This case involved the civil forfeiture of Kevin Glenn Kelley's 1997 Pontiac Grand Prix after police found small amounts of controlled substances inside the vehicle, leading to his youthful-offender adjudication for simple possession. The trial court condemned the car as contraband under Alabama's forfeiture statute and awarded it to the Birmingham Police Department, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the forfeiture violated the Excessive Fines Clauses of the Eighth Amendment and the Alabama Constitution because the vehicle's substantial value (estimated at $30,000-$35,000) made the penalty grossly disproportionate to the offense of personal possession, which did not involve dealing or trafficking.
The case involved Jerold and Renaa Hopper suing the Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society and its agent for fraud and deceit, alleging they were induced to replace existing insurance policies with a less valuable new policy under false pretenses about coverage and cash value. The Society moved to compel arbitration under a binding alternative dispute resolution procedure it adopted after the policies were issued and the lawsuit began, citing language in the policies and state law allowing amendments to bind members. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration multiple times, but the Alabama Supreme Court granted the Hoppers' petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the order, determining that no valid and enforceable arbitration agreement existed between the parties.
This case concerned an eminent domain proceeding in which Alabama Power Company condemned an easement across Velpeau Williams's property, with the sole disputed issue being the amount of just compensation owed, particularly whether prejudgment interest must be included for the period of delayed payment. After a jury awarded $44,000 for the easement, the trial court applied an earlier version of Ala. Code § 18-1A-211 to calculate interest at 12% but the Court of Civil Appeals directed use of the amended statute, which the trial court then interpreted on remand as barring any prejudgment interest. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that the amended statute cannot be read to eliminate prejudgment interest because the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment (applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment) and Article XII, § 235 of the Alabama Constitution require that just compensation be the full equivalent of the property taken, which includes interest when payment is not made at the time of the taking.
The case concerned a contract between Fred Lloyd and Gray Brown-Service Mortuary for purchase of a crypt space in a mausoleum, where Lloyd's wife was entombed after her death; employees placed BBs in the crypt and sealed it, but a crack later allowed decomposing bodily fluids to leak into a lower crypt, producing a noxious odor noticed by other visitors. Lloyd sued the mortuary, and a jury returned a general verdict awarding him $2 million in damages. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of remittitur, holding that the evidence could support a substantial compensatory award and that the verdict was not excessive even without a specific allocation between compensatory and punitive damages.
Robin Henry sued her employer Georgia-Pacific and a supervisor for the tort of outrage, alleging she was required to attend one-on-one counseling sessions with an outside consultant who made inappropriate sexual comments and suggestions during hypnosis sessions, and that she was threatened with job loss if she refused to continue after reporting the conduct to supervisors. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence did not create a genuine issue of material fact on whether Georgia-Pacific's actions after learning of the reports amounted to ratification of the consultant's conduct or itself rose to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct required for the tort of outrage, distinguishing the facts from Busby v. Truswal and following Hendley v. Springhill Memorial Hospital.
Daniel Lyles, a switchman employed by the Alabama State Docks Terminal Railway, sued the Railway under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) and the Safety Appliance Act (SAA) after he was injured when a train he was riding suddenly stopped and threw him off, allegedly due to negligent braking by the engineer or a defect in the air brake system, along with a faulty radio that hindered communication. The trial court entered summary judgment for the Railway, finding no genuine issue of material fact. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that Lyles presented substantial evidence from which a factfinder could infer either that the engineer negligently caused the train to go into emergency braking or that a defect in the brake line caused the sudden stop, creating triable issues under FELA and SAA standards that liberally protect railroad workers. The court applied federal common-law negligence elements and SAA requirements for effective brakes, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to Lyles, and remanded the case.