Follows and clarifies Acker v. Guinn as controlling without revisiting it in [0]; applies established procedural rules without deviation. Reed v. Wylie ↗
Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
The record consists primarily of opinions from the Texas Supreme Court dated 1975-1977, with one opinion from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2007. Cases address civil disputes involving business entities, governmental authorities, property interests, and regulatory agencies, along with limited criminal matters.
Criminal law
Addressed a federal criminal conviction appeal and a state habeas corpus proceeding.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit — appointed by Jimmy Carter
Party: Democratic →B.A., The University of Texas at AustinJ.D., Harvard UniversityJD, Harvard UniversityJD, Austin CollegeJD, Southwestern UniversityJD, Texas Wesleyan UniversityJD, Pepperdine University
The case involved defendant Juan Jose Ronquillo, who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. The district court imposed the 60-month statutory minimum sentence on each count, to run consecutively, after reviewing the presentence report, the defendant's criminal history involving aliases and failures to appear, and the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Ronquillo appealed, arguing that consecutive sentences were unreasonable. The Fifth Circuit reviewed for plain error and affirmed, concluding that the district court had adequately considered the statutory factors, including promoting respect for the law, without improperly relying on unadjudicated arrests.
The case involved a dispute between the Texas Turnpike Authority and the City of Fort Worth over Resolution No. 500, which authorized a feasibility study for enlarging the Dallas-Fort Worth Turnpike through new bonds and tolls, rather than transferring it to the state for toll-free operation. The trial court enjoined the Authority from proceeding, finding inadequate notice under the Texas Open Meetings Act and a breach of prior agreements with the City and Tarrant County regarding the turnpike's transfer. While the appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted a bill mandating the transfer effective December 31, 1977, which mooted most issues, but the Texas Supreme Court addressed the resolution's prior validity. The Court held that the meeting notice sufficiently described the subject under the Open Meetings Act without needing to detail all potential outcomes or deviations from prior intentions, and that the Authority had no binding contractual obligation to transfer the turnpike without improvements. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment, dissolved the injunction, and rendered judgment in favor of the Turnpike Authority.
This case concerns the validity of a 1958 royalty deed executed by a successor trustee over land placed in court receivership without obtaining court approval or confirmation. The receivers filed suit for a declaratory judgment to nullify the deed's effect on their control of the property and distribution of proceeds. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals and held, with modification, that the deed had no force or effect to the extent it interfered with the receivers' powers, because property under receivership is in custodia legis and cannot be conveyed without court approval. The court reasoned that private transfers would undermine the receivership's goals of conservation and equitable management, though the grantee might retain rights against the original grantors that do not disrupt the proceeding.
In Sears v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., a depositor sued the bank after it withdrew $431,305.11 from his account to apply toward a promissory note signed by the depositor and two others. The trial court directed a verdict for the bank, which the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial. The court noted that the bank-depositor relationship is that of debtor and creditor, allowing the bank a right of setoff, but held that the bank must prove the underlying indebtedness when the depositor challenges the withdrawal. Because no such proof was offered, the directed verdict was improper.
This case concerned a 1950 deed that reserved to the grantor a one-fourth interest in 'all oil, gas and other minerals on and under' certain Texas land; the dispute was whether that reservation included coal and lignite, especially lignite near the surface that would require strip or open-pit mining. The trial court granted summary judgment declaring the surface owner entitled to all such coal and lignite removable by those methods, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded, finding the proof insufficient. The Texas Supreme Court agreed that summary judgment was improper and that the case should proceed to trial. It reaffirmed its 1971 decision in Acker v. Guinn, under which a general mineral reservation does not include substances that would have to be extracted by destroying the surface estate, and held that the surface owner therefore owns the lignite that must be removed by strip mining. The court declined to revisit the Acker rule because parties had relied on it in subsequent transactions.
The case concerned a dispute over the scope of a 1958 deed in which James and Jack Blackmon conveyed their interests in their mother Cathalene Parker's estate to their stepfather Gaines Parker. Under the mother's will, Parker received her property but the sons were to receive her share of proceeds if Parker later sold the family home. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's declaratory judgment, construing the deed to transfer all of the sons' interests—including any contingent claim to sale proceeds—and vesting full fee simple title in Parker. The court reasoned that interests in an estate, even if contingent or expectant, may be effectively conveyed by deed, and that the trial judge's findings and intent supported Parker's complete ownership without reservation of future claims.
