This case involves Gary Lee Sampson's post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging his federal carjacking convictions and death sentence based on claims including ineffective assistance of counsel, government nondisclosure of evidence, grand jury abuse, and the constitutionality of the carjacking statute and Federal Death Penalty Act. The court granted the government's request for summary dismissal of several claims, such as those alleging counsel's failure to advise a pre-Ring guilty plea, advice to plead guilty after Ring, failure to seek a mistrial over exposed evidence, nondisclosure issues, grand jury misconduct, and statutory/constitutional challenges, because the motion, exhibits, and record conclusively showed no entitlement to relief. However, the court declined to summarily dismiss other claims, including those concerning counsel's alleged failure to provide medical records to experts that could have supported additional mitigating evidence of brain abnormality, reasoning that summary dismissal under § 2255 Rule 4(b) is permitted only when the record plainly demonstrates the movant cannot prevail and that fact-specific claims outside the trial judge's knowledge require further development.
This case involves Gary Lee Sampson's post-conviction challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to his federal conviction and death sentence. The court granted relief on Claim IV, finding that Sampson was denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury and is therefore entitled to a new trial to determine whether the death penalty is justified. Many of Sampson's other claims were summarily dismissed, though several alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence were not dismissed and may become moot if a new sentencing trial occurs. The court has not yet issued a final order and directed the parties to address appealability of its rulings, potential mootness, and the appropriate next steps before any further proceedings.
The case involved Gary Lee Sampson, who pleaded guilty in federal court to carjackings resulting in death and faced a capital sentencing trial under the Federal Death Penalty Act after the government sought execution. Following the jury's verdict imposing the death penalty, Sampson raised a post-trial claim alleging that one juror (referred to as C) was biased and had provided incomplete or misleading responses during the extensive voir dire process designed to ensure impartiality. The court denied relief, holding that the juror had not given a dishonest answer to any material voir dire question, which is a required element for a new trial under the McDonough standard, and that post-verdict events could not support such a claim. The decision emphasized the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury in death penalty cases, where even one biased juror requires vacating a sentence, but found the facts did not meet the legal threshold for relief.
This case involved the convictions of Salvatore DiMasi, former Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, and Richard McDonough for conspiracy to commit honest services mail and wire fraud as well as extortion under color of official right, arising from payments received in exchange for official acts to benefit a software company seeking state contracts. Following their sentencing to eight and seven years in prison respectively, the defendants moved for bail pending appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b). The court denied the motions, concluding that the defendants had not shown a substantial question of law or fact that was likely to result in reversal, a new trial, or a lower sentence. The core reasoning applied precedents such as United States v. Bayko, requiring a close question whose favorable resolution would more probably than not alter the outcome, and found that none of the argued issues, including sufficiency of evidence and trial rulings, met this standard after reviewing the trial record.
In United States v. DiMasi, former Massachusetts House Speaker Salvatore DiMasi, Richard McDonough, and others were charged with conspiracy to commit honest services mail and wire fraud as well as extortion under color of official right, along with related substantive counts, based on allegations that payments from Cognos Corporation were made to DiMasi and associates in exchange for official acts benefiting the company. DiMasi and McDonough were convicted on most counts after a six-week trial while a codefendant was acquitted, prompting their post-trial motions for acquittal under Rule 29 or a new trial under Rule 33 on grounds including erroneous admission of co-conspirator statements, flawed jury instructions, and insufficient evidence. The court denied the motions, holding that its prior evidentiary and instructional rulings were correct, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the verdicts were reasonable such that no miscarriage of justice warranted retrial.
This case involved a post-trial request by the Boston Globe to publicly release the names and addresses of jurors who had convicted former Massachusetts House Speaker Salvatore DiMasi and a co-defendant of public corruption offenses after a seven-week trial. The court granted the request but ordered a one-day delay before disclosure, making the information part of the public record on June 16, 2011. The decision balanced the jurors' interest in privacy and time to decompress following the stressful proceedings against the media's First Amendment right of access to criminal trial information, particularly in cases involving public officials. Relying on precedents such as United States v. Hurley, the court found no ongoing need to withhold identities to protect the fairness of the trial but determined that a short postponement appropriately accommodated both interests.
