The case concerned a condemnation proceeding in which the District of Columbia took land to extend Lamont Street as an improved thoroughfare and assessed $200 in benefits against Georgiana Thompson's lot as a lien. After Thompson paid the assessment following a tax sale and the District failed to build the street extension—leaving the strip unimproved and obstructed—the plaintiff sued in Municipal Court to recover the payment on grounds of failure of consideration. The court affirmed judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the assessment was made in exchange for the street extension, the undisputed facts established the District's abandonment of the project, and this created an implied contractual obligation to repay the funds. Jurisdiction existed because the claim was for debt under an implied contract, and the three-year statute of limitations did not bar the suit since the cause of action accrued upon abandonment rather than at assessment or payment.
This case involved an insurance company's denial of coverage under an automobile liability policy after a 17-year-old driver, operating with the owner's consent, caused an accident resulting in personal injuries. The policy excluded liability when the vehicle was operated by anyone under the age limit fixed by law or under 16. Although no Ohio state statute addressed drivers over 16, a Lakewood city ordinance made it unlawful for an owner to permit a minor under 18 to drive on public streets. The Supreme Court held that the ordinance qualified as fixing an age limit by law within the policy's plain meaning, triggering the exclusion and precluding coverage, and therefore reversed the judgments in favor of the insured.
The case concerned the death of a seaman, Barford, caused by negligence while working on a vessel owned by the United States, and whether his estate's administrator could recover damages under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 when Barford left no qualifying beneficiaries such as a widow, child, parent, or dependent next of kin. The administrator sued the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act, seeking recovery either through the federal statute or, alternatively, under Virginia's death statute or for unseaworthiness of the vessel. The Supreme Court held that Section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act, which incorporates the Federal Employers' Liability Act's provisions on wrongful death, supplies the exclusive remedy for a seaman's death due to negligence and limits recovery solely to the designated beneficiaries; with no such beneficiaries present, no action could be maintained, and state remedies or claims based on unseaworthiness were unavailable. The Court reasoned that the federal statute's structure and prior interpretations made its right of action for the personal representative exclusive, precluding supplementation by state law or other maritime remedies.
The case concerned whether a receiver appointed by an Ohio state court for an Ohio corporation could sue in federal district court in Ohio to recover mortgage bonds or their value from a New York corporation, based on an exchange the receiver claimed was ultra vires. The district court ruled for the receiver after the state court authorized the suit, but the circuit court of appeals dismissed the action, holding that the state court lacked power to authorize a federal suit. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that a receiver duly appointed and authorized by a state court may bring suit in federal court within the appointing court's jurisdiction, as this does not make the receiver a foreign officer acting outside his authority.
This case involved a challenge to an Oregon insurance law requiring fire insurance companies to pay a $500 additional fee to appoint more than two agents in larger cities like Portland. Herbring applied for an agent's license to represent a qualified foreign insurer that already had two agents there, but the Insurance Commissioner denied it because the company had not paid the fee. The state trial court ruled the fee requirement unconstitutional as an interference with the agent's rights, but the Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute validly made payment a condition precedent for the company to appoint an additional agent and that an agent's license rights were contingent on the company's compliance. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the provision regulated the insurance company itself rather than restricting individual agents and that Herbring could not challenge the law based on the company's rights.
This case involves two related patent infringement suits concerning specific claims in a 1921 patent for improvements in latches used in refrigerators. The Supreme Court addressed a conflict between the Seventh and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding whether the latches manufactured by Dent Hardware Co. infringed the patent held by Winters and Crampton. The Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's finding of infringement and reversed the Third Circuit's finding of noninfringement. The reasoning centered on the doctrine of equivalents, concluding that the accused devices performed substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve the same result as the patented invention, despite minor differences in form.
