Tammy Prout sued Sears, Roebuck and Company and her store manager for wrongful termination after being fired for falsifying time sheets, claiming breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent firing, estoppel, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Prout was an at-will employee who had signed employment documents stating that her job could be terminated at any time with or without cause or notice. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding there were no genuine issues of material fact. The Montana Supreme Court reversed, finding that disputed facts regarding an alleged store practice of making up missed hours instead of correcting time sheets, as well as the circumstances of her termination, created material issues that precluded summary judgment.
The case was a wrongful death and survival action brought by the family and insurer of a driver killed in a head-on collision against a Montana tavern's operators, alleging they unlawfully served alcohol to an already intoxicated patron who then caused the fatal accident while driving in North Dakota. The district court granted summary judgment to the tavern operators, ruling that Montana law imposed liability only for serving a helplessly intoxicated customer, that North Dakota's dram shop statute did not apply extraterritorially, and that no common-law negligence claim existed. The Montana Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded, reasoning that serving alcohol in violation of state beverage control statutes could support a negligence claim, that precedent did not limit liability to helplessly intoxicated patrons, and that disputed facts about the patron's visible intoxication and the timing and amount of drinks served precluded summary judgment.
In State v. Armfield, the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence, informed of Montana's implied consent law requiring submission to a chemical test such as a breathalyzer, and told he had no right to consult an attorney before deciding whether to take the test; he agreed to the test but later moved to suppress the results on constitutional grounds. The City of Bozeman and State appealed after the District Court granted suppression, finding a limited right to counsel under the federal and state constitutions. The Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the Sixth Amendment nor due process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment or Montana's Constitution provide a right to attorney consultation prior to deciding on a breathalyzer test. The court reasoned that the test involves only physical evidence, the consent statute's procedures satisfy due process requirements of fair play, and no violation occurs absent coercive methods that offend basic decency. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
In State v. Cutner, the defendant was charged with sexual assault and burglary after an incident involving a seventy-year-old victim; he was convicted following a trial held 286 days after his arrest. Cutner appealed, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the delays were largely caused by the defendant's own actions, including multiple motions to substitute judges, requests for psychiatric examination, alibi and mental defect notices, and stipulations for additional lab analysis. The court found a reasonable excuse for the delay and determined that the state overcame the presumption of prejudice, as the defendant showed no actual impairment to his defense or oppressive incarceration. The opinion noted that Cutner did not assert his speedy trial right until the day of trial and appeared to benefit from exploring defense options during the postponements.
The case involved a dispute between an insurance company and its insured, a gas station owner, over coverage for damages from a gasoline leak that contaminated neighboring wells between 1973 and 1975. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling that split liability equally between the parties, holding instead that the insurer was liable for the full amount under the policy. The court reasoned that the policy's pollution exclusion did not apply because the discharge was sudden, unexpected, and unintentional from the insured's perspective, and the insured's negligence in failing to mitigate damages did not bar coverage absent a specific cooperation clause requiring such action. The decision emphasized that mere negligence does not defeat recovery on an insurance policy without allegations of intentional wrongdoing.
This case involved a partition action over a 320-acre inherited tract of land in Gallatin County, Montana, along with appurtenant water rights including shares in the Middle Creek Ditch Company and West Gallatin Canal Company. The cotenants settled most issues, agreeing to divide the land and Middle Creek water proportionally, but disputed allocation of the indivisible half-share in West Gallatin water rights. The District Court awarded the West Gallatin water to the defendants (Kittles) as appurtenant to specific parcels and the Supreme Court affirmed that decision, while remanding solely to correct inconsistencies in the findings regarding certain land parcel awards.