Armand Arabian

This case involved ten commercial airlines suing eighteen California counties for partial refunds of ad valorem personal property taxes paid from 1985 to 1989, alleging violations of former 49 U.S.C. section 1513(d) of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act. The airlines claimed that California's tax system discriminated against them by assessing their property at full market value while underassessing other commercial and industrial property, and by applying a lower assessment ratio to railroad property. The California Supreme Court held that the airlines have a private right of action under the federal statute. It further ruled that the airlines stated a valid claim based on allegations of unequal enforcement of facially neutral tax laws but failed to state a claim regarding the railroad assessment ratio comparison, and it found the section 1983 claim not properly before the court. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed based on these interpretations of federal law.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryfederal powerproperty

This case involved plaintiffs who bought land previously leased to Aerojet-General Corporation, which had dumped and burned millions of pounds of toxic wastes including TCE on the property. Plaintiffs sued Aerojet for nuisance and trespass, seeking damages and arguing that the contamination constituted a continuing nuisance that avoided the statute of limitations bar. The California Supreme Court ruled that because plaintiffs presented no substantial evidence that the contamination was subject to remediation at a reasonable cost, the nuisance had to be classified as permanent. Consequently, the three-year statute of limitations for permanent nuisances had expired before the suit was filed, making the claims time-barred and requiring judgment for the defendant.

environmentpropertyproceduretorts & liability

This case concerns a property developer's challenge to a city's imposition of a $280,000 recreation mitigation fee as a condition for rezoning land previously used as a private tennis club to allow construction of a condominium project. The California Supreme Court held that the Nollan and Dolan standards from the U.S. Supreme Court—requiring an essential nexus and rough proportionality—apply to such monetary exactions under California's Mitigation Fee Act to determine if a regulatory taking has occurred. The court found that a sufficient connection existed between the rezoning's loss of recreational land and the fee's purpose, but the record did not support the specific fee amount as roughly proportional to the development's impacts. It therefore remanded the matter to the city for further proceedings to potentially justify or adjust the fee. The opinion emphasizes applying heightened scrutiny to discretionary permit conditions rather than generally applicable regulations.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether recorded covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) limiting property in a subdivision to residential use could be enforced against later buyers whose deeds did not mention the restrictions. The Andersons sought to plant grapes, operate a winery, and keep llamas on their Woodside lots, but neighbors claimed these uses violated the CC&Rs. The California Supreme Court held that the CC&Rs were enforceable. It reasoned that when a declaration establishing a common plan is recorded before any sales, describes the affected property, and states that it binds all purchasers and successors, subsequent buyers with constructive notice are deemed to have agreed to the restrictions. The court therefore reversed the Court of Appeal's contrary ruling.

property

This case addressed whether Family Code section 7895 requires an appellate court to appoint counsel for an indigent parent who is the respondent in an appeal from a trial court's denial of a petition to terminate parental rights, where the child was not a juvenile court dependent. The stepfather had appealed the denial of his petition alleging abandonment by the father, and the father requested appointed counsel after the Court of Appeal denied it based on the statute's terms. The California Supreme Court held that the statute mandates appointment only for appellants challenging a judgment that frees a dependent child from parental custody and control, as its plain language and history limit the right to that specific context. However, the Court concluded that appellate courts retain discretion to appoint counsel in other parental rights cases and should do so when counsel could reasonably affect the outcome, remanding for the Court of Appeal to exercise that discretion here.

family lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involves the penalty phase retrial of defendant John Galen Davenport, who had been convicted in 1980 of first-degree murder with a torture-murder special circumstance for the brutal killing of Gayle Lingle. After the original death sentence was reversed due to instructional errors, a new jury in 1989 again imposed the death penalty, leading to this automatic appeal. The court affirmed the judgment, reviewing the guilt-phase facts including the victim's extensive wounds and evidence linking the defendant's motorcycle to the scene, as well as challenges to jury instructions on reasonable doubt, mitigating factors, and verdict forms. The core reasoning focused on the sufficiency of the evidence, the propriety of the instructions provided at retrial, and the absence of prejudicial error in the penalty determination process.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Alfredo Alvarado Padilla, who was charged with first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and solicitation of murder in connection with the 1988 killing of Esther Alvarado by Jesse Hernandez near Modesto, California. The prosecution's theory was that Padilla and Brenda Prado solicited Hernandez to commit the murder in revenge for a drug theft, in exchange for narcotics, with a special circumstance allegation of murder for financial gain. At trial, the state relied on witness testimony about prior conflicts, motive, and events on the night of the murder, including accounts from Anthony Ybarra. On appeal, the California Supreme Court addressed claims regarding jury instructions on aider and abettor liability for foreseeable consequences, the admissibility of certain evidence, and other procedural matters, and affirmed the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

In Adams v. Paul, the plaintiff sued her former attorney for legal malpractice, alleging he gave incorrect advice about filing deadlines for a wrongful death claim against her ex-husband's estate, leading her to settle the underlying action for less after the statute of limitations defense was raised. The trial court sustained a demurrer, finding the malpractice suit time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 because actual injury occurred when the underlying statute expired or when she opposed summary judgment. The California Supreme Court held that in missed statute cases, the determination of when the plaintiff sustained actual injury for purposes of the malpractice limitations period is generally a question of fact that depends on the specific circumstances, and may be resolved as a matter of law only if the material facts are undisputed.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a defendant convicted of perjury under Penal Code section 118 for submitting a false affidavit in support of a restraining order application and making false reports to police. The California Supreme Court addressed whether the element of materiality in a perjury prosecution must be decided by the jury or can be determined by the court as a question of law. The court held that due process and the Sixth Amendment require the jury to determine all elements of the offense, including materiality, reversing prior precedent that treated it as a legal issue for the judge. This conclusion drew on U.S. Supreme Court decisions such as United States v. Gaudin and In re Winship, as well as the court's own analysis in People v. Hedgecock.

criminal lawprocedure

In Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., an automobile wholesaler sued Toyota alleging intentional interference with prospective economic relations after Toyota implemented policies and sanctions to prevent dealers from exporting Lexus vehicles to foreign markets, which disrupted the plaintiff's profitable resale business. The trial court modified the jury instruction to require the plaintiff to prove that Toyota's interference was wrongful by some standard beyond the interference itself, resulting in a defense verdict. The Court of Appeal reversed and ordered a new trial, but the California Supreme Court reversed that ruling and affirmed the judgment for Toyota. The court held that in tort claims for interference with prospective economic advantage, the plaintiff must prove the defendant's conduct was wrongful apart from the fact of interference, drawing on precedent from other states, the Restatement Second of Torts, and policy considerations to balance remedies for predatory acts against protections for legitimate competition.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned ownership of 12 acres of land that had accreted along the tidally influenced, navigable Sacramento River at Chicory Bend, with the State Lands Commission claiming the parcel as former riverbed and the adjacent private landowners claiming it under their deed to the high-tide line. The dispute turned on whether the accretion was natural (which would belong to the upland owners) or artificial (which would remain state property under California's longstanding rule for tidelands and navigable waterways). The Supreme Court reaffirmed that artificially caused accretion stays with the state but held that accretion is artificial only when directly produced by human activities in the immediate vicinity of the land, not by distant or long-ago activities such as hydraulic mining in upstream watersheds or broader river modifications. Applying this standard, the court agreed with the Court of Appeal's result in denying the state's petition for writ of mandate but rejected much of its reasoning.

property

The case concerned whether a lender that made full credit bids to acquire properties at nonjudicial foreclosure sales could still pursue fraud claims against third-party nonborrowers who allegedly induced the original loans through false appraisals, employment verifications, title reports, and other misrepresentations. The California Supreme Court held that the full credit bid rule does not bar such fraud actions as a matter of law. The court reasoned that justifiable reliance on the defendants' fraudulent statements prevents them from asserting the full credit bid as a defense, and that the lender's damages from the fraud could still be recoverable under tort principles even after acquiring the properties. The decision resolved a conflict among lower courts and allowed the lender's claims to proceed beyond the pleading stage.

propertytorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involved anti-abortion activists challenging a permanent injunction that restricted their protest activities, including picketing and sidewalk counseling, at a Planned Parenthood clinic in Vallejo to the sidewalk across the street. The California Supreme Court had previously upheld the injunction in Planned Parenthood I, but the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., which applied a stricter standard for evaluating buffer zones around clinics. After reviewing supplemental briefing and the record of protesters' conduct such as impeding access and approaching patients, the court determined that the injunction complied with the Madsen standard because it was narrowly tailored to address the specific harms at the clinic. The court therefore reaffirmed the judgment upholding the injunction in favor of Planned Parenthood.

abortionfree speech

The case involved a minor and his family who claimed serious injuries from exposure to malathion insecticide sprayed by helicopter over their Los Angeles County neighborhood during a 1989 state-declared emergency to eradicate Mediterranean fruit fly infestations. The plaintiffs sued the chemical manufacturers and distributors, alleging that the companies had a duty to issue additional public health warnings or take other protective steps after learning of alleged deficiencies in the state's notifications. The California Supreme Court held that the defendants owed no such common-law duty to intervene. The court reasoned that recognizing a duty to undermine or supplement the state's emergency warnings would constitute an unprecedented interference with the government's police powers under the Emergency Services Act to respond to conditions of extreme peril. The court therefore affirmed summary judgment for the defendants without reaching the question of federal preemption under FIFRA.

torts & liabilityenvironment

This case involves a habeas corpus petition by Craig Anthony Ross challenging his death sentence after convictions for multiple murders, robberies, and other crimes committed in 1980. The petition claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate and present mitigating character and background evidence at the penalty phase of trial. Following a reference hearing, the referee found that counsel's performance was deficient and that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome, but the California Supreme Court upheld most of the factual findings while rejecting the legal conclusions. The court reasoned that the aggravating circumstances of the crimes were overwhelming and that the omitted evidence would not have created a reasonable probability of a life sentence instead of death. The court therefore discharged the order to show cause and denied the petition.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a suspect, Pele Thomas, who fled from Richmond police officers responding to a report of armed individuals and was struck by a pursuing police vehicle, resulting in quadriplegia. Thomas sued the city and the officer under Vehicle Code section 17001 for negligent operation of a motor vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants based on immunities under Government Code section 845.8 and Vehicle Code section 17004, but the Court of Appeal reversed as to the city. The California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Government Code section 845.8 immunity for injuries caused by fleeing suspects does not shield public entities from liability imposed by Vehicle Code section 17001, even when the individual officer is immune. The core reasoning was that public entity tort liability is statutory, Vehicle Code section 17001 creates an exception to general immunity rules, and section 845.8 does not extend to injuries from the entity's own negligent vehicle operation during pursuits.

torts & liabilitycriminal law

The case involved David Joseph Carpenter's convictions and death sentence for multiple murders and related crimes in Marin County, known as the Trailside Murders. After a separate trial for similar Santa Cruz crimes, Carpenter filed a habeas corpus petition claiming that juror Barbara Durham committed misconduct by discussing the case and being exposed to outside information. The superior court held an evidentiary hearing, credited testimony of misconduct, and vacated the judgment and sentence. On appeal by the Director of Corrections, the court reversed the order, concluding that the record did not support a finding of prejudicial juror misconduct under the applicable standards. The decision rested on an objective assessment of whether any improper influence created a substantial likelihood of bias affecting the verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

In this legal malpractice case, William Daniel consulted attorney Gail Flatt about a potential claim against another lawyer but was informed a week later that her firm could not represent him due to a conflict with an existing client; Daniel later sued Flatt's firm after his claims against the first lawyer were allegedly time-barred, asserting that Flatt had a duty to advise him about the statute of limitations and the need to seek other counsel. The California Supreme Court held that an attorney owes no such advisory duty to a prospective client when representation would create an unwaivable conflict with an existing client, requiring prompt withdrawal to uphold the duty of loyalty. The decision rests on the principle that undivided loyalty to the current client overrides any obligation to assist the second individual once the conflict is identified and the relationship terminated. The court emphasized the holding applies narrowly to situations of mandatory, irremediable conflicts and prompt action by the attorney.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned whether Penal Code section 208(d), which prohibits kidnapping with the intent to commit rape or similar sex offenses, constitutes a separate crime or merely an enhancement to simple kidnapping under section 207(a), and what standard of asportation applies to support a conviction. The defendant had accosted the victim in a parking lot, moved her approximately 105 feet behind a wall to a more secluded area, and attempted to rape her before robbing her. The California Supreme Court ruled that section 208(d) is a distinct offense and that the evidence of asportation was sufficient under the aggravated kidnapping standard, which requires movement for a substantial distance that substantially increases the risk of harm beyond that inherent in the underlying offense. The court reversed the Court of Appeal's contrary judgment on these points.

criminal law

In Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center, a patient sued the hospital and nurse after falling from an emergency room gurney while awaiting treatment, claiming general negligence and premises liability based on the failure to raise both side rails. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants after finding their expert evidence on the standard of care unrebutted, but the Court of Appeal reversed on the ground that the pleadings supported separate theories of ordinary negligence in addition to professional negligence. The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal, holding that ordinary and professional negligence comprise essentially one form of action, with any distinction serving only to identify the applicable standard of care rather than creating independent causes of action from the same facts. The court explained that negligence consists of conduct below the standard of ordinary prudence under the circumstances, and that characterizing the claim as one or the other does not alter substantive liability analysis outside of specific statutory contexts.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare