This case is a direct appeal from a death sentence imposed after a Dauphin County jury convicted Herbert J. Blakeney of first-degree murder for fatally slashing the throat of his estranged wife's 14-month-old son with a butcher knife during a domestic confrontation, as well as attempted murder and aggravated assault of another adult present. The trial court sentenced Blakeney to death after he represented himself at trial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the claims raised on appeal, including issues concerning self-representation and access to expert assistance, lacked merit.
The case concerned whether a shipyard worker injured in a graven dry dock could receive workers' compensation benefits under both the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act and the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s ruling that concurrent benefits were available. The court reasoned that the injury occurred on land rather than upon the navigable waters of the United States, placing the claim outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the LHWCA under the 1972 amendments and Sun Ship precedent, while the worker’s performance of a traditional maritime function was undisputed.
Gene Stilp, a taxpayer acting pro se, petitioned for a declaratory judgment that the Pennsylvania Auditor General has authority and a duty to audit the General Assembly's financial accounts and that the Legislative Audit Advisory Commission was unconstitutionally created, while also seeking orders compelling such an audit. The Commonwealth Court found Stilp had taxpayer standing but held that no constitutional or statutory provision authorized the Auditor General to perform the audit and that separation of powers principles barred it. On cross-appeals, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Stilp failed to meet the requirements for taxpayer standing under the Biester test, as his allegations were conclusory and did not show the governmental action would otherwise go unchallenged or that no better-suited parties existed, and therefore affirmed the dismissal solely on standing grounds without reaching the merits.
This case involved challenges to the nomination papers of Edward Benkoski, Sr., and Jeffrey P. Stewart, who sought to run as independent candidates for township supervisor after their Democratic nomination petitions were invalidated for failing to timely file financial interest statements. The objectors argued that Section 976(e) of the Pennsylvania Election Code prohibits candidates who filed nomination petitions from later filing nomination papers for the same office in the general election. The trial court agreed and removed the candidates from the ballot, but the Commonwealth Court reversed, interpreting the setting aside of petitions as undoing the filing ab initio. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain language of Section 976(e) bars such filings where a nomination petition has been filed and set aside, treating it as a sore loser provision that prevents circumvention of primary defects.
In Ferguson v. McKiernan, former paramours entered into an agreement for clinical sperm donation via IVF, with the understanding that the donor would have no parental rights or support obligations and the donor's role would remain confidential. After the birth of twins, the mother sought child support five years later, and lower courts ruled the agreement unenforceable as against public policy to protect the children's best interests. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that the private agreement was enforceable because it was materially indistinguishable from institutional sperm donations, and enforcing such contracts does not violate public policy.
This case concerned a long-running dispute over the management of the financially distressed Chester-Upland School District, pitting the Department of Education against the Special Board of Control (SBOC) appointed under the Public School Code. After hearings, the Commonwealth Court appointed a receiver and later approved a settlement substituting the Empowerment Board of Control as the respondent while marking the case settled. The Supreme Court affirmed the substitution order, holding that the SBOC and its members were no longer proper parties once the Secretary dissolved the SBOC and the new board assumed control. It also quashed the appeal from the settlement order because the appellants lacked standing to challenge an agreement to which they were not parties. The core reasoning centered on the statutory framework for distressed districts, rules of appellate procedure governing party substitution, and the effect of the settlement on the ongoing litigation.