleged prior agreement, which would require a summary judgment motion instead.
