Nathaniel P. Conrey

The case concerned a dispute over fees awarded to special administrators and their attorney in the probate of Colonel J.B. Lankershim's estate. Mr. MacDonald, who served as co-special administrator with the Bank of America and also acted as the bank's attorney, sought compensation solely for legal services after agreeing to waive any administrator fees; the trial court granted the bank $49,387.75 in administrative fees and MacDonald $56,443.15 in attorney fees plus $15,000 for extraordinary services in a claim contest. The Supreme Court affirmed the awards, holding that the objectors (the decedent's children) were estopped from challenging the fees because they had been notified of the arrangement beforehand without objection, and that the total compensation did not exceed limits set by the Probate Code sections on special administrators and attorney fees.

propertyprocedure

The case involved disciplinary proceedings against attorney Homer C. Mills for alleged professional misconduct in misusing client funds. Charges included his collection of $100 on a client's note, which he applied to personal use before eventually accounting for it, and his use of funds from client Mrs. Gripton intended for litigation costs for his own purposes instead. The Board of Governors recommended disbarment after considering evidence and Mills' prior one-year suspension, and the court reviewed the record under a writ. The court ordered Mills disbarred, finding the evidence supported that he had repeatedly applied client moneys to his own use in violation of his duties, and determining that habitual misuse of such funds requires revocation of the license to practice law.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a 13-year-old plaintiff who, while spectating in a public balcony of a dance hall owned and operated by the defendants, climbed an unsecured ladder into the attic, walked across a catwalk, and fell through a canvas-covered skylight, suffering injuries. He sued for damages under a theory of attractive nuisance. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants, and the California Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. The court reasoned that property owners owe no duty to keep premises safe for trespassers, the ladder was a common object posing familiar risks rather than an uncommon or alluring device that would attract children, and the plaintiff had entered the restricted area without invitation or temptation.

torts & liabilityproperty

This case involved a minor plaintiff, through her guardian ad litem, and her father suing a riding school and its operator for personal injuries sustained when the plaintiff was thrown from a rented horse named 'Kolto' during a lesson. The complaint alleged breach of an implied warranty that the horse was suitable and safe for riding, along with negligence, seeking damages for the injuries. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant after specially finding that the horse was not vicious, dangerous, or unsuitable, leading to a judgment in the defendant's favor; the trial court also denied a motion to strike the defendant's cost memorandum. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment and cost order, holding that the verdict was supported by the evidence, that numerous claimed errors and instances of misconduct did not result in a miscarriage of justice, and that the cost bill was properly presented.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned a plaintiff's petition under California's 1935 Moratorium Act to delay a threatened foreclosure sale of real property secured by a trust deed. The trial court dismissed the petition after defendants objected that it was untimely, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. The petition was filed more than ninety days after the April 1935 recording of the notice of default and more than thirty days after the act took effect, exceeding the statutory filing windows that ended no later than January 1, 1937. The court held that these time limits were jurisdictional requirements inherent to the limited statutory remedy, rather than a waivable statute of limitations, so the filing was too late to confer jurisdiction.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned the validity of a 1934 Oakland city ordinance section that banned deliveries of bakery goods on specified holidays and between 6 p.m. and 6:30 a.m. on other days. Bakery companies sued the city and officials for an injunction, alleging the rule would destroy their business by preventing timely early-morning deliveries to retailers and consumers. The trial court sustained a demurrer and dismissed the complaint, but the appellate court reversed, holding the provision an invalid exercise of police power. The court reasoned that the restriction was an arbitrary interference with a lawful business that bore no reasonable relation to health or sanitation goals, as it was not limited to unsanitary deliveries and served mainly to accommodate inspectors' schedules, violating due process and equal protection under the state and federal constitutions.

business & regulatorycivil rights

This case concerned a surviving widow's claim to a bequest under her late husband's holographic will, which provided her one thousand dollars for each year of their marriage, after the trial court denied her the legacy due to a prior property settlement agreement. The court reversed the distribution order, holding that the widow was entitled to the bequest. The agreement waived rights as spouse or heir and barred contesting the will or seeking administration, but it did not renounce the right to receive future gifts by devise or bequest; the will spoke from the date of death, and the testator had left it unchanged for over two years after the agreement despite resuming cohabitation. The court also rejected the claim that the settlement constituted an ademption of the legacy under the applicable Civil Code provisions.

family lawproperty

The case involved the appeal of Francisco Murguia from a second-degree murder conviction after he admitted shooting Aristeo Martinez following a quarrel during a poker game, claiming self-defense when Martinez allegedly advanced with a knife. The court addressed challenges to jury instructions on flight as evidence of guilt and a statutory presumption under the 1923 firearms law stating that carrying a concealable pistol without a license constitutes prima facie evidence of intent to commit a felony against another person. It held that the flight instruction was appropriate given the circumstances and that the presumption was a valid, non-conclusive rule of evidence that did not violate due process because it left the defendant a full opportunity to rebut it with contrary evidence and was rationally related to the facts. The judgment of conviction was therefore affirmed.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

This case involved a disciplinary proceeding against attorney Alfred L. Branch before the State Bar of California, where he was charged with violating his professional oath by misappropriating funds from clients, including money advanced for a proposed divorce action and prior instances of converting client payments for costs. The local administrative committee recommended a six-month suspension, but the Board of Governors recommended three years after adopting findings of multiple misappropriations. Branch challenged only the evidence supporting two specific $20 misappropriations from 1933, without disputing the main charge or another prior incident. The court upheld the three-year suspension, reasoning that the undisputed record of misconduct was sufficient to justify the penalty regardless of the challenged findings, and that personal excuses did not excuse the failure to meet professional responsibilities to clients.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a personal injury lawsuit arising from a car accident, in which the plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment against the defendant driver. The trial court instructed the jury that exceeding the 20 mph speed limit under the California Vehicle Act constituted negligence as a matter of law, but the appellate court held this instruction was erroneous because the statute expressly provides that such a violation does not establish negligence per se and instead places the burden on the opposing party to prove negligence. On appeal, the defendant argued for reversal based on the flawed instruction, but the court affirmed the judgment, reasoning that an erroneous instruction does not require reversal unless it results in a miscarriage of justice and that the defendant's own admissions of driving 30-40 mph in a 20 mph zone with heavy traffic, combined with uncontradicted evidence of failure to control the vehicle, overwhelmingly established negligence and causation such that the verdict would not have differed absent the error.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a judgment creditor seeking to set aside a conveyance of real property from defendant Bell to her son Sidwell, made while a lawsuit was pending against Bell. The trial court found the transfer was without consideration and intended to defraud the creditor, allowing the property to be subject to the judgment. The appellate court affirmed, holding that actual fraudulent intent suffices to invalidate the conveyance even without full insolvency, that the plaintiff qualified as a creditor based on the pending claim, and that procedural objections like pleading deficiencies and statute of limitations were not properly raised or preserved on appeal.

propertyprocedure

The case was a review of a State Bar of California recommendation to disbar attorney Alfred T. Roark based on charges of professional misconduct while he served as counsel for the guardian of an incompetent person's estate. The court found that Roark had converted estate funds to his own use, failed to record or deliver a mortgage securing a loan from the estate, obtained subsequent loans on the same property, and forged the guardian's signature on court documents. The evidence established deliberate dishonesty and violations of duties to the client and court under the Code of Civil Procedure. The court ordered Roark disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Burkhart, the defendant was charged in superior court with the felony of driving an automobile on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor under section 112 of the California Vehicle Act. He entered a plea of former conviction, asserting that he had previously pleaded guilty in justice's court to being drunk on a public highway under Los Angeles County Ordinance No. 1735, but the trial court rejected the plea, found him guilty, and entered judgment. On appeal, the defendant argued that the prior offense was necessarily included in the current charge, but the court affirmed the judgment. The court reasoned that the ordinance was never introduced into evidence and thus could not support the plea, and that even if its terms had been properly before the court, the prior offense involved only being intoxicated on a public highway and did not require or include the act of driving a vehicle.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the interpretation of paragraph four of Frances B. Swan's will, which created a trust of $15,000 for the benefit of her brother's widow and two sons (with income payments until the sons reached specified ages), after which the $10,000 principal was to pass to any surviving children of the sons or revert to the residuary estate if no such children existed; the brother had predeceased the testatrix, triggering the trust. The trial court awarded the $10,000 principal to the two nephews, but the appellate court reversed that portion of the decree directing payment to them. The court held that the will contained no direct gift to the nephews, and no bequest by implication could be recognized because the language explicitly required reversion to the residuary estate absent surviving children, and judicial interpretation cannot create testamentary gifts absent clear expression in the will.

property

The case involved a dispute between El Dorado Oil Works and Frey & Horgan Corporation over contracts that included arbitration clauses governed by California law. El Dorado petitioned the superior court to order arbitration, serving notice on Frey & Horgan in New York, which the company moved to quash, arguing lack of jurisdiction. The superior court denied the motion and ordered arbitration to proceed. The California Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, holding that by agreeing to arbitration under California law, Frey & Horgan consented to the court's jurisdiction, allowing extraterritorial service of process for the arbitration proceeding.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a dispute over water rights in Bear Creek in Merced County, where plaintiff Crane, a riparian landowner, sought to quiet title to both natural creek flows and 'foreign water' introduced from the Merced River via surplus from the Merced Irrigation District’s operations, and to enjoin defendants from interfering with his use. Defendants, including Stevinson, claimed rights to the foreign water based on a prior settlement with the irrigation district and riparian ownership along the San Joaquin and Merced Rivers. The trial court ruled for the defendants, finding Stevinson entitled to the foreign water in the creek channel, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The core reasoning was that foreign water entering a stream becomes part of the flow available to downstream riparians on the main watershed, plaintiff’s land was not riparian to the Merced River, and any claims by appropriation were unperfected under the Water Commission Act.

propertyenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over the validity of tax anticipation notes that the County of Los Angeles sought to issue under section 3719 of the Political Code to meet immediate fiscal needs before tax revenues arrived. The respondent refused to sign the notes, claiming the statute unconstitutionally authorized debt payable from future years' revenues without voter approval as required by the state constitution. The court ruled in favor of the petitioner, granting a writ of mandate to compel the signing, reasoning that the statute, when properly interpreted alongside the constitution, limits repayment to the current fiscal year's income and revenue by necessary implication from its terms about short-term loans and first liens on current taxes. The court also found that the board's resolution adequately set forth the necessity for borrowing and complied with statutory limits on the amount.

taxes

The case involved a will contest filed by Anna Dixon challenging the probate of her sister Ella A. Leahy's will, which left the bulk of the estate to another sister, Mary Cornyn, and named Mary's son as executor; the sole remaining ground was undue influence. After a jury returned a verdict for the contestant, the trial court granted the proponents' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the contestant appealed. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the evidence showed the testatrix was mentally competent when she executed the will, there was no direct evidence of coercion or persuasion by the beneficiaries, and the circumstantial evidence of close family relations and prior transactions did not rise above mere suspicion to prove undue influence on the testamentary act itself.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case concerned a dispute over ownership of a $50,000 life insurance policy on the life of Oscar Boldemann, president of plaintiff Boldemann Chocolate Co. The corporation's board resolved to insure his life with the corporation as beneficiary and pay the premiums, which it did; however, Boldemann purchased the policy in his own name and assigned it to a trustee for the benefit of the corporation's stockholders. When the corporation later sought to borrow against the policy, one minority stockholder refused to consent to revocation of the trust. The court held that the corporation was the sole owner of the policy and entitled to its possession. It reasoned that Boldemann had acted as the corporation's agent in obtaining the policy but lacked authority to create the trust, rendering the assignment invalid and leaving the corporation with full ownership rights.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved a petition to annul a workers' compensation death benefit award granted by the Industrial Accident Commission to the widow and child of a traveling salesman who died from carbon monoxide poisoning while staying in an auto camp cabin during a business trip. The salesman had used a gas heater without ventilation, leading to asphyxiation. The California Supreme Court affirmed the award, reasoning that the death occurred in the course of employment because commercial travelers remain covered throughout their business trips including overnight accommodations, and that it arose out of the employment as using the provided heater was a reasonable act for comfort; the court further noted that employee negligence does not bar recovery under the applicable compensation law.

labor & employment