Stephen Gerald Breyer

The case involved Abu Zubaydah's request under 28 U.S.C. §1782 for discovery from former CIA contractors to support a Polish criminal investigation into his alleged detention and enhanced interrogation at a CIA site in Poland. The Government intervened and asserted the state secrets privilege, arguing that confirming or denying the site's existence or operational details would harm national security. The district court dismissed the application, finding that privileged information was central and could not be segregated. The Ninth Circuit partially reversed, allowing discovery on certain topics because some information was public and the contractors were private parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state secrets privilege barred the requested discovery because it would necessarily risk disclosing protected information about CIA activities with a foreign government.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

The case involved Le Roy Torres, an Army Reserve veteran who sued the Texas Department of Public Safety under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) after the state refused to reemploy him in a different role due to his service-related respiratory disability from deployment in Iraq. Texas sought dismissal based on sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court held that Congress may authorize private damages suits against nonconsenting states under its Article I powers to raise and support armies, as states agreed their sovereignty would yield to this federal authority in the plan of the Convention. The core reasoning examined the Constitution's text granting complete power over the armed forces, historical context, and precedents such as PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, finding structural waiver of state immunity for this plenary federal power.

federal powerlabor & employmentcivil rights

The case concerned two licensed physicians convicted under 21 U.S.C. §841 for prescribing controlled substances outside the scope of their authorization, with the central dispute being the level of criminal intent (mens rea) required to prove a violation. The Supreme Court held that the statute’s “knowingly or intentionally” requirement applies to the “except as authorized” clause, meaning that once a defendant produces evidence of authorization, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally acted without authorization. The Court reasoned that criminal statutes carry a presumption of scienter to distinguish wrongful from innocent conduct, that authorization plays a critical role in separating lawful medical practice from illegal distribution, and that analogous precedents such as Rehaif v. United States support extending the mens rea element to the authorization exception. The Court rejected arguments that would limit the scienter requirement or treat the clause as merely jurisdictional or regulatory.

criminal law

The case concerned a 2018 Washington workers’ compensation statute that applied exclusively to certain employees at the federal Hanford site, easing eligibility rules and raising costs only for the United States and its contractors. The United States sued, claiming the law violated the Supremacy Clause by discriminating against the federal government. The Supreme Court held that the statute facially singled out federal workers for less favorable treatment and therefore breached intergovernmental immunity. It further ruled that 40 U.S.C. §3172 does not contain a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity from such discriminatory state measures. The Ninth Circuit’s contrary decision was reversed.

labor & employmentfederal power

In Smith v. Shinn, petitioner Joe Clarence Smith challenged his Arizona death sentence, imposed originally in 1977 and followed by multiple resentencings, arguing that more than 44 years on death row, much of it in solitary confinement, would render any execution cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. Justice Breyer filed a statement respecting the denial, observing that the extended delay and isolation raised serious constitutional questions but that procedural obstacles precluded granting review at this stage.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved Harold Shurtleff and Camp Constitution requesting permission from Boston to raise a Christian flag on a third flagpole at City Hall Plaza during an event celebrating the Christian community's civic contributions, after the city had approved dozens of other private flags over the years. Boston denied the flag request due to concerns that displaying a religious flag would violate the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court held that the city's flag-raising program did not constitute government speech and that denying the request based on the flag's religious content violated the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. The core reasoning applied a holistic inquiry examining the history of flag displays at government sites, the public's likely perception of who was speaking, and the limited extent of the city's control over the messages on the flags flown by private groups.

free speechreligious libertycivil rights

The case Shurtleff v. Boston concerned whether the City of Boston violated the First Amendment by refusing to allow a private group to raise a Christian flag on a city flagpole during an event on City Hall Plaza, after having approved dozens of other private flags over the years. The Supreme Court ruled that the city's flag-raising program did not qualify as government speech, as Boston had not maintained active control over the content of the flags flown by private groups. Therefore, the city's denial amounted to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination under the Free Speech Clause.

free speechreligious libertycivil rights

This case involved Carl Wayne Buntion's application to the Supreme Court for a stay of his execution in Texas. The Court denied the application for stay. Justice Breyer issued a statement noting that Buntion had been on death row for 30 years, including 20 years in solitary confinement, and suggested that such prolonged delays raise questions about whether the death penalty as administered violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.

criminal law

The case concerned Abu Zubaydah's application under 28 U.S.C. §1782 seeking discovery from two former CIA contractors about his alleged 2002-2003 detention and interrogation at a CIA facility in Poland, for use in a Polish criminal proceeding. The United States intervened and asserted the state secrets privilege, arguing that confirming or denying the site's existence or related operational details would harm national security. The district court dismissed the application, the Ninth Circuit reversed in part by allowing discovery into certain topics it deemed non-privileged, and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the privilege applies to information that could confirm or deny the CIA detention site in Poland. The Court reasoned that the government had properly invoked the privilege through a formal claim, that courts must defer to executive judgments on national security risks from disclosing foreign cooperation details, and that the requested discovery could not proceed without risking disclosure of protected information.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

The case involved Abu Zubaydah's request under 28 U.S.C. §1782 for discovery from former CIA contractors about his alleged detention and treatment at a CIA facility in Poland, to support a Polish criminal investigation. The U.S. government intervened, asserting the state secrets privilege to block any confirmation or denial of the site's existence or related details, arguing that official acknowledgment would harm national security. The district court dismissed the application, finding that meaningful discovery would require disclosing privileged information. The Ninth Circuit partially reversed, allowing discovery on certain topics since the information was already public unofficially and the contractors were private parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the privilege applies to prevent confirmation or denial of the site's location in Poland because the government demonstrated potential harm to national security interests, and Zubaydah's need for the information did not overcome the privilege.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

The case Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P. concerned whether a copyright registration is invalid when an applicant includes inaccurate information on the application due to a misunderstanding of legal requirements. Unicolors registered 31 fabric designs in a single application despite a Copyright Office rule limiting such registrations to works in the same unit of publication, and H&M challenged the registration's validity after a jury found infringement. The Supreme Court held that 17 U.S.C. §411(b)(1)(A) provides a safe harbor excusing inaccuracies if the applicant lacked knowledge that the information was inaccurate, and this protection covers both mistakes of law and mistakes of fact. The reasoning centered on the plain meaning of "knowledge" in the statute, related Copyright Act provisions requiring legal information, and legislative history intended to ease valid registrations for nonlawyers.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by abortion providers and advocates seeking to compel the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to remand their challenge to Texas Senate Bill 8—a law banning most abortions after six weeks—to the district court for further proceedings on the merits. The Supreme Court had previously ruled that the suit could proceed against certain state medical licensing officials. The Court denied the mandamus petition. The core reasoning, as set out in the dissenting opinions, was that the Fifth Circuit had improperly delayed resolution by certifying questions to the Texas Supreme Court rather than promptly implementing the prior ruling and allowing the district court to address enforcement of the law.

abortionprocedurecivil rights

This case involves Carl Wayne Buntion, who was convicted of capital murder in Texas, sentenced to death in 1991, resentenced to death in 2012 after his original sentencing was found unconstitutional, and has spent 30 years on death row, including 20 years in solitary confinement. Buntion petitioned the Supreme Court to decide whether carrying out his execution after such an extended period would violate the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari due to procedural obstacles. In a statement respecting the denial, Justice Breyer highlighted how the case illustrates problems with prolonged death row delays and solitary confinement, which he has previously argued undermine the death penalty's justification and impose severe conditions.

criminal law

The case involved abortion providers challenging a Texas law (S.B. 8) that bans most abortions after detection of fetal cardiac activity around six weeks and delegates enforcement to private citizens through lawsuits. The Supreme Court denied the application for injunctive relief or to vacate stays of district court proceedings. The majority held that the applicants failed to carry their burden of making a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, due to unresolved procedural questions including whether the named defendants (state judges and a private individual) could or would enforce the law, issues of standing requiring certainly impending injury, and limits on federal courts' ability to enjoin state judges or non-enforcing officials under precedents like Ex parte Young and California v. Texas. The order emphasized that it did not resolve the law's constitutionality or limit other challenges.

abortionprocedure

The case concerned New York landlords seeking to enjoin enforcement of Part A of the COVID Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act (CEEFPA), which allowed tenants to submit a sworn attestation of pandemic-related financial hardship that automatically paused eviction proceedings without permitting landlords to challenge the claim in court. The Supreme Court granted the application for injunctive relief, enjoining only Part A of CEEFPA pending appeal in the Second Circuit and any certiorari petition. The Court reasoned that the law violates due process by denying landlords a hearing to contest the tenant's self-certification, consistent with the principle that no person can be a judge in their own case. The order did not affect the separate Tenant Safe Harbor Act, which requires courts to evaluate hardship claims.

propertyprocedurecivil rights

The case concerned a challenge to the Affordable Care Act's minimum essential coverage provision (the individual mandate) after 2017 amendments set the associated penalty to zero. Texas and other states, along with individual plaintiffs, argued that the provision was unconstitutional without the penalty and sought to invalidate the entire Act. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because they failed to show any past or future injury fairly traceable to enforcement of the specific provision they challenged. The core reasoning was that, absent any penalty or other enforcement mechanism, the mandate's text alone does not cause the alleged harm, and declaratory relief would not redress it.

healthcarefederal power

The case concerned whether Google infringed Oracle's copyright in the Java SE platform by copying about 11,500 lines of declaring code from its Application Programming Interface (API) to help build the Android mobile operating system. After lower courts split on copyrightability and fair use, the Supreme Court assumed the code was copyrightable and held that Google's copying qualified as fair use as a matter of law. The Court reasoned that the use was transformative because it enabled programmers to apply their existing Java skills to a new platform, that only the minimal code necessary was taken, and that fair use serves as a context-specific limit on copyright to avoid stifling innovation in functional works like software. The decision reversed the Federal Circuit and ended the damages phase of the long-running litigation.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved a high school student, B.L., who was suspended from the junior varsity cheerleading squad after posting two Snapchat images off campus over a weekend that expressed frustration with the school and squad, including vulgar language. B.L. and her parents sued, claiming the punishment violated her First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court held that the school violated those rights, ruling that while schools may have some interest in regulating certain off-campus student speech, the circumstances here—such as the speech occurring outside school hours and not targeting individuals—did not justify the suspension. The Court reasoned that off-campus speech is typically distinguished by the absence of in loco parentis authority, the risk of overbroad regulation covering all student expression, and schools' interest in safeguarding unpopular viewpoints as part of democratic education. It noted that the posts were shared privately via personal device without causing substantial disruption.

free speechcivil rights

In California v. Texas, the case concerned challenges to the Affordable Care Act's requirement that most Americans obtain minimum essential health insurance coverage after Congress reduced the associated penalty to zero in 2017. Plaintiffs, including states and individuals, argued that the provision was unconstitutional and sought to invalidate the entire Act. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing under Article III because they failed to demonstrate any injury fairly traceable to the enforcement of the specific provision, as it was no longer enforceable without a penalty. The Court reasoned that without actual or threatened government action causing harm, declaratory relief alone could not satisfy the requirements for a justiciable case or controversy.

healthcarefederal powertaxes

In United States v. Cooley, a tribal police officer on the Crow Reservation stopped and searched a non-Indian driver on a public highway within the reservation after observing signs of impairment and weapons in the vehicle, leading to the discovery of methamphetamine and resulting in federal drug and gun charges. The district court and Ninth Circuit suppressed the evidence, holding that the officer lacked authority because he had not first confirmed the driver's non-Indian status. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that tribal officers possess inherent authority under the second Montana exception to temporarily detain and search non-Indians on public rights-of-way for suspected violations of state or federal law when such conduct threatens tribal health or welfare. The Court reasoned that this power includes the ancillary authority to investigate, search for safety, and hold suspects until transfer to proper authorities, without requiring prior determination of Indian status or limiting detention to only apparent violations.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure