Mark Lawrence Wolf

This case involves Gary Lee Sampson's post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging his federal carjacking convictions and death sentence based on claims including ineffective assistance of counsel, government nondisclosure of evidence, grand jury abuse, and the constitutionality of the carjacking statute and Federal Death Penalty Act. The court granted the government's request for summary dismissal of several claims, such as those alleging counsel's failure to advise a pre-Ring guilty plea, advice to plead guilty after Ring, failure to seek a mistrial over exposed evidence, nondisclosure issues, grand jury misconduct, and statutory/constitutional challenges, because the motion, exhibits, and record conclusively showed no entitlement to relief. However, the court declined to summarily dismiss other claims, including those concerning counsel's alleged failure to provide medical records to experts that could have supported additional mitigating evidence of brain abnormality, reasoning that summary dismissal under § 2255 Rule 4(b) is permitted only when the record plainly demonstrates the movant cannot prevail and that fact-specific claims outside the trial judge's knowledge require further development.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves Gary Lee Sampson's post-conviction challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to his federal conviction and death sentence. The court granted relief on Claim IV, finding that Sampson was denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury and is therefore entitled to a new trial to determine whether the death penalty is justified. Many of Sampson's other claims were summarily dismissed, though several alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence were not dismissed and may become moot if a new sentencing trial occurs. The court has not yet issued a final order and directed the parties to address appealability of its rulings, potential mootness, and the appropriate next steps before any further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved Gary Lee Sampson, who pleaded guilty in federal court to carjackings resulting in death and faced a capital sentencing trial under the Federal Death Penalty Act after the government sought execution. Following the jury's verdict imposing the death penalty, Sampson raised a post-trial claim alleging that one juror (referred to as C) was biased and had provided incomplete or misleading responses during the extensive voir dire process designed to ensure impartiality. The court denied relief, holding that the juror had not given a dishonest answer to any material voir dire question, which is a required element for a new trial under the McDonough standard, and that post-verdict events could not support such a claim. The decision emphasized the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury in death penalty cases, where even one biased juror requires vacating a sentence, but found the facts did not meet the legal threshold for relief.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the convictions of Salvatore DiMasi, former Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, and Richard McDonough for conspiracy to commit honest services mail and wire fraud as well as extortion under color of official right, arising from payments received in exchange for official acts to benefit a software company seeking state contracts. Following their sentencing to eight and seven years in prison respectively, the defendants moved for bail pending appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b). The court denied the motions, concluding that the defendants had not shown a substantial question of law or fact that was likely to result in reversal, a new trial, or a lower sentence. The core reasoning applied precedents such as United States v. Bayko, requiring a close question whose favorable resolution would more probably than not alter the outcome, and found that none of the argued issues, including sufficiency of evidence and trial rulings, met this standard after reviewing the trial record.

criminal law

In United States v. DiMasi, former Massachusetts House Speaker Salvatore DiMasi, Richard McDonough, and others were charged with conspiracy to commit honest services mail and wire fraud as well as extortion under color of official right, along with related substantive counts, based on allegations that payments from Cognos Corporation were made to DiMasi and associates in exchange for official acts benefiting the company. DiMasi and McDonough were convicted on most counts after a six-week trial while a codefendant was acquitted, prompting their post-trial motions for acquittal under Rule 29 or a new trial under Rule 33 on grounds including erroneous admission of co-conspirator statements, flawed jury instructions, and insufficient evidence. The court denied the motions, holding that its prior evidentiary and instructional rulings were correct, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the verdicts were reasonable such that no miscarriage of justice warranted retrial.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a post-trial request by the Boston Globe to publicly release the names and addresses of jurors who had convicted former Massachusetts House Speaker Salvatore DiMasi and a co-defendant of public corruption offenses after a seven-week trial. The court granted the request but ordered a one-day delay before disclosure, making the information part of the public record on June 16, 2011. The decision balanced the jurors' interest in privacy and time to decompress following the stressful proceedings against the media's First Amendment right of access to criminal trial information, particularly in cases involving public officials. Relying on precedents such as United States v. Hurley, the court found no ongoing need to withhold identities to protect the fairness of the trial but determined that a short postponement appropriately accommodated both interests.

criminal lawfree speech

In Turner v. City of Boston, plaintiffs including former City Councilor Charles Turner sought a preliminary injunction to halt special elections scheduled to fill his District 7 seat following his removal from office. The court denied the motion, finding that Turner's federal prison sentence for extortion and false statements automatically vacated his position under Massachusetts law, making the elections necessary. The decision emphasized that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, that delaying the elections would harm the public interest by leaving constituents unrepresented, and that equitable factors weighed against granting relief given the circumstances of Turner's conviction.

electionscriminal law

This case concerns the removal of Boston City Councilor Charles Turner from office following his federal felony conviction, after the Council adopted Rule 40A allowing expulsion for conduct unbecoming a member by a two-thirds vote. Turner and fifteen voters sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the Council's action exceeded its authority under the city charter and state law, thereby violating Turner's rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause and the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the voters' rights against disenfranchisement. The court denied an injunction against the special elections to fill the seat, as Turner's subsequent prison sentence automatically vacated the position under Massachusetts law, but the damages claims remain pending. It decided to certify two questions of state law to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on whether the Council had authority to remove Turner via Rule 40A and to stay the federal case pending that response. The reasoning is that authoritative state court rulings on these issues may obviate the need to decide the federal constitutional questions.

electionscriminal lawcivil rights

The case concerns Boston City Councillor Charles Turner, who was convicted of bribery in federal court; the City Council then expelled him under a newly adopted Rule 40A before his sentencing, prompting Turner and constituents to sue in federal court alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as an Ex Post Facto Clause violation because Rule 40A allegedly imposed a criminal sanction not in place at the time of his conduct. The court did not rule on the merits or the requested injunction against special elections but instead indicated its intent to either abstain or certify unsettled state-law questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. The core reasoning is that whether the Council had authority under state law to enact and apply Rule 40A, and whether the rule is civil or criminal, are uncertain issues whose resolution could eliminate the need to decide the federal constitutional claims, consistent with principles of federalism and separation of powers under precedents like Pullman abstention.

electionscriminal lawcivil rightsfederal power

The case involved a claim by Susan Hassett that Elisabeth Hasselbeck and her publisher infringed the copyright in Hassett's book "Living with Celiac Disease" by publishing "The G Free Diet," which allegedly copied facts, ideas, and phrases from the plaintiff's work. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that there was no substantial similarity between the two books once unprotected elements were excluded. The reasoning centered on the principle that copyright law protects only original expression, not facts, ideas, or compilations of unoriginal material, and a comparison showed that the works did not share protectable similarities in their expression or arrangement.

property

This case concerns Gary Sampson's amended motion for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging aspects of his federal conviction and sentence. The court scheduled and structured an August 30, 2010 hearing to first address whether any claims should be summarily dismissed under Rule 4(b) of the § 2255 Rules, beginning with discussion of the applicable legal standard from cited First Circuit precedents and then turning to the merits of discrete claims such as ineffective assistance of counsel. The order notes that claims involving matters outside the original trial record may proceed to discovery, record expansion under Rules 6 and 7, or evidentiary hearings under Rule 8 if not dismissed, and directs the parties to confer on the sequence and timing of those steps.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Gonzalez, the defendant faced charges of being a felon in possession of two firearms and possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, both found during execution of a search warrant at his mother's home. The court considered a motion to suppress the evidence after hearing multiple days of testimony regarding events at the scene. The court allowed the motion in part, suppressing the defendant's incriminating statements and the physical evidence derived from them because the government did not prove the statements were made after a knowing and voluntary waiver of Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda. The core reasoning focused on the defendant's dazed and injured state during questioning, inadequate Miranda warnings, and coercive police actions including a punch to the stomach, which together rendered any waiver involuntary.

criminal lawgunscivil rightsprocedure

This case involved federal criminal charges against Salvatore F. Dimasi and other defendants for honest services fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 1346. Following the Supreme Court's June 2010 decisions in Skilling v. United States, Weyhrauch v. United States, and Black v. United States, which interpreted the scope of honest services fraud, the district court addressed the defendants' pending motions to dismiss those charges. The court did not rule on the motions but instead ordered the parties to confer and set a new briefing schedule, directing defendants to either withdraw the motions or file renewed ones by July 30, 2010, that address the implications of the Supreme Court rulings. The government was to respond by August 30, 2010, with replies due by September 24, 2010. This procedural order was issued to allow the parties to incorporate the new precedent into their arguments.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendants Nicholas Djokich and Eginardo DeAngelis, who were charged with conspiracy to commit kidnapping and conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire based on a plot hatched in Canada targeting a Canadian citizen in the Bahamas. Djokich moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that government agents and an informant engaged in outrageous misconduct by manufacturing federal jurisdiction through meetings in Boston and suggestions to shift the crime to Florida. The court denied the motion after trial, in which Djokich was convicted and DeAngelis was acquitted. The decision rested on findings that the government merely offered an opportunity without coercion, abuse, or other extreme conduct, and that the defendant was predisposed to commit crimes involving the United States.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Jones, the defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, and the government failed to disclose exculpatory information to the defense despite prior court orders and local rules on discovery. The court had previously directed Assistant U.S. Attorney Suzanne Sullivan and the U.S. Attorney to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for this and similar violations. After deferring the sanctions decision for several months to allow for remedial actions, the court decided not to sanction Sullivan or the office. The reasoning was that Sullivan's ongoing efforts, new training programs developed with input from prosecutors and defense counsel, and initiatives by the new U.S. Attorney and Attorney General Holder sufficiently reduced the risk of future violations, with the original error having been unintentional rather than deliberate.

criminal lawprocedure

In Kelly v. Cort Furniture, plaintiff Mary Kelly brought a state law handicap discrimination claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B against her former employer after her termination, which followed an unannounced absence to obtain hospital treatment for a back condition; she also asserted claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court denied summary judgment on the discrimination claim after finding genuine issues of material fact as to whether Kelly was terminated because of her handicap. The court granted summary judgment on the emotional distress claims, concluding they were preempted by the Massachusetts Workers’ Compensation Act.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In this case, plaintiff Carl Chiaretto brought a state law age discrimination claim against his former employer Starwood Hotels under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B, alleging that his termination from a bartending position following a November 2005 workplace incident was motivated by age bias. The court adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to grant Starwood's motion for summary judgment. The core reasoning was that the decisionmakers, General Manager Michael Jorgensen and Director of Human Resources Kenia Franco, had no evidence of age-based motivation, as any alleged bias from supervisor Donna Filippetti was not connected to the termination, which was instead based on independent reports of insubordination and improper conduct. The court rejected objections regarding the investigation's origin, the severity of discipline, and the disciplinary record, noting that isolated remarks and speculation do not establish discriminatory intent under the applicable burden-shifting framework.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case is a putative class action by Black and Hispanic employees or former employees of the Massachusetts Bay Commuter Rail Company alleging racial discrimination in promotions. The plaintiffs brought claims under Title VII, Massachusetts General Laws ch. 151B, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, asserting both disparate treatment from subjective, standardless promotional decisions by department managers and disparate impact from those practices as well as from certain pre-employment tests used for promotions. All named plaintiffs worked in the Mechanical Department and sought certification of a class of Black and Hispanic employees denied promotions from 2005 onward, seeking injunctive relief, back pay, and damages. The court denied the motion for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the necessary requirements, and stayed the case briefly to allow potential intervention before addressing individual claims.

civil rightslabor & employment

In this criminal case, the government sought to file a sealed ex parte affidavit from a prosecutor to support its opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss the superseding indictment on grounds of grand jury abuse. The court initially permitted the filing without prejudice but later reconsidered after briefing. It denied the motion to file ex parte, holding that there were no compelling circumstances, such as threats to safety or other imminent harm, to justify affirmatively using undisclosed information against the defendants' defense. Relying on First Circuit precedent in United States v. Claudio, the court explained that ex parte submissions are presumptively disfavored when they counter a defendant's claims and may only be used in limited contexts like discovery disputes. The government was ordered to either provide additional information to the defendants or proceed without the court considering the withheld material.

criminal lawprocedure

Erick Joseph Flores-Powell, a lawful permanent resident, has been held in mandatory detention for 22 months under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) while awaiting final resolution of removal proceedings based on his state conviction for marijuana possession with intent to distribute. He filed a habeas corpus petition claiming the detention statute does not apply and that the prolonged detention violates due process. The court held that exhaustion of remedies is unnecessary and that it lacks jurisdiction to decide deportability, but ruled that the extended detention is unreasonable and contravenes the implicit time limits in § 1226(c). The court therefore granted the petition, denied the motion to dismiss, and scheduled a hearing to assess whether Flores is a danger or flight risk so that an appropriate remedy, such as conditional release, could be ordered.

immigrationcriminal lawcivil rights