The case concerned a dispute over fees awarded to special administrators and their attorney in the probate of Colonel J.B. Lankershim's estate. Mr. MacDonald, who served as co-special administrator with the Bank of America and also acted as the bank's attorney, sought compensation solely for legal services after agreeing to waive any administrator fees; the trial court granted the bank $49,387.75 in administrative fees and MacDonald $56,443.15 in attorney fees plus $15,000 for extraordinary services in a claim contest. The Supreme Court affirmed the awards, holding that the objectors (the decedent's children) were estopped from challenging the fees because they had been notified of the arrangement beforehand without objection, and that the total compensation did not exceed limits set by the Probate Code sections on special administrators and attorney fees.
The case involved disciplinary proceedings against attorney Homer C. Mills for alleged professional misconduct in misusing client funds. Charges included his collection of $100 on a client's note, which he applied to personal use before eventually accounting for it, and his use of funds from client Mrs. Gripton intended for litigation costs for his own purposes instead. The Board of Governors recommended disbarment after considering evidence and Mills' prior one-year suspension, and the court reviewed the record under a writ. The court ordered Mills disbarred, finding the evidence supported that he had repeatedly applied client moneys to his own use in violation of his duties, and determining that habitual misuse of such funds requires revocation of the license to practice law.
The case involved a 13-year-old plaintiff who, while spectating in a public balcony of a dance hall owned and operated by the defendants, climbed an unsecured ladder into the attic, walked across a catwalk, and fell through a canvas-covered skylight, suffering injuries. He sued for damages under a theory of attractive nuisance. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants, and the California Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. The court reasoned that property owners owe no duty to keep premises safe for trespassers, the ladder was a common object posing familiar risks rather than an uncommon or alluring device that would attract children, and the plaintiff had entered the restricted area without invitation or temptation.
This case involved a minor plaintiff, through her guardian ad litem, and her father suing a riding school and its operator for personal injuries sustained when the plaintiff was thrown from a rented horse named 'Kolto' during a lesson. The complaint alleged breach of an implied warranty that the horse was suitable and safe for riding, along with negligence, seeking damages for the injuries. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant after specially finding that the horse was not vicious, dangerous, or unsuitable, leading to a judgment in the defendant's favor; the trial court also denied a motion to strike the defendant's cost memorandum. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment and cost order, holding that the verdict was supported by the evidence, that numerous claimed errors and instances of misconduct did not result in a miscarriage of justice, and that the cost bill was properly presented.
This case concerned a plaintiff's petition under California's 1935 Moratorium Act to delay a threatened foreclosure sale of real property secured by a trust deed. The trial court dismissed the petition after defendants objected that it was untimely, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. The petition was filed more than ninety days after the April 1935 recording of the notice of default and more than thirty days after the act took effect, exceeding the statutory filing windows that ended no later than January 1, 1937. The court held that these time limits were jurisdictional requirements inherent to the limited statutory remedy, rather than a waivable statute of limitations, so the filing was too late to confer jurisdiction.
The case concerned the validity of a 1934 Oakland city ordinance section that banned deliveries of bakery goods on specified holidays and between 6 p.m. and 6:30 a.m. on other days. Bakery companies sued the city and officials for an injunction, alleging the rule would destroy their business by preventing timely early-morning deliveries to retailers and consumers. The trial court sustained a demurrer and dismissed the complaint, but the appellate court reversed, holding the provision an invalid exercise of police power. The court reasoned that the restriction was an arbitrary interference with a lawful business that bore no reasonable relation to health or sanitation goals, as it was not limited to unsanitary deliveries and served mainly to accommodate inspectors' schedules, violating due process and equal protection under the state and federal constitutions.
