This case involved ten commercial airlines suing eighteen California counties for partial refunds of ad valorem personal property taxes paid from 1985 to 1989, alleging violations of former 49 U.S.C. section 1513(d) of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act. The airlines claimed that California's tax system discriminated against them by assessing their property at full market value while underassessing other commercial and industrial property, and by applying a lower assessment ratio to railroad property. The California Supreme Court held that the airlines have a private right of action under the federal statute. It further ruled that the airlines stated a valid claim based on allegations of unequal enforcement of facially neutral tax laws but failed to state a claim regarding the railroad assessment ratio comparison, and it found the section 1983 claim not properly before the court. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed based on these interpretations of federal law.
This case involved plaintiffs who bought land previously leased to Aerojet-General Corporation, which had dumped and burned millions of pounds of toxic wastes including TCE on the property. Plaintiffs sued Aerojet for nuisance and trespass, seeking damages and arguing that the contamination constituted a continuing nuisance that avoided the statute of limitations bar. The California Supreme Court ruled that because plaintiffs presented no substantial evidence that the contamination was subject to remediation at a reasonable cost, the nuisance had to be classified as permanent. Consequently, the three-year statute of limitations for permanent nuisances had expired before the suit was filed, making the claims time-barred and requiring judgment for the defendant.
This case concerns a property developer's challenge to a city's imposition of a $280,000 recreation mitigation fee as a condition for rezoning land previously used as a private tennis club to allow construction of a condominium project. The California Supreme Court held that the Nollan and Dolan standards from the U.S. Supreme Court—requiring an essential nexus and rough proportionality—apply to such monetary exactions under California's Mitigation Fee Act to determine if a regulatory taking has occurred. The court found that a sufficient connection existed between the rezoning's loss of recreational land and the fee's purpose, but the record did not support the specific fee amount as roughly proportional to the development's impacts. It therefore remanded the matter to the city for further proceedings to potentially justify or adjust the fee. The opinion emphasizes applying heightened scrutiny to discretionary permit conditions rather than generally applicable regulations.
The case concerned whether recorded covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) limiting property in a subdivision to residential use could be enforced against later buyers whose deeds did not mention the restrictions. The Andersons sought to plant grapes, operate a winery, and keep llamas on their Woodside lots, but neighbors claimed these uses violated the CC&Rs. The California Supreme Court held that the CC&Rs were enforceable. It reasoned that when a declaration establishing a common plan is recorded before any sales, describes the affected property, and states that it binds all purchasers and successors, subsequent buyers with constructive notice are deemed to have agreed to the restrictions. The court therefore reversed the Court of Appeal's contrary ruling.
This case addressed whether Family Code section 7895 requires an appellate court to appoint counsel for an indigent parent who is the respondent in an appeal from a trial court's denial of a petition to terminate parental rights, where the child was not a juvenile court dependent. The stepfather had appealed the denial of his petition alleging abandonment by the father, and the father requested appointed counsel after the Court of Appeal denied it based on the statute's terms. The California Supreme Court held that the statute mandates appointment only for appellants challenging a judgment that frees a dependent child from parental custody and control, as its plain language and history limit the right to that specific context. However, the Court concluded that appellate courts retain discretion to appoint counsel in other parental rights cases and should do so when counsel could reasonably affect the outcome, remanding for the Court of Appeal to exercise that discretion here.
This case involves the penalty phase retrial of defendant John Galen Davenport, who had been convicted in 1980 of first-degree murder with a torture-murder special circumstance for the brutal killing of Gayle Lingle. After the original death sentence was reversed due to instructional errors, a new jury in 1989 again imposed the death penalty, leading to this automatic appeal. The court affirmed the judgment, reviewing the guilt-phase facts including the victim's extensive wounds and evidence linking the defendant's motorcycle to the scene, as well as challenges to jury instructions on reasonable doubt, mitigating factors, and verdict forms. The core reasoning focused on the sufficiency of the evidence, the propriety of the instructions provided at retrial, and the absence of prejudicial error in the penalty determination process.