
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1998-06-03 · cited 12×
The case involved a contract dispute between Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. and Heatway Systems over the supply of rubber hoses for hydronic radiant heating systems, with Goodyear seeking payment and Heatway raising issues about warranties and product defects. The court granted partial summary judgment to Goodyear, ordering payment on Entran III hose contracts from 1995-1996, but found genuine issues of material fact regarding the applicability of disclaimers in Entran II contracts, the disclaimer of implied warranties of fitness, and whether disclaimers failed their essential purpose. It ruled that Goodyear did not disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability because the term "merchantability" was not used, and reserved decision on unconscionability. The reasoning centered on Ohio commercial law governing contract formation, warranty disclaimers, and limitations on liability under the UCC.
business & regulatory
United States v. Lorantffy Care Center
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1998-03-24 · cited 4×
The case concerned the United States' lawsuit against Lorantffy Care Center (LCC), a nonprofit assisted-living facility for elderly Hungarian immigrants, and its individual operators under the Fair Housing Act, alleging a pattern of discrimination against African-American applicants through unequal treatment in inquiries about bed availability and wait times. The court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment that the government had standing to bring the suit, that LCC was not exempt from the FHA despite its religious and ethnic ties to a church, and that the defendants' affirmative defenses—including statute of limitations, res judicata, collateral estoppel, and others—were without merit. It granted summary judgment to the individual defendants on all claims against them personally. The reasoning relied on the text and purpose of the FHA, principles of standing and jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 3614, and the lack of factual or legal support for the asserted defenses.
civil rightsfederal power
Ragsdale v. Unum Life Insurance Co. of America
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1998-03-23 · cited 7×
The case involved John Ragsdale suing Unum Life Insurance under ERISA for additional long-term disability benefits under his employer's policy, claiming he should be classified as physically disabled due to vision impairment, neck/back injuries, and related issues rather than only mentally disabled. The court granted summary judgment to Ragsdale, ruling that Unum erred in denying reclassification to physical disability. The decision was based on medical evidence showing Ragsdale's physical limitations from congenital nystagmus, cervical spine injuries, degenerative arthritis, and inability to use certain medications due to addiction, combined with the policy's provisions allowing benefits until age 65 for physical disabilities versus a 24-month limit for mental illness.
labor & employmenthealthcare
Doe v. New Philadelphia Public Schools Board of Education
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1998-03-12 · cited 3×
The case involved a lawsuit by Jane Roe on behalf of her minor son John Doe against the New Philadelphia Public Schools Board of Education, stemming from a sexual relationship between Doe and his teacher Vicki McCune during the 1994-95 school year. Roe alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 through deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, a hostile educational environment under Title IX, and state-law claims of reckless indifference causing injury. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 claim, finding no evidence of a school policy or custom causing the violation, but denied summary judgment on the Title IX and state-law claims after determining that genuine issues of material fact existed and that Ohio sovereign immunity under R.C. § 2744 did not apply due to statutory duties under R.C. § 2151.421. The court also denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment, allowing the remaining claims to proceed to a jury trial.
civil rightstorts & liability
MacE v. City of Akron
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1998-01-16 · cited 3×
In this case, plaintiff Regina Mace, a former Felony Court Bailiff at the Akron Municipal Court, sued the City of Akron and her supervisor Mary Sammon under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Ohio common law. She alleged that her 1995 demotion to Traffic Court Clerk, following her requests for a computer accommodation due to physical issues and her involvement in union and grievance activities, violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as federal disability protections. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissal as to all federal claims. It reasoned that the Akron Municipal Court and its officials acting in an official capacity are not subject to suit under § 1983 due to Eleventh Amendment immunity and because they are not "persons" within the meaning of the statute. The court further found that Mace lacked a protected property interest in her position and that her ADA and other claims were either not properly presented or failed on the merits based on the limited discovery conducted.
civil rightslabor & employmentfree speechprocedure
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1997-11-25 · cited 19×
The case involved Playboy Enterprises suing the operators of a computer bulletin board service (Rusty-N-Edie’s BBS) for allowing subscribers to upload and download digital copies of copyrighted adult photographs from Playboy Magazine. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on claims of direct and contributory copyright infringement against both the company and its president, finding that the defendants actively encouraged uploads through a credit system, screened files for acceptability, and thereby distributed unauthorized copies to paying customers. The court denied summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim of unfair competition, holding that the plaintiff had not shown the removal of trademarks was material to subscribers’ decisions. The remaining claims were set for trial.
propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory
Swales v. Township of Ravenna
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1997-10-20 · cited 8×
This case involves claims by Kelly and David Swales under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ohio law against the Township of Ravenna, its police department, and Chief Larry Carver, alleging unconstitutional searches, seizures, and related violations during a 1994 drug investigation at a residence. Officers executed an arrest warrant at the property amid surveillance for drug activity, detained and searched the plaintiffs (including a second search of Ms. Swales' cigarette case leading to her arrest), and conducted additional searches of their persons and vehicle. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, finding no merit in certain claims such as those under the Fifteenth Amendment, absolute immunity for the police chief regarding prosecutorial activities, and that the police department is not a separate legal entity, while allowing some Fourth Amendment issues to proceed. The decision rests on analysis of qualified and absolute immunity doctrines, the incorporation of Fourth Amendment protections via the Fourteenth Amendment, and the lack of genuine issues of material fact on dismissed claims.
civil rightscriminal lawprocedure
Ohio Citizen Action v. City of Avon Lake
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1997-09-24 · cited 5×
The case involves Ohio Citizen Action, a nonprofit group that engages in door-to-door canvassing to distribute information and solicit funds on environmental and public health issues, challenging the City of Avon Lake's ordinances under Chapter 840 that require a permit from the police chief for such activities. The ordinances mandate detailed disclosures including personal information, past activities, and criminal history for those soliciting for charitable, religious, or nonprofit purposes, or seeking to influence opinions on social or political matters. Plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief, claiming the scheme violated its First Amendment free speech rights by imposing an unconstitutional prior restraint. The court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff on the issue of liability, holding that the regulations infringed protected speech rights as applied to the plaintiff's activities.
free speechcivil rights
Cooey v. Anderson
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1997-09-04 · cited 19×
The case involved Richard Cooey’s petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 1986 Ohio convictions for two counts of aggravated murder, rape, kidnapping, robbery, and related offenses, as well as his death sentences. After state courts upheld the convictions and sentences on direct appeal and post-conviction review, the district court considered 23 claims of error. The court denied the petition, holding that some claims were procedurally defaulted under state law and thus barred by principles of federalism and comity, while the remaining claims lacked sufficient merit to warrant relief. The decision rested on deference to state-court findings and the absence of grounds for federal intervention.
criminal lawprocedure
Buckeye Community Hope Foundation v. City of Cuyahoga Falls
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1997-06-20 · cited 8×
This case involved plaintiffs, including a nonprofit developer seeking to build low-income housing in Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio, who sued the city and its officials after a citizen referendum blocked issuance of building permits; the plaintiffs alleged violations of due process and equal protection under the Constitution as well as federal fair housing laws. The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding no genuine issues of material fact on the claims. The core reasoning was that the relevant site-plan ordinance and referendum process were facially race-neutral, other non-racial rationales existed for citizen opposition, Sixth Circuit precedent precluded inquiry into the electorate's motives where multiple reasons were possible, and city officials were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions were not clearly unlawful under controlling law.
civil rightspropertyelectionsprocedure
Holmes Limestone Co. v. United States
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1996-11-13 · cited 4×
The case concerned several coal mining companies seeking refunds of overpaid federal excise taxes under 26 U.S.C. §4121, which funds benefits for black lung disease, along with one company's challenge to a civil fraud penalty under §6653(b). The dispute centered on whether the taxable product "coal" included the full weight of run-of-mine (ROM) coal sold with its natural impurities or only the purer coal component. The court ruled that the tax applies to the entire weight of ROM coal at the mine, including impurities, because that reflects the ordinary understanding of "coal" in the industry. It also addressed the fraud penalty claim based on evidence of the company's knowledge and actions regarding filing and payment obligations.
taxesbusiness & regulatory
Rhodes v. Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1996-09-05 · cited 17×
The case involved plaintiff Dru Rhodes, a high school senior with learning disabilities including Attention Deficit Disorder, who sought a preliminary injunction against the Ohio High School Athletic Association (OHSAA) and the Catholic Diocese of Youngstown to allow him to play football in his ninth and tenth semesters of high school enrollment. Rhodes had attended a private academy for one year where he received inadequate accommodations, resulting in poor grades and ineligibility under the OHSAA's eight-consecutive-semester rule, even though he had only competed in seven semesters of athletics. After the OHSAA denied his waiver request, the court evaluated the motion under the four-factor test for preliminary injunctions, focusing on likelihood of success on claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and related Ohio statutes. The court denied the injunction, finding Rhodes unlikely to prevail on the merits because his ineligibility stemmed from neutral application of the rule rather than discrimination based solely on his disability, while also weighing irreparable harm to the plaintiff against harm to other athletes, the association's regulatory goals, and the public interest.
civil rights
Equal Open Enrollment Ass'n v. Board of Education
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1996-08-28 · cited 1×
This case involved a motion by the Equal Open Enrollment Association for a preliminary injunction against the Akron Board of Education's policy barring white students from transferring to adjacent districts under Ohio's open enrollment laws, which the board adopted to preserve racial balance following prior desegregation litigation that left the district with unitary status. The court reviewed the background of the board's efforts to avoid racial disparities, the state statute permitting districts to object to transfers either to maintain appropriate racial balance or based on federal funding thresholds, and the specific policy language prohibiting white student transfers subject to ongoing review. Core reasoning emphasized addressing statutory interpretation questions before any constitutional issues, noting the unique facts presented and the board's interests in funding, enrollment stability, and educational quality alongside its racial balance goals.
civil rights
United States v. Erkard
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1996-07-25 · cited 7×
The case involved the United States seeking repayment on two defaulted Health Education Assistance Loans (HEAL) from defendant James T. Erkard after he failed to make payments, with the government having guaranteed and later acquired the notes through assignment. Erkard defended by asserting that the debt was discharged in his 1989 Chapter 7 bankruptcy, where a default judgment was entered against the loan servicer. The court granted the United States' motion for summary judgment and held Erkard liable for the full amount plus interest. The core reasoning was that the bankruptcy default judgment did not bind the United States under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(e) because the government was not a party, received no notice, and no evidence established the merits of discharge against it, and separately that the United States as guarantor was an unscheduled creditor entitled to notice under the Bankruptcy Code.
federal powerhealthcareprocedure
United States v. Fairways Villas Condominium Ass'n
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1996-01-03 · cited 1×
This case involved a lawsuit brought by the United States on behalf of a handicapped resident of the Fairway Villas Condominiums who alleged that the condominium association and its officers violated the Fair Housing Act by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation in the form of a designated handicap parking space. The defendants denied the allegations in their answer, and the district court initially dismissed the claims before the United States appealed. After mediation in the Sixth Circuit, the parties reached a settlement without any admission of liability, leading the court to enter a consent order that permanently enjoins the defendants from violating the Fair Housing Act or retaliating against handicapped persons exercising their rights, settles all monetary claims, vacates the prior dismissal, and retains jurisdiction for enforcement.
civil rights
Damron v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1995-08-17 · cited 6×
In this case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), plaintiff Robert Heffner, a former railroad employee, sued defendant Norfolk & Western Railway Co. for permanent hearing loss allegedly caused by excessive workplace noise exposure during his decades of service. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that a release Heffner signed as part of a voluntary separation program in 1990 barred the claim, even though he was unaware of the hearing loss at the time. The court denied the motion, holding that the release did not bar the action because there was no evidence it resulted from a full and fair compromise of a claimed liability, as required under FELA section 5 (45 U.S.C. § 55) to avoid functioning as an impermissible exemption from liability.
labor & employmenttorts & liability
Baker v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1995-07-25 · cited 7×
This product liability case arose after plaintiff Donald Burton Baker was injured in 1990 by an exploding multi-piece wheel rim made by defendant Bridgestone/Firestone. The opinion addresses Firestone's renewed motion to disqualify plaintiffs' lead attorney John Hash (and eventually the entire firm) on grounds that Hash improperly obtained Firestone confidences through his friendship with former Firestone in-house counsel Joseph Downs, who had handled rim litigation for the company. After an evidentiary hearing that incorporated new evidence from a related Kansas case in which Hash had already been disqualified, the court applied professional-conduct rules on preserving client confidences and secrets, imputed disqualification, and the burden-shifting effect of a rebuttable presumption to determine whether Hash's access to Downs created a disqualifying taint. The court made detailed findings of fact about the nature and extent of Downs-Hash contacts and set out its conclusions of law on the disqualification motion.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Nahra v. Honeywell, Inc.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1995-05-24 · cited 14×
In Nahra v. Honeywell, Inc., plaintiffs sued the alarm company under state law for property damage to their warehouse, alleging that Honeywell failed to properly monitor or report a suspected break-in after the tenant vacated the premises. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion, granted the defendant's motion in part, and held that any damages would be capped at $2,124 under the clear terms of the parties' service agreement, which limited Honeywell's liability to the annual service charge or $10,000 (whichever is less) even in cases of negligence. The matter was set for trial solely on the question of liability because factual disputes remained about whether Honeywell had provided notice of the break-in. The decision rested on contract interpretation principles recognizing that parties may agree to limit damages for breach or negligence in a commercial service contract.
business & regulatorypropertytorts & liabilityprocedure
Rachel v. Consolidated Rail Corp.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1995-04-04 · cited 9×
This case involves a railroad employee's FELA claim against Consolidated Rail Corp. for personal injuries sustained on the job, with the trial set for April 1995 and pending motions in limine regarding evidence of damages. The court partially granted the defendant's motion to exclude testimony from the plaintiff's expert economist Dr. John Burke, ruling that the expert could account for unpaid household services and need not deduct received disability benefits from lost earnings projections, but could not treat future Tier I and Tier II Railroad Retirement Board tax contributions as lost fringe benefits, consistent with Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt and the Railroad Retirement Act's benefit calculation method at 45 U.S.C. § 231b(b). The court also granted the motion to exclude any reference to a 1984 arbitration decision against the defendant, finding it irrelevant to safety issues and unduly prejudicial under Fed.R.Evid. 403. The core reasoning focused on ensuring damages projections accurately reflected after-tax income and actual lost benefits without tenuous tax-to-benefit links, while barring prior unrelated conduct evidence.
labor & employmentproceduretorts & liabilitytaxes
United States Ex Rel. Woodruff v. Fairways Villas Condominium Ass'n
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1995-03-09 · cited 3×
This case involved a claim by the United States on behalf of Rebecca Woodruff against a condominium association and its officers under the Fair Housing Act, alleging failure to provide a reasonable accommodation by designating a reserved handicap parking space near her unit. Woodruff, who had mobility impairments, repeatedly requested the spot in the common area after purchasing her unit in 1991, but the association did not grant it; she later moved out and sold the unit. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, holding that the association and its board lacked authority to allocate exclusive use of a jointly owned common parking space to one owner. The court reasoned that the association held no ownership interest allowing it to grant such a request, distinguishing the facts from cases where the housing provider controlled the relevant facilities or rules.
civil rightsproperty