Luis D. Rovira

This case concerned whether the owner of a severed deep mineral interest, who retained limited rights to use the surface estate for mineral development under a 1917 deed, could exercise statutory redemption rights after a tax lien sale of the surface estate in Colorado. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that such a mineral interest owner does not possess a legal or equitable claim in the surface estate sufficient to redeem under section 39-12-103(1). The court reasoned that the redemption statute requires an interest in the property being sold for taxes, but the mineral owner's reasonable surface-use rights are incidental to mineral development and do not extend to a claim allowing redemption of the severed surface estate itself, which would remain unchanged by issuance of a tax deed. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

propertytaxesprocedure

In this workers' compensation dispute, Lawrence Horton suffered a work-related head injury as a minor employee at Golden Animal Hospital in 1983, reaching maximum medical improvement in 1987 and later seeking permanent disability benefits. The Colorado Supreme Court considered whether the minors' statute required using the higher compensation rate from the law in effect at the 1992 hearing date or the lower rate from the statute applicable in 1987. The court reversed the court of appeals, reinstated the Industrial Claim Appeal Panel's order, and held that benefits must be calculated under the statute in effect at the time of maximum medical improvement. It reasoned that the phrase 'determination of such permanency' in the minors' statute refers to the date permanency becomes determinable, which aligns with the established practice of using maximum medical improvement, and that a later-enacted higher rate applied only to injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1991.

labor & employment

In this case, Denver police obtained and executed a search warrant for a residence suspected of drug activity, later discovering it was located outside Denver in Arapahoe County, in violation of a statute limiting execution to the issuing county's officers. The defendant moved to suppress the seized evidence of cocaine and related items, arguing the jurisdictional error and any description flaw invalidated the warrant and its execution under constitutional standards. The trial court granted suppression based on precedent requiring local officer involvement. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the warrant's practical description was adequate to identify the premises and that the statutory violation in execution did not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment or Colorado Constitution, so exclusion of evidence was not required.

criminal lawprocedure

In Ghrist v. People, the petitioner appealed the denial of his Crim.P. 35(b) motion to reduce his twelve-year sentence for reckless manslaughter, arguing that the trial court wrongly concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider evidence of his post-incarceration conduct. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the trial court had jurisdiction to review the timely-filed motion, which was submitted, heard, and decided within 120 days after the court of appeals issued its mandate. The court reasoned that Crim.P. 35(b) permits trial courts to consider all relevant factors, including new evidence of a defendant's behavior while incarcerated, as part of determining whether the original sentence aligns with statutory sentencing purposes, and that filing such a motion suspends the finality of the sentence. It distinguished prior cases and rejected the view that post-incarceration conduct could not be considered or that the motion's timeliness was undermined by any delay in hearing it.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a challenge by the Denver Publishing Company, publisher of the Rocky Mountain News, to a City of Aurora ordinance that banned solicitation of sales from occupants of moving vehicles on city streets, which affected the newspaper's street vendors. The district court ruled the ordinance unconstitutional under the First Amendment as an impermissible burden on free speech. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance was a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction that was narrowly tailored to serve the significant government interest in public safety on the streets, and that it left open ample alternative channels for communication.

free speechbusiness & regulatory

This case involved the Browders, who purchased a motel from the Fletcher Corporation and were assigned its multi-peril insurance policy issued by USF&G. After discovering structural damage in 1985, the Browders obtained an uncollectible judgment against Fletcher for negligent construction and then sued USF&G as subrogees to recover under the policy's liability provisions for property damage to third parties. The trial court granted summary judgment to USF&G, which the court of appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court upheld that decision. The court reasoned that the policy provided occurrence-based coverage only for liability to third parties arising from the insured's ownership or use of the premises, but Fletcher could not have claimed coverage for damage to its own property, and the Browders had no third-party status or damages during the policy period when Fletcher was the insured. Subrogation therefore conferred no greater rights than Fletcher possessed under the policy terms.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned a 1990 lawsuit by Delta Sales Yard against a deputy brand inspector for allegedly allowing the resale of cattle without proper title documents in 1988, raising the question of which statute of limitations applied. The Colorado Supreme Court held that deputy brand inspectors qualify as 'law enforcement authority' under section 13-80-103(1)(c), triggering the one-year limitations period rather than the two-year period for other government employees. The court reasoned that brand inspectors are designated level III peace officers with arrest powers and broad statutory duties to enforce livestock and agriculture laws, making the more specific one-year provision applicable and barring the claim.

procedurecriminal law

In Kelly v. Mile Hi Single Ply, Inc., a corporate president and sole stockholder who had elected to reject workers' compensation coverage under Colorado law sued a co-employee driver and the corporation for negligence and vicarious liability after a work-related car accident left him paraplegic. The trial court dismissed the claims against the co-employee on grounds of co-employee immunity, and after the parties stipulated that claims against the corporation were solely derivative, the court of appeals affirmed dismissal of all claims. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an officer's rejection of coverage permits a tort suit only against the employer and does not remove the exclusivity protections of the Workers' Compensation Act for covered co-employees, whose immunity remains intact under the statutory scheme. The court reasoned that the Act's mutual renunciation of common-law rights applies to maintain co-employee immunity regardless of the rejecting officer's status.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved Gregory Lindsey's conviction for first-degree sexual assault and related charges, where the trial court admitted DNA evidence showing a match between Lindsey's profile and samples from the crime scene, along with expert testimony on the statistical probability of a random match in the African American population. Lindsey challenged the admission under the Frye standard, arguing that the statistical calculation methods lacked general scientific acceptance at the time of trial. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the evidence was properly admitted because Frye requires only general acceptance of the techniques at the time of admission, and disputes over statistical methods affect the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility, consistent with the prior decision in Fishback v. People.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the Jefferson County assessor's valuation of an IBM computer owned by IBM Credit Corp. for 1991 property tax purposes, where the assessor used a cost approach based on acquisition cost and depreciation tables while the taxpayer sought a lower market-based valuation that accounted for obsolescence using pricing guides from 1990-1991. The trial court rejected the county's valuation, adopted the taxpayer's figure, and the court of appeals affirmed, leading the Colorado Supreme Court to grant certiorari on whether a statute imposing time limits and conditions on comparable sales data applied to personal property. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings in favor of the taxpayer, concluding after statutory analysis that section 39-1-103(8)(a)(I) applies only to real property due to its references to real property reassessment cycles and sales samples, while personal property valuation is governed by other provisions like section 39-1-104(12.3) that allow consideration of market data and obsolescence without those restrictions.

taxesproperty

The case involved the suppression of narcotics evidence obtained from a dog sniff of an Express Mail package addressed to the defendant. The district court suppressed the evidence, ruling that the postal inspector lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the dog sniff search. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the totality of the circumstances—including the defendant's suspicious phone calls inquiring about the package, the package's unusual characteristics like a fake return address and powdery contents, and the impractical use of Express Mail for baby formula—provided the necessary reasonable suspicion for the search. The court concluded that the dog sniff constituted a search but was justified under the reasonable suspicion standard, remanding for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved attorney disciplinary proceedings against Mack Edward Murray, Jr., based on two consolidated complaints alleging misconduct across multiple client matters. In one civil case, Murray neglected to file required documents, attend conferences, or prosecute the action, resulting in dismissal and fee assessments against his clients; he then mishandled a follow-up filing. In a criminal assault defense, he missed arraignments and conferences, failed to raise available defenses, filed a defective appeal notice, and committed other errors. The Colorado Supreme Court accepted the hearing board's findings of repeated violations of disciplinary rules on neglect, inadequate preparation, and conduct prejudicial to justice, and ordered disbarment effective upon issuance of the opinion along with restitution and costs.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether a defendant could challenge a county court's finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing by seeking review in district court under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), and the proper route for the prosecution's appeal after such review. David Abbott was charged with sexual assault on a child; after the county court found probable cause based on an officer's testimony, the district court reviewed the transcript, found insufficient evidence on the sexual contact element, and dismissed the charges. The Colorado Supreme Court held that district courts lack authority to review county court probable cause findings under C.R.C.P. 106 because Crim.P. 5 mandates binding the defendant over for trial without further reexamination, and that the prosecution's appeal to the court of appeals was the correct procedure under C.A.R. 4(b)(2). The court reversed and remanded with directions to reinstate the charge.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involves a certified question from the U.S. District Court to the Colorado Supreme Court asking whether owners of an overriding royalty interest in gas production must bear a proportionate share of post-production costs such as processing, transportation, and compression when the assignment creating the interest is silent on the issue. The court answered in the negative, holding that such royalty owners are not required to share in those costs when they are incurred to convert raw gas into a marketable product. The reasoning rests on the implied covenant to market contained in every oil and gas lease, under which the lessee bears the costs of making the product marketable, and on the distinction between costs of production (borne by the working interest) and subsequent costs after a marketable product exists (which may be shared). The court limited its answer to general principles of Colorado oil and gas law without applying them to the specific assignment in the case.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In this case, Anthony Quintana was tried for first-degree murder, felony murder, conspiracy, and crime of violence after he and another man killed Lawrence Martinez by stabbing and bludgeoning him during a kidnapping. At trial, the prosecution sought to introduce three statements Quintana made during and after the crime expressing his desire to kill other, unrelated individuals, arguing they were admissible under Colorado Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show intent, plan, state of mind, and absence of mistake. The trial court allowed the statements for the limited purposes of proving intent to commit the charged crime and lack of mistake or accident, with a limiting instruction to the jury. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, holding the statements inadmissible primarily on grounds related to intent to eliminate witnesses. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, concluding the statements were properly admitted for the purposes identified by the trial court and remanding for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved consolidated challenges to Colorado's Workers’ Compensation Act, which uses a fixed schedule to calculate permanent partial disability benefits for partial loss or loss of use of extremities but relies on American Medical Association impairment ratings for total loss of extremities or injuries to the torso and head. Petitioners argued that this two-tiered system violated equal protection under the federal and state constitutions because similarly situated workers could receive vastly different awards depending on which formula applied. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the statutes, finding that the distinctions were rationally related to the Act's goals of delivering benefits quickly and efficiently at reasonable cost to employers. The court noted that the legislature had repeatedly amended the provisions, including to increase compensation rates and to adjust for perceived differences in injury severity, and rejected claims that the schedule was an irrational or outdated relic.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case concerned whether the Colorado legislature could impose additional qualifications, such as licensing requirements under the Real Estate Appraiser's Act, on holders of the constitutionally created office of county assessor beyond the requirements of being a qualified elector and one-year county resident set forth in article XIV, sections 8 and 10 of the Colorado Constitution. Pat Reale, the elected Adams County Assessor who had not obtained the required appraiser license, challenged the Board's attempt to enjoin him from performing his duties. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial court's permanent injunction, holding that the qualifications specified in the constitution are exclusive and that the legislature lacks authority to add further prerequisites for holding the office. The court's reasoning relied on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, rules of constitutional construction, and precedents from other states establishing that enumerated constitutional eligibility criteria preclude additional legislative restrictions. The case was remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint.

elections

The case involved a defamation lawsuit brought by the Living Will Center against NBC Subsidiary and reporter Suzanne McCarroll over two television news broadcasts that questioned whether the company's $29.95 living will packet was worth the cost, featured comments from a medical ethicist calling it a scam, and noted the availability of similar free forms from hospitals and libraries. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding the gist of the reports true and the statements not verifiable assertions of fact. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the broadcasts implied material facts capable of being proven true or false. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded, reasoning that the reports disclosed the underlying facts about the packet's contents and alternatives, so the critical statements were protected opinions rather than actionable defamatory implications under the First Amendment.

free speechtorts & liability

This case involved a challenge to the Colorado Title Setting Board's proposed title, submission clause, and summary for a ballot initiative that would amend article II, section 10 of the state constitution to allow state and local governments to control the promotion of obscenity to the full extent permitted by the First Amendment. Petitioners argued that the title and submission clause failed to inform voters that the measure's purpose was to prevent Colorado courts from interpreting the state constitution to provide broader free-expression protections than the federal First Amendment in the area of obscenity. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed, holding that the title and submission clause were misleading because they did not accurately reflect the initiative's intent and meaning. The court reasoned that undisputed testimony before the Board established this restrictive purpose, which was a central feature voters needed to understand, and therefore required the Board to revise the title and submission clause accordingly.

free speechelections

The case concerned a challenge to the Colorado Public Utilities Commission's (PUC) rate-setting decisions in a US WEST general rate case, specifically its imposition of mandatory measured service rates for shared tenant service (STS) providers and continuation of such rates for public access line (PAL) service used by private payphone operators. The district court set aside the PUC orders and remanded for consideration of flat-rate options. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the PUC's measured-rate decisions were supported by substantial evidence in the record regarding cost recovery and usage patterns. The court reasoned that judicial review is limited to checking for evidentiary support and that ratemaking policy choices belong to the PUC rather than the courts, which cannot substitute their judgment on viable alternatives.

business & regulatoryprocedure