Frank I. Haswell

Tammy Prout sued Sears, Roebuck and Company and her store manager for wrongful termination after being fired for falsifying time sheets, claiming breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent firing, estoppel, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Prout was an at-will employee who had signed employment documents stating that her job could be terminated at any time with or without cause or notice. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding there were no genuine issues of material fact. The Montana Supreme Court reversed, finding that disputed facts regarding an alleged store practice of making up missed hours instead of correcting time sheets, as well as the circumstances of her termination, created material issues that precluded summary judgment.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case was a wrongful death and survival action brought by the family and insurer of a driver killed in a head-on collision against a Montana tavern's operators, alleging they unlawfully served alcohol to an already intoxicated patron who then caused the fatal accident while driving in North Dakota. The district court granted summary judgment to the tavern operators, ruling that Montana law imposed liability only for serving a helplessly intoxicated customer, that North Dakota's dram shop statute did not apply extraterritorially, and that no common-law negligence claim existed. The Montana Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded, reasoning that serving alcohol in violation of state beverage control statutes could support a negligence claim, that precedent did not limit liability to helplessly intoxicated patrons, and that disputed facts about the patron's visible intoxication and the timing and amount of drinks served precluded summary judgment.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In State v. Armfield, the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence, informed of Montana's implied consent law requiring submission to a chemical test such as a breathalyzer, and told he had no right to consult an attorney before deciding whether to take the test; he agreed to the test but later moved to suppress the results on constitutional grounds. The City of Bozeman and State appealed after the District Court granted suppression, finding a limited right to counsel under the federal and state constitutions. The Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the Sixth Amendment nor due process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment or Montana's Constitution provide a right to attorney consultation prior to deciding on a breathalyzer test. The court reasoned that the test involves only physical evidence, the consent statute's procedures satisfy due process requirements of fair play, and no violation occurs absent coercive methods that offend basic decency. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In State v. Cutner, the defendant was charged with sexual assault and burglary after an incident involving a seventy-year-old victim; he was convicted following a trial held 286 days after his arrest. Cutner appealed, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the delays were largely caused by the defendant's own actions, including multiple motions to substitute judges, requests for psychiatric examination, alibi and mental defect notices, and stipulations for additional lab analysis. The court found a reasonable excuse for the delay and determined that the state overcame the presumption of prejudice, as the defendant showed no actual impairment to his defense or oppressive incarceration. The opinion noted that Cutner did not assert his speedy trial right until the day of trial and appeared to benefit from exploring defense options during the postponements.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between an insurance company and its insured, a gas station owner, over coverage for damages from a gasoline leak that contaminated neighboring wells between 1973 and 1975. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling that split liability equally between the parties, holding instead that the insurer was liable for the full amount under the policy. The court reasoned that the policy's pollution exclusion did not apply because the discharge was sudden, unexpected, and unintentional from the insured's perspective, and the insured's negligence in failing to mitigate damages did not bar coverage absent a specific cooperation clause requiring such action. The decision emphasized that mere negligence does not defeat recovery on an insurance policy without allegations of intentional wrongdoing.

business & regulatoryenvironmenttorts & liability

This case involved a partition action over a 320-acre inherited tract of land in Gallatin County, Montana, along with appurtenant water rights including shares in the Middle Creek Ditch Company and West Gallatin Canal Company. The cotenants settled most issues, agreeing to divide the land and Middle Creek water proportionally, but disputed allocation of the indivisible half-share in West Gallatin water rights. The District Court awarded the West Gallatin water to the defendants (Kittles) as appurtenant to specific parcels and the Supreme Court affirmed that decision, while remanding solely to correct inconsistencies in the findings regarding certain land parcel awards.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned a challenge to Montana Constitutional Initiative No. 23, a proposed ballot measure that would amend the state constitution to direct the legislature to apply to Congress under Article V of the U.S. Constitution for a convention to consider a federal balanced budget amendment, with penalties for legislative inaction. Plaintiffs sought to block the initiative from appearing on the ballot, arguing it exceeded the scope of the initiative power and conflicted with federal constitutional requirements. The Montana Supreme Court granted the requested injunction, holding the measure void. The court reasoned that the initiative, despite its form as a constitutional amendment, was in substance a legislative resolution directing specific action by the legislature, which falls outside the initiative powers enumerated in the Montana Constitution for enacting laws, state constitutional amendments, or calling a state convention. It further concluded that the measure's constraints on legislative deliberation violated Article V of the U.S. Constitution, which reserves the application process exclusively to deliberative state legislatures.

electionsfederal power

The case concerned Jerry Korell's convictions for attempted deliberate homicide and aggravated assault arising from a shooting incident involving his former supervisor. Korell's primary defense was that he lacked the required criminal mental state due to mental disease or defect stemming from his Vietnam service and subsequent psychological issues. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, he argued that the state's statutory scheme unconstitutionally barred him from raising insanity as an independent defense separate from negating mens rea. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that Montana law adequately allowed evidence of mental condition to disprove the mental element of the offenses and that the Constitution does not require a broader, independent insanity defense that would result in acquittal even when the mental state is proven.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case concerned a dispute over payment for logs purchased on credit, where the parties reduced the unpaid balance to a promissory note carrying 20% interest after an earlier oral agreement for 17% interest on the account. The district court found the note usurious under Montana statutes because the rate exceeded the greater of 10% or 4% above the 13% discount rate on 90-day commercial paper, awarded the buyer a statutory penalty of double the interest on the note, and entered a net judgment for the seller after crediting payments and the penalty. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the note was a forbearance subject to the usury limits, that arguments for extending the usury penalty period to the date of trial were not preserved for appeal, and that the seller remained the prevailing party entitled to attorney fees based on the net judgment in its favor.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In State v. Furlong, the defendant was convicted of felony theft after items including a welder and battery chargers were found in his car trunk near the scene of a residential burglary in Great Falls, Montana; he was sentenced to ten years plus an additional ten years as a persistent felony offender. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the conviction and dismissed the case. The court held that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence of the property's current value to support a felony charge, as testimony relied only on purchase prices from several years earlier without accounting for depreciation or establishing a value over the felony threshold, and the trial court should have instructed on the lesser-included misdemeanor theft offense. The court also ruled that the prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant about his post-Miranda silence at arrest violated due process under Doyle v. Ohio, as it improperly impeached his trial alibi with his exercise of the right to remain silent.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a dispute over modifying a joint custody arrangement for a seven-year-old child following the parents' divorce. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision to award primary school-year custody to the father after the mother relocated to Hawaii. The court reasoned that the statutory provision allowing modification based on the child's integration into one parent's family does not apply to joint custody decrees, which are intended to integrate the child into both households, and there was insufficient evidence that the move would harm the child's interests. The original joint custody order was reinstated.

family law

The case concerned a veteran employee of the Montana Department of Labor and Industry's Job Service Division who applied for a manager position in 1982 but was passed over in favor of a nonveteran after the department treated the opening as an internal promotion and declined to apply a veteran's preference. Following the Crabtree decision interpreting the Veterans and Handicapped Civilians Employment Preference Act as granting qualified veterans an absolute preference over nonveterans, the petitioner sought enforcement of that preference. The district court ruled that the hiring constituted an appointment within the scope of the Act, applied the Crabtree interpretation retroactively, and ordered the department to appoint the petitioner to the position with back pay and interest. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the preference interpretation applied retroactively, whether the position was an appointment or promotion, and whether the ordered remedy was proper, resolving the issues in light of the statute as it stood prior to its repeal.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In State v. Koepplin, the defendant was charged with deliberate homicide after beating his ex-wife, who later died from her injuries; he pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of mitigated deliberate homicide under a plea agreement with no sentencing recommendation. After receiving a 40-year prison sentence as a dangerous offender, Koepplin moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that his counsel had not adequately explained the charge or the elements of negligent homicide and that he had been promised a lighter sentence. The district court denied the motion following an evidentiary hearing, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, applying the three Huttinger factors to conclude that the plea was voluntary and intelligent, that any lack of advice on lesser offenses did not render it involuntary, and that the motion appeared driven by dissatisfaction with the sentence after receiving the plea bargain's benefits.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Gary and Diana Gray, who purchased land in Billings and entered a subdivision improvement agreement with the City to replat it for mobile home lots, including a requirement to install a drain crossing that could be funded through a special improvement district (SID 1155) after the Grays waived protest rights. The Grays sued the City, seeking to enjoin the SID's formation while asserting claims that the agreement was invalid due to misrepresentations or duress and that the City breached the contract by the scope of the required crossing. The district court ruled for the City without a jury trial. The Montana Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that breach of contract is a legal claim for which the Grays had timely demanded and were entitled to a jury trial under the state constitution and rules of civil procedure, even when joined with equitable claims for rescission or injunction.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a collection action on a $10,000 promissory note given as part of the purchase price for a motel, after the buyers withheld part of a payment to cover alleged repair costs. The trial court entered default against the defendants after an attorney filed an appearance on their behalf but then disappeared without further action or notice to them, and later denied a motion to set aside the default. The Montana Supreme Court vacated the default and default judgment, holding that the attorney's total abandonment of the clients provided good cause to relieve the blameless defendants from the default, especially where they had acted diligently to monitor the case and raised a potential defense to the underlying claim.

procedureproperty

This case involves a workers' compensation claim by Calvin Metzger against Chemetron Corporation and its insurer for a back injury sustained at work in 1980. The Workers' Compensation Court awarded Metzger 80 percent permanent partial disability benefits after he underwent multiple surgeries but remained in pain and medically stable. Metzger appealed, arguing for permanent total disability benefits due to his pain and lack of job prospects, as well as a penalty for delayed payments. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding substantial evidence supported the partial disability award, that pain was appropriately considered as a factor, that Metzger did not prove no reasonable employment prospects, and that he had reached maximum medical recovery with no basis for a penalty.

labor & employment

The case concerned whether Truck Insurance Exchange's liability policy, issued to Action Sales and covering products hazards and completed operations, extended to a wrongful death claim from a propane furnace explosion in a camper sold by Action while the policy was in force, even though the accident occurred after the policy had been canceled. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's summary judgment for the insured and the plaintiff, ordering the insurer to pay the $225,000 consent judgment plus attorney fees. The majority held the policy ambiguous because its definitions of covered hazards, combined with language extending to "death at any time resulting therefrom," did not clearly limit coverage to injuries occurring strictly within the policy period. The court therefore construed the ambiguity against the insurer and found coverage applied. Three justices dissented, arguing the policy's general period limitation was unambiguous and barred coverage for post-expiration injuries.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved James Birkenbuel, who received workers' compensation benefits from the Montana State Compensation Insurance Fund after a work-related injury and later sued the Fund alleging bad faith in settlement negotiations under common law and the Unfair Trade Practices Act, as well as fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment to the Fund, dismissing the claims under the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act and holding that punitive damages were unavailable against a state agency. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, concluding that the exclusive remedy clause does not bar independent tort actions for bad faith conduct during the claims settlement process. However, the court affirmed that punitive damages cannot be recovered against the State Fund, as any award would ultimately be borne by subscribing employers rather than serving a deterrent function.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved a dispute over a buy/sell agreement for a 10,000-acre Montana ranch listed at $2.25 million, where buyer Ray Ehly sued sellers Dorothy, Bruce, and Cassandra Cady for specific performance, contract reformation, and damages after the deal fell through, later adding realtor James Ussin as a defendant and abandoning the specific performance claim. Ussin cross-claimed for his commission, and the Cadys asserted counterclaims. Following a nonjury trial, the district court awarded Ehly approximately $245,000 in damages plus attorney fees from the Cadys and awarded Ussin his commission, adopting proposed findings largely verbatim; the Cadys appealed. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, addressing issues including contract formation, breach liability, the realtor's entitlement to commission, and the calculation of damages such as lost investment tax credits, which the court found too speculative and uncertain to support full recovery.

propertybusiness & regulatorytaxesprocedure

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by Kerry Hafer, an ironworker who suffered a fractured elbow in a 1977 industrial accident at Anaconda Aluminum Company, leading to restricted mobility and a 20% permanent impairment rating of his left upper extremity. The Workers' Compensation Court found Hafer had a 40% diminished earning capacity but awarded benefits based on a 30% permanent partial disability after considering factors like age, education, pain, and work experience. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court addressed the proper test for calculating permanent partial disability benefits under state law. The court held that when earning capacity impairment can be independently determined, that percentage (here 40%) must be used to compute benefits without further adjustment by other variables, as the core purpose of workers' compensation is to compensate for reduced earning capability. It vacated the lower court's order and remanded for recalculation using the 40% figure, with a maximum of 280 weeks at $81 per week.

labor & employment