Mark Kennedy

This case involved the civil forfeiture of Kevin Glenn Kelley's 1997 Pontiac Grand Prix after police found small amounts of controlled substances inside the vehicle, leading to his youthful-offender adjudication for simple possession. The trial court condemned the car as contraband under Alabama's forfeiture statute and awarded it to the Birmingham Police Department, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the forfeiture violated the Excessive Fines Clauses of the Eighth Amendment and the Alabama Constitution because the vehicle's substantial value (estimated at $30,000-$35,000) made the penalty grossly disproportionate to the offense of personal possession, which did not involve dealing or trafficking.

criminal lawproperty

The case involved Jerold and Renaa Hopper suing the Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society and its agent for fraud and deceit, alleging they were induced to replace existing insurance policies with a less valuable new policy under false pretenses about coverage and cash value. The Society moved to compel arbitration under a binding alternative dispute resolution procedure it adopted after the policies were issued and the lawsuit began, citing language in the policies and state law allowing amendments to bind members. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration multiple times, but the Alabama Supreme Court granted the Hoppers' petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the order, determining that no valid and enforceable arbitration agreement existed between the parties.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case concerned an eminent domain proceeding in which Alabama Power Company condemned an easement across Velpeau Williams's property, with the sole disputed issue being the amount of just compensation owed, particularly whether prejudgment interest must be included for the period of delayed payment. After a jury awarded $44,000 for the easement, the trial court applied an earlier version of Ala. Code § 18-1A-211 to calculate interest at 12% but the Court of Civil Appeals directed use of the amended statute, which the trial court then interpreted on remand as barring any prejudgment interest. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that the amended statute cannot be read to eliminate prejudgment interest because the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment (applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment) and Article XII, § 235 of the Alabama Constitution require that just compensation be the full equivalent of the property taken, which includes interest when payment is not made at the time of the taking.

propertycivil rightsprocedure

The case concerned a contract between Fred Lloyd and Gray Brown-Service Mortuary for purchase of a crypt space in a mausoleum, where Lloyd's wife was entombed after her death; employees placed BBs in the crypt and sealed it, but a crack later allowed decomposing bodily fluids to leak into a lower crypt, producing a noxious odor noticed by other visitors. Lloyd sued the mortuary, and a jury returned a general verdict awarding him $2 million in damages. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of remittitur, holding that the evidence could support a substantial compensatory award and that the verdict was not excessive even without a specific allocation between compensatory and punitive damages.

torts & liabilityproperty

Robin Henry sued her employer Georgia-Pacific and a supervisor for the tort of outrage, alleging she was required to attend one-on-one counseling sessions with an outside consultant who made inappropriate sexual comments and suggestions during hypnosis sessions, and that she was threatened with job loss if she refused to continue after reporting the conduct to supervisors. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence did not create a genuine issue of material fact on whether Georgia-Pacific's actions after learning of the reports amounted to ratification of the consultant's conduct or itself rose to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct required for the tort of outrage, distinguishing the facts from Busby v. Truswal and following Hendley v. Springhill Memorial Hospital.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

Daniel Lyles, a switchman employed by the Alabama State Docks Terminal Railway, sued the Railway under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) and the Safety Appliance Act (SAA) after he was injured when a train he was riding suddenly stopped and threw him off, allegedly due to negligent braking by the engineer or a defect in the air brake system, along with a faulty radio that hindered communication. The trial court entered summary judgment for the Railway, finding no genuine issue of material fact. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that Lyles presented substantial evidence from which a factfinder could infer either that the engineer negligently caused the train to go into emergency braking or that a defect in the brake line caused the sudden stop, creating triable issues under FELA and SAA standards that liberally protect railroad workers. The court applied federal common-law negligence elements and SAA requirements for effective brakes, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to Lyles, and remanded the case.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityfederal powerprocedure

The case involved a default judgment in a wrongful death lawsuit arising from a traffic accident where Neil Cansler was killed after his tractor was struck by a car driven by Terence Sampson. The estate sued the Sampsons for negligence and negligent entrustment, and after the defendants failed to respond, a $5 million default judgment was entered. The trial court denied the Sampsons' motion under Rule 60(b)(6) to set aside the judgment, finding their inaction negligent and no meritorious defense. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendants presented evidence of a meritorious defense regarding fault in the accident, that any prejudice to the plaintiff was not substantial, and that their conduct, while negligent, was not willful or in bad faith, thus warranting relief under the Kirtland factors.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned the employment classification of division chief positions at the Alabama Department of Economic and Community Affairs (ADECA), specifically whether they were merit system (classified) positions or unclassified/exempt. It arose from a 1993 settlement agreement under Governor Folsom that reclassified the positions as merit system roles effective 1996, which was challenged in 1996 by Governor James and current division chiefs as invalid. The trial court dismissed the challenge, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the positions are unclassified under the relevant statutes and that a private settlement agreement cannot alter statutory classifications or displace the legislature's authority to enact laws on civil service matters.

labor & employmentprocedure

In this case, W. Fred Pennington sued chiropractor Dr. Melvin Mashner for the tort of outrage and breach of an implied contract, alleging that Mashner conducted an affair with Pennington's wife during billed chiropractic appointments. The trial court ruled that the Alabama Medical Liability Act did not apply to the claims, but the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed that decision on appeal. The court held that a 1996 legislative supplement extending the Act to chiropractors governs all actions filed after its effective date of May 17, 1996, regardless of when the underlying cause of action accrued, and this suit was filed in 1997. The reasoning drew on the statute's text excluding only pending cases and contrasted it with prior precedent on the Act's temporal reach.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure

Billy Thomas, an inmate at Limestone Correctional Facility, petitioned the circuit court for medical treatment for symptoms including head and chest pains, alleging inadequate response from prison medical staff, and sought to proceed in forma pauperis by filing affidavits of substantial hardship. The trial court denied the in forma pauperis requests without inquiry and dismissed the petitions, including one ruling that it lacked jurisdiction. The Alabama Supreme Court granted Thomas's petition for a writ of mandamus in part, concluding that the circuit court erred in denying in forma pauperis status without investigating indigency and in ruling on the merits of the petition after such a denial, as it then lacked jurisdiction; the court directed the circuit court to allow Thomas to proceed without a docket fee unless he is determined not to be indigent.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case concerns a petition for certiorari in a capital murder prosecution where the trial court instructed the jury before closing arguments in the sentencing phase, a practice the Court of Criminal Appeals had deemed non-reversible error. The Alabama Supreme Court denied the petition but expressly declined to endorse the lower court's holding on that issue. It pointed to Rule 21.1 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure and Alabama Code § 13A-5-46(d), both of which require jury instructions after the parties complete their arguments. The court reasoned that this sequence ensures the trial judge is the last voice heard by the jury, directing attention to the law and allowing time to set aside emotional elements of counsel's arguments before deliberations begin.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the Water Works and Sewer Board of Birmingham seeking to overturn a trial court order compelling production of documents related to settlement negotiations between the Board and the Attorney General. The underlying dispute was a declaratory judgment action over whether the Board's approximately $806,000 in charitable expenditures were within its corporate powers and served a public purpose, with intervenor Wallace realigned as a plaintiff seeking discovery of the negotiation materials to check for collusion or concessions of liability. The Alabama Supreme Court granted the writ and vacated the discovery order. It reasoned that settlement communications are not discoverable without a particularized showing of relevance to independently admissible evidence, as they are protected from use to prove liability under principles akin to Rule 408 of the Alabama Rules of Evidence and prior precedent discouraging disclosure of compromise negotiations.

procedure

This case concerned multiple construction contracts between the City of Birmingham and contractor BRIC for street and sidewalk projects, where BRIC alleged the City breached the contracts, negligently supervised work, breached an implied warranty, and intentionally interfered with BRIC's business relationship with its surety USFG. A jury awarded BRIC damages totaling over $350,000 across the claims. The City appealed, arguing it was immune from the intentional-interference claim under Alabama Code § 11-47-190, that certain verdicts were inconsistent, and that an additur was improper. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the City had waived its statutory immunity defense by failing to raise it in pleadings or at trial, that other arguments were either unsupported by authority or lacked merit, and that the trial court committed no error in its evidentiary or damages rulings.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a class action by Alabama borrowers against United Companies Lending Corporation alleging that the lender violated the Mini-Code by charging 8% points on 1991 mortgage loans, exceeding the 5% statutory limit then in effect. The plaintiffs sought damages under the version of § 5-19-19 in force when the loans were made, the complaint filed in 1994, and the class certified. After the Legislature amended the statute in 1996 to reduce recoverable damages, the trial court ruled on interlocutory appeal that retroactive application would violate Alabama Constitution Article I §§ 13 and 22 and Article IV § 95 by impairing contract remedies and taking away existing causes of action after suit had begun. The Supreme Court addressed whether the amendment could constitutionally reduce the plaintiffs' damages, focusing on the constitutional protections against ex post facto impairment of remedies for contracts consummated and litigated before the change.

business & regulatory

The case involved plaintiffs who sued Tri-Star Development Corporation and related parties for breach of contract, negligence, warranty violations, and fraud arising from the construction and sale of homes, with additional claims against Colonial Bank and Colonial Mortgage Company. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on a provision in warranty booklets from Residential Warranty Corporation that were mailed to the plaintiffs after the home purchases closed, and the trial court granted the motion. The plaintiffs petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to reverse that order, arguing they had never agreed to arbitration because no signed documents referenced the provision and that the defendants had waived any right to arbitrate by participating in litigation. The court examined whether the parties had formed an agreement to arbitrate, noting that none of the original contracts mentioned arbitration and rejecting the attempt to incorporate the unsigned booklet by reference. The court concluded that the trial court erred in compelling arbitration.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerns a father's petition to modify a 1991 divorce decree that awarded joint custody of the child with the mother as primary custodian, seeking to make him the primary or equal custodian. The trial court denied the petition under the McLendon standard, which requires the moving party to show that a custody change would materially promote the child's welfare, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed without opinion. The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari review without an opinion. In dissent, Justice Maddox argued that the initial joint-custody order meant the McLendon standard did not apply and that the less burdensome best-interest standard from Ex parte Couch should govern instead.

family law

The case involved defendants Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., and Ann Holman appealing the trial court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration. The Alabama Supreme Court dismissed the appeal ex mero motu because the notice of appeal was filed on June 21, 1997, well after the 42-day appeal period had expired following the trial court's March 5, 1997, denial of the defendants' Rule 59(e) motion. The core reasoning was that the trial court's later June 1997 orders purporting to set aside and re-deny the Rule 59(e) motion had no legal effect under Rules 60(a) or 60(b), as there was no clerical error or other qualifying circumstance, and procedural rules prohibit using such orders to artificially renew appeal deadlines.

procedure

The case involved Phillip Dillard and his wife suing Pittway Corporation (manufacturer) and Gadsden Fire Extinguisher (seller) under Alabama's Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine after a smoke detector allegedly failed to alarm promptly during a fire at a boarding home, leading to Dillard's injuries while rescuing boarders including his father. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on Dillard's personal-injury claims and his wife's derivative loss-of-consortium claim. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the rescue doctrine permits a rescuer to sue a product manufacturer when a defect creates the peril that prompts the rescue, and that genuine issues of material fact existed because discovery was incomplete and the plaintiffs had presented evidence of potential defects such as an improper obscuration level and a recalled component.

torts & liabilityprocedure

Kenneth Steiner sued AmSouth Bank for negligence, wantonness, conversion, defamation, and breach of fiduciary duty after the bank debited his checking account for debts that had been discharged in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Steiner sought to compel responses to interrogatories asking for the names and addresses of thousands of other bank customers who had both accounts and loans and had filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the prior ten years. The trial court denied the motion to compel after finding the requests overly burdensome, and Steiner petitioned for a writ of mandamus. The Alabama Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that Steiner failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in controlling discovery where compliance would require manual review of over 20,000 records.

proceduretorts & liability

Jeanette Brown sued Brown & Root, Inc., under the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act seeking benefits after her husband died of a dissecting aortic aneurysm while attending a safety meeting at a job site in Texas. The trial court awarded benefits and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and remanded for dismissal, holding that the claim was barred because the plaintiff did not give written notice of a possible work-related connection within 90 days of the death as required by § 25-5-78, and the employer had no actual knowledge that the death was connected to employment since the information available indicated a genetic condition unrelated to work.

labor & employment