This case concerned whether the owner of a severed deep mineral interest, who retained limited rights to use the surface estate for mineral development under a 1917 deed, could exercise statutory redemption rights after a tax lien sale of the surface estate in Colorado. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that such a mineral interest owner does not possess a legal or equitable claim in the surface estate sufficient to redeem under section 39-12-103(1). The court reasoned that the redemption statute requires an interest in the property being sold for taxes, but the mineral owner's reasonable surface-use rights are incidental to mineral development and do not extend to a claim allowing redemption of the severed surface estate itself, which would remain unchanged by issuance of a tax deed. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
In this workers' compensation dispute, Lawrence Horton suffered a work-related head injury as a minor employee at Golden Animal Hospital in 1983, reaching maximum medical improvement in 1987 and later seeking permanent disability benefits. The Colorado Supreme Court considered whether the minors' statute required using the higher compensation rate from the law in effect at the 1992 hearing date or the lower rate from the statute applicable in 1987. The court reversed the court of appeals, reinstated the Industrial Claim Appeal Panel's order, and held that benefits must be calculated under the statute in effect at the time of maximum medical improvement. It reasoned that the phrase 'determination of such permanency' in the minors' statute refers to the date permanency becomes determinable, which aligns with the established practice of using maximum medical improvement, and that a later-enacted higher rate applied only to injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1991.
In this case, Denver police obtained and executed a search warrant for a residence suspected of drug activity, later discovering it was located outside Denver in Arapahoe County, in violation of a statute limiting execution to the issuing county's officers. The defendant moved to suppress the seized evidence of cocaine and related items, arguing the jurisdictional error and any description flaw invalidated the warrant and its execution under constitutional standards. The trial court granted suppression based on precedent requiring local officer involvement. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the warrant's practical description was adequate to identify the premises and that the statutory violation in execution did not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment or Colorado Constitution, so exclusion of evidence was not required.
In Ghrist v. People, the petitioner appealed the denial of his Crim.P. 35(b) motion to reduce his twelve-year sentence for reckless manslaughter, arguing that the trial court wrongly concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider evidence of his post-incarceration conduct. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the trial court had jurisdiction to review the timely-filed motion, which was submitted, heard, and decided within 120 days after the court of appeals issued its mandate. The court reasoned that Crim.P. 35(b) permits trial courts to consider all relevant factors, including new evidence of a defendant's behavior while incarcerated, as part of determining whether the original sentence aligns with statutory sentencing purposes, and that filing such a motion suspends the finality of the sentence. It distinguished prior cases and rejected the view that post-incarceration conduct could not be considered or that the motion's timeliness was undermined by any delay in hearing it.
The case involved a challenge by the Denver Publishing Company, publisher of the Rocky Mountain News, to a City of Aurora ordinance that banned solicitation of sales from occupants of moving vehicles on city streets, which affected the newspaper's street vendors. The district court ruled the ordinance unconstitutional under the First Amendment as an impermissible burden on free speech. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance was a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction that was narrowly tailored to serve the significant government interest in public safety on the streets, and that it left open ample alternative channels for communication.
This case involved the Browders, who purchased a motel from the Fletcher Corporation and were assigned its multi-peril insurance policy issued by USF&G. After discovering structural damage in 1985, the Browders obtained an uncollectible judgment against Fletcher for negligent construction and then sued USF&G as subrogees to recover under the policy's liability provisions for property damage to third parties. The trial court granted summary judgment to USF&G, which the court of appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court upheld that decision. The court reasoned that the policy provided occurrence-based coverage only for liability to third parties arising from the insured's ownership or use of the premises, but Fletcher could not have claimed coverage for damage to its own property, and the Browders had no third-party status or damages during the policy period when Fletcher was the insured. Subrogation therefore conferred no greater rights than Fletcher possessed under the policy terms.