The case involved a chocolate manufacturer suing buyers who were exporters to recover a federal excise tax of $1,904 plus interest that the manufacturer had paid to the government. The contract called for chocolate packed in cases strapped for export with delivery free alongside steamer in New York and payment against documents, but the buyers instead sold the goods domestically after taking delivery. Lower courts directed a verdict for the defendants on the ground that the contract did not require export. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the contract language and surrounding circumstances showed the parties intended an export sale exempt from tax under the Revenue Act of 1918, so the defendants' domestic resale breached the agreement and rendered them liable for the tax.
This case concerned a longshoreman's 1920 negligence lawsuit against Walker D. Hines, then-Director General of Railroads, seeking damages for injuries sustained in 1919 while working on a steamer operated under federal railroad control. After federal control ended in March 1920 pursuant to the Transportation Act, Hines was no longer the designated agent, and the summons had been served on a company secretary rather than the proper presidential designee. The court held that jurisdiction over the United States could not be obtained in this manner, that the action could only proceed against the current designated agent under section 206 of the Act, and that service and the named defendant were insufficient, leading to reversal of the denial of the motion to dismiss.
The case involved an indemnity insurance policy under which the defendant insurer agreed to defend the plaintiff coal company against third-party bodily injury claims up to a $5,000 limit and to pay related costs and interest. After the insurer took over defense of two suits arising from a 1917 accident, it received but did not communicate a $5,000 settlement offer; the cases proceeded to judgments exceeding $12,000, which the insured had to pay in part. The insured then sued the insurer for the excess amount, alleging an implied duty to disclose the offer based on the parties' relationship. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, the Appellate Division reinstated a jury verdict for the plaintiff, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the unambiguous policy created no such duty absent allegations of fraud, negligence, or bad faith.
This case involves real estate brokers suing a property owner for a commission after they allegedly procured a corporate buyer ready, willing, and able to purchase the owner's Bronx real estate on the agreed terms. The trial court entered judgment for the brokers, but the Appellate Division reversed on the facts and law and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals determined that the owner had accepted the corporation as purchaser without objecting to its solvency or financial capacity at the time and modified the Appellate Division judgment to grant a new trial instead of dismissing the complaint.
The case concerned the estate of Patrick J. Dunn, who died in 1921, specifically whether New York's transfer tax applied to the full value of two parcels of real property acquired by Dunn and his wife in 1919 and 1920 as tenants by the entirety. The appraiser initially included the property's full value in the taxable estate; the Surrogate's Court reversed and directed a deduction for the widow's dower interest, a decision affirmed by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 1916 amendment to the Transfer Tax Law imposed the tax on the survivor's right to the entire property as though it had been bequeathed by the deceased, without any dower deduction. The court explained that estates by the entirety had historically been exempt because no new interest passed on death, the statute created no dower right, and the legislative fiction of absolute ownership by the deceased required taxing the whole rather than a partial interest.
The case involved a dispute between a Massachusetts cotton manufacturer and New York buyers over three 1919 contracts for the sale of textile goods, where the seller manufactured and set aside bales of goods but the buyers refused to pay outstanding invoices or accept further shipments amid a business downturn. The seller sued for the price of goods sold and delivered, though no physical delivery occurred, prompting defenses that the contracts were canceled due to the seller's refusal to ship and that title had not passed. The trial court entered judgment for the seller, but the Appellate Division reversed on grounds that the complaint alleged actual delivery while the evidence showed only symbolic appropriation under the Personal Property Law. The Court of Appeals held that the buyers were not misled by the pleadings, that title passed upon the seller's selection and allocation of the goods, and that the complaint sufficiently supported recovery for the contract price, leading it to reverse the Appellate Division and reinstate the trial judgment.
