The case involved a contract dispute between Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. and Heatway Systems over the supply of rubber hoses for hydronic radiant heating systems, with Goodyear seeking payment and Heatway raising issues about warranties and product defects. The court granted partial summary judgment to Goodyear, ordering payment on Entran III hose contracts from 1995-1996, but found genuine issues of material fact regarding the applicability of disclaimers in Entran II contracts, the disclaimer of implied warranties of fitness, and whether disclaimers failed their essential purpose. It ruled that Goodyear did not disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability because the term "merchantability" was not used, and reserved decision on unconscionability. The reasoning centered on Ohio commercial law governing contract formation, warranty disclaimers, and limitations on liability under the UCC.
The case concerned the United States' lawsuit against Lorantffy Care Center (LCC), a nonprofit assisted-living facility for elderly Hungarian immigrants, and its individual operators under the Fair Housing Act, alleging a pattern of discrimination against African-American applicants through unequal treatment in inquiries about bed availability and wait times. The court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment that the government had standing to bring the suit, that LCC was not exempt from the FHA despite its religious and ethnic ties to a church, and that the defendants' affirmative defenses—including statute of limitations, res judicata, collateral estoppel, and others—were without merit. It granted summary judgment to the individual defendants on all claims against them personally. The reasoning relied on the text and purpose of the FHA, principles of standing and jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 3614, and the lack of factual or legal support for the asserted defenses.
The case involved John Ragsdale suing Unum Life Insurance under ERISA for additional long-term disability benefits under his employer's policy, claiming he should be classified as physically disabled due to vision impairment, neck/back injuries, and related issues rather than only mentally disabled. The court granted summary judgment to Ragsdale, ruling that Unum erred in denying reclassification to physical disability. The decision was based on medical evidence showing Ragsdale's physical limitations from congenital nystagmus, cervical spine injuries, degenerative arthritis, and inability to use certain medications due to addiction, combined with the policy's provisions allowing benefits until age 65 for physical disabilities versus a 24-month limit for mental illness.
The case involved a lawsuit by Jane Roe on behalf of her minor son John Doe against the New Philadelphia Public Schools Board of Education, stemming from a sexual relationship between Doe and his teacher Vicki McCune during the 1994-95 school year. Roe alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 through deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, a hostile educational environment under Title IX, and state-law claims of reckless indifference causing injury. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 claim, finding no evidence of a school policy or custom causing the violation, but denied summary judgment on the Title IX and state-law claims after determining that genuine issues of material fact existed and that Ohio sovereign immunity under R.C. § 2744 did not apply due to statutory duties under R.C. § 2151.421. The court also denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment, allowing the remaining claims to proceed to a jury trial.
In this case, plaintiff Regina Mace, a former Felony Court Bailiff at the Akron Municipal Court, sued the City of Akron and her supervisor Mary Sammon under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Ohio common law. She alleged that her 1995 demotion to Traffic Court Clerk, following her requests for a computer accommodation due to physical issues and her involvement in union and grievance activities, violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as federal disability protections. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissal as to all federal claims. It reasoned that the Akron Municipal Court and its officials acting in an official capacity are not subject to suit under § 1983 due to Eleventh Amendment immunity and because they are not "persons" within the meaning of the statute. The court further found that Mace lacked a protected property interest in her position and that her ADA and other claims were either not properly presented or failed on the merits based on the limited discovery conducted.
The case involved Playboy Enterprises suing the operators of a computer bulletin board service (Rusty-N-Edie’s BBS) for allowing subscribers to upload and download digital copies of copyrighted adult photographs from Playboy Magazine. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on claims of direct and contributory copyright infringement against both the company and its president, finding that the defendants actively encouraged uploads through a credit system, screened files for acceptability, and thereby distributed unauthorized copies to paying customers. The court denied summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim of unfair competition, holding that the plaintiff had not shown the removal of trademarks was material to subscribers’ decisions. The remaining claims were set for trial.
