Thomas Morrow Reavley

The case involved defendant Juan Jose Ronquillo, who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. The district court imposed the 60-month statutory minimum sentence on each count, to run consecutively, after reviewing the presentence report, the defendant's criminal history involving aliases and failures to appear, and the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Ronquillo appealed, arguing that consecutive sentences were unreasonable. The Fifth Circuit reviewed for plain error and affirmed, concluding that the district court had adequately considered the statutory factors, including promoting respect for the law, without improperly relying on unadjudicated arrests.

criminal law

The case involved a dispute between the Texas Turnpike Authority and the City of Fort Worth over Resolution No. 500, which authorized a feasibility study for enlarging the Dallas-Fort Worth Turnpike through new bonds and tolls, rather than transferring it to the state for toll-free operation. The trial court enjoined the Authority from proceeding, finding inadequate notice under the Texas Open Meetings Act and a breach of prior agreements with the City and Tarrant County regarding the turnpike's transfer. While the appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted a bill mandating the transfer effective December 31, 1977, which mooted most issues, but the Texas Supreme Court addressed the resolution's prior validity. The Court held that the meeting notice sufficiently described the subject under the Open Meetings Act without needing to detail all potential outcomes or deviations from prior intentions, and that the Authority had no binding contractual obligation to transfer the turnpike without improvements. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment, dissolved the injunction, and rendered judgment in favor of the Turnpike Authority.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns the validity of a 1958 royalty deed executed by a successor trustee over land placed in court receivership without obtaining court approval or confirmation. The receivers filed suit for a declaratory judgment to nullify the deed's effect on their control of the property and distribution of proceeds. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals and held, with modification, that the deed had no force or effect to the extent it interfered with the receivers' powers, because property under receivership is in custodia legis and cannot be conveyed without court approval. The court reasoned that private transfers would undermine the receivership's goals of conservation and equitable management, though the grantee might retain rights against the original grantors that do not disrupt the proceeding.

propertyprocedure

In Sears v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., a depositor sued the bank after it withdrew $431,305.11 from his account to apply toward a promissory note signed by the depositor and two others. The trial court directed a verdict for the bank, which the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial. The court noted that the bank-depositor relationship is that of debtor and creditor, allowing the bank a right of setoff, but held that the bank must prove the underlying indebtedness when the depositor challenges the withdrawal. Because no such proof was offered, the directed verdict was improper.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerned a 1950 deed that reserved to the grantor a one-fourth interest in 'all oil, gas and other minerals on and under' certain Texas land; the dispute was whether that reservation included coal and lignite, especially lignite near the surface that would require strip or open-pit mining. The trial court granted summary judgment declaring the surface owner entitled to all such coal and lignite removable by those methods, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded, finding the proof insufficient. The Texas Supreme Court agreed that summary judgment was improper and that the case should proceed to trial. It reaffirmed its 1971 decision in Acker v. Guinn, under which a general mineral reservation does not include substances that would have to be extracted by destroying the surface estate, and held that the surface owner therefore owns the lignite that must be removed by strip mining. The court declined to revisit the Acker rule because parties had relied on it in subsequent transactions.

property

The case concerned a dispute over the scope of a 1958 deed in which James and Jack Blackmon conveyed their interests in their mother Cathalene Parker's estate to their stepfather Gaines Parker. Under the mother's will, Parker received her property but the sons were to receive her share of proceeds if Parker later sold the family home. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's declaratory judgment, construing the deed to transfer all of the sons' interests—including any contingent claim to sale proceeds—and vesting full fee simple title in Parker. The court reasoned that interests in an estate, even if contingent or expectant, may be effectively conveyed by deed, and that the trial judge's findings and intent supported Parker's complete ownership without reservation of future claims.

property

This case involved Vivian Goffney, whose parental rights to her two children were terminated by a final judgment in Harris County Juvenile Court. She filed an affidavit of inability to pay appeal costs under Rule 355, but the trial court sustained the clerk's contest after a hearing, finding she could potentially borrow from her cousin or sell a record player. The Texas Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, holding that the trial court's own fact findings showed Goffney was destitute and dependent on public and private charity, so any possible loan would be non-repayable charity rather than a bona fide means to pay costs. The court reasoned that Texas law protects indigent litigants from being denied the right to appeal merely because they cannot secure funds without depriving themselves or their families of necessities, and Rule 355 requires only proof of the applicant's own inability to pay.

family lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved a dispute over a $55,000 mortgage loan secured by liens on several properties, where forged estoppel letters from a prior lienholder led to undisclosed dragnet clauses and higher balances, causing the mortgagee (Northland) to recover nothing after foreclosure by the senior lienholder. Northland sued the title insurer (Southwest Title) for breach of the mortgagee title policy and for violation of closing conditions requiring valid estoppel letters before disbursing funds. The Texas Supreme Court held that Southwest Title breached the policy terms through its agent's actions but severed and reversed the judgment on the policy claim, remanding it because Northland failed to prove its actual loss from the title defect (such as by showing the value of additional secured properties or limiting recovery to the policy amount of $55,000 or the unpaid debt). The court affirmed judgments on the remaining claims against other parties, noting that the policy insured only against defects in security title, not the underlying note payment itself.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a hospital's petition for a writ of mandamus to block a trial court's discovery order requiring production of minutes from pediatric, medical staff, and board meetings in a personal injury suit alleging that an infant was blinded by excessive oxygen during treatment. The Supreme Court of Texas examined Article 4447d, section 3, which declares hospital committee records and proceedings confidential and unavailable for subpoena, subject to an exception for records made in the regular course of business. Interpreting the statute in context with the rest of the article on health data reporting, the court held that the privilege applies only to information furnished under the act's study and reporting provisions and does not shield the requested minutes from discovery in the underlying tort action.

procedurehealthcaretorts & liability

The case concerned disputes over contracts for exclusive water and sewer service rights within a 100-acre tract, involving Clear Lake Utilities Co., Clear Lake Water Authority, and successor landowner Clear Lake Apartments, Inc. Utilities sought declaratory judgments upholding its contracts and damages for conspiracy and interference, while the Authority challenged the contracts' validity and Apartments contested being bound by an exclusive service provision. The court held that the 1966 contract between Utilities and the Authority was valid and binding until terminated by the Authority's 1975 notice, that Apartments was not bound by the 1967 exclusive service contract with its predecessor, and that Utilities could not recover damages. It further ruled that other landowners need not be joined as parties for adjudication of the main controversy between Utilities and the Authority. The decision rested on contract interpretation, the terminable nature of the agreements, rules regarding covenants running with the land, and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39 on joinder.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involved a products liability claim by Robert Hopkins against General Motors after he was injured when his 1970 Chevrolet truck veered off the road, which he attributed to a defective quadrajet carburetor whose secondary valves locked open due to a faulty lock-out mechanism. The jury found the carburetor was defectively designed, that the defect was a producing cause of the accident, and also that Hopkins had misused the carburetor by altering it during removal and reinstallation, which was likewise a producing cause. The trial court disregarded the misuse findings and entered judgment for Hopkins; the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, ruling that misuse serving only as a concurring cause does not bar recovery against the manufacturer of a defective product. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Hopkins, holding that the evidence supported the defect and causation findings and that the misuse findings did not provide a defense under the circumstances.

torts & liability

This case involved public entities, including school districts and a hospital district, challenging the City of San Antonio's inclusion of payments to its general fund in utility rates for gas and electricity from its municipally owned systems, as well as automatic fuel adjustment charges. The trial court ruled these charges invalid as an illegal tax and improper delegation, awarding recovery of payments, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the payments were authorized by statute and the trust indenture governing the utilities, and that the fuel adjustment mechanism was a valid computation of rates based on costs without unlawful delegation of authority, since the overall rates were not challenged as unreasonable.

business & regulatorytaxes

The case concerned the constitutionality of Texas's Sunday closing law under Art. 9001, which prohibits the sale of certain enumerated merchandise on consecutive Saturdays and Sundays. Appellants, Gibson Products, challenged the law on equal protection and due process grounds after the repeal of broader Sunday closing provisions, arguing it lacked rational basis. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the trial court's injunction against the appellants, holding the statute constitutional. The court reasoned that the law serves the legislative purpose of encouraging weekday shopping for items like clothing and furniture, with exceptions for those closing on Saturday, and found it had a rational relation to public welfare, reaffirming prior precedents.

business & regulatorycivil rights

This case was a trespass to try title suit over 24.744 acres of land fenced together with Calfee's Moorefield homestead property. Calfee acquired a deed to the homestead in 1946 and claimed title to the disputed acres through adverse possession under the ten-year statute, based on his continuous use and belief that the deed included all fenced land. The trial court ruled in Calfee's favor after a non-jury trial, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, finding that Calfee's testimony showed his claim was not adverse. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that Calfee's possession and claim of right satisfied the statutory requirements for adverse possession because he intended to appropriate the land as his own from the time of purchase, regardless of any lack of knowledge about title defects or potential other claimants.

property

The case concerned the jurisdiction of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals after the Texas State Board of Pharmacy and other defendants filed a notice of appeal from a trial court injunction blocking enforcement of statutes regulating prescription drug price advertising, and that notice specified an appeal to the Texas Supreme Court instead. The Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction on the ground that the notice had perfected an appeal only to the named court. The Texas Supreme Court held that the rules do not require a notice of appeal to identify any appellate court and that naming an incorrect one is immaterial surplusage that does not divest jurisdiction, reversing the dismissal and remanding the case for a decision on the merits of the appeal.

procedure

The case concerned an unwed biological father imprisoned since 1973 who sought voluntary legitimation of his infant daughter under the Texas Family Code and appointment as managing conservator after the mother relinquished her parental rights to the Nueces County Child Welfare Unit. The trial court denied the father's petition, finding him unfit and that denial served the child's best interests, and instead designated the welfare unit as managing conservator to enable adoption. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed, ruling that the Code requires court consent for legitimation beyond mere biological paternity and that this discretionary standard, which considers fitness and the child's welfare, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by treating the unwed father differently from a married parent. The court further held that termination of any resulting parental rights need not proceed under the specific grounds of Section 15.02 when the father had not yet obtained parent status.

family lawcivil rights

In Reese v. Piperi, Katherine Reese sought a writ of mandamus to vacate a September 5, 1975 order by Judge Piperi granting a new trial in a divorce case filed in 1974. A default judgment had been entered on May 16, 1975, followed by a motion for new trial on May 23; although the judge indicated at a June 25 hearing that a new trial would be granted if the parties did not resolve their issues by June 30, no written order was signed until September. The Texas Supreme Court held that under Rule 329b of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law 45 days after filing because there was no written agreement extending the deadline, rendering the judgment final 30 days later and depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to grant a new trial. The court reasoned that an oral announcement of future intent does not constitute a timely rendition of judgment and that nunc pro tunc entry could not retroactively validate the late order. The court directed the judge to vacate the September order or face issuance of the writ.

family lawprocedure

This case concerned the ownership of land along the Houston Ship Channel that had gradually subsided below the water level due to underground water removal. Coastal Industrial Water Authority sought to condemn the land owned by W.D. York and others but disputed whether it needed to compensate for 3.353 acres that had become submerged by the time of the taking. The Texas Supreme Court held that York retained title to the submerged land. The court reasoned that title does not pass due to mere submergence from subsidence without erosion or displacement of the soil, distinguishing it from cases of gradual erosion or sudden avulsion where ownership boundaries might change.

property

The case involved Gussie Stoot's personal injury lawsuit against Southern Pacific Transportation Company, filed in 1971 for an alleged injury suffered in 1969 while alighting from a train. After the case languished with minimal activity for years, the trial court dismissed it for want of prosecution under local Galveston County district court rules that automatically placed civil jury cases on a drop docket after two or three years without a trial setting, followed by notice and an opportunity to move for reinstatement. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the dismissal, but the Texas Supreme Court upheld the trial court's action and reinstated the judgment of dismissal. The court reasoned that excessive delay undermines accurate fact-finding and fair adjudication, that the local rules properly enforced parties' duty of diligence, and that Stoot had failed to demonstrate good cause for not advancing the case to trial within the required timeframe.

proceduretorts & liability

Houston Lighting & Power Company sued to invalidate a Railroad Commission order establishing a curtailment program and priority list for natural gas deliveries by United Texas Transmission Company during shortages. The order gave higher priority to residential and certain commercial uses over industrial boiler fuel uses, which reduced the gas Houston Lighting & Power received under its 1964 contract and increased its costs. The trial court upheld the order, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the Commission had statutory authority under Article 6053 and related laws to allocate scarce gas supplies by end use when demand exceeds supply, rather than following contract terms or ratable apportionment, and that the utility's contract was entered subject to existing regulatory powers.

business & regulatory