Ralph J. Cappy

This case is a direct appeal from a death sentence imposed after a Dauphin County jury convicted Herbert J. Blakeney of first-degree murder for fatally slashing the throat of his estranged wife's 14-month-old son with a butcher knife during a domestic confrontation, as well as attempted murder and aggravated assault of another adult present. The trial court sentenced Blakeney to death after he represented himself at trial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the claims raised on appeal, including issues concerning self-representation and access to expert assistance, lacked merit.

criminal law

The case concerned whether a shipyard worker injured in a graven dry dock could receive workers' compensation benefits under both the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act and the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s ruling that concurrent benefits were available. The court reasoned that the injury occurred on land rather than upon the navigable waters of the United States, placing the claim outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the LHWCA under the 1972 amendments and Sun Ship precedent, while the worker’s performance of a traditional maritime function was undisputed.

labor & employmentfederal power

Gene Stilp, a taxpayer acting pro se, petitioned for a declaratory judgment that the Pennsylvania Auditor General has authority and a duty to audit the General Assembly's financial accounts and that the Legislative Audit Advisory Commission was unconstitutionally created, while also seeking orders compelling such an audit. The Commonwealth Court found Stilp had taxpayer standing but held that no constitutional or statutory provision authorized the Auditor General to perform the audit and that separation of powers principles barred it. On cross-appeals, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Stilp failed to meet the requirements for taxpayer standing under the Biester test, as his allegations were conclusory and did not show the governmental action would otherwise go unchallenged or that no better-suited parties existed, and therefore affirmed the dismissal solely on standing grounds without reaching the merits.

procedure

This case involved challenges to the nomination papers of Edward Benkoski, Sr., and Jeffrey P. Stewart, who sought to run as independent candidates for township supervisor after their Democratic nomination petitions were invalidated for failing to timely file financial interest statements. The objectors argued that Section 976(e) of the Pennsylvania Election Code prohibits candidates who filed nomination petitions from later filing nomination papers for the same office in the general election. The trial court agreed and removed the candidates from the ballot, but the Commonwealth Court reversed, interpreting the setting aside of petitions as undoing the filing ab initio. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain language of Section 976(e) bars such filings where a nomination petition has been filed and set aside, treating it as a sore loser provision that prevents circumvention of primary defects.

elections

In Ferguson v. McKiernan, former paramours entered into an agreement for clinical sperm donation via IVF, with the understanding that the donor would have no parental rights or support obligations and the donor's role would remain confidential. After the birth of twins, the mother sought child support five years later, and lower courts ruled the agreement unenforceable as against public policy to protect the children's best interests. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that the private agreement was enforceable because it was materially indistinguishable from institutional sperm donations, and enforcing such contracts does not violate public policy.

family law

This case concerned a long-running dispute over the management of the financially distressed Chester-Upland School District, pitting the Department of Education against the Special Board of Control (SBOC) appointed under the Public School Code. After hearings, the Commonwealth Court appointed a receiver and later approved a settlement substituting the Empowerment Board of Control as the respondent while marking the case settled. The Supreme Court affirmed the substitution order, holding that the SBOC and its members were no longer proper parties once the Secretary dissolved the SBOC and the new board assumed control. It also quashed the appeal from the settlement order because the appellants lacked standing to challenge an agreement to which they were not parties. The core reasoning centered on the statutory framework for distressed districts, rules of appellate procedure governing party substitution, and the effect of the settlement on the ongoing litigation.

procedure

The case concerned HSP Gaming's petition for review asking the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to order Philadelphia's City Council and related bodies to enact zoning ordinances designating its Gaming Board-approved casino site as a Commercial Entertainment District and to approve its plan of development, after Council took no action on bills introduced following Planning Commission approval. The Gaming Act and local CED ordinance provisions preserved the Board's site selection authority and prohibited local interference with permitted gaming uses. The City respondents did not oppose the relief, and the court held that Council's inaction justified declaring the site zoned as requested and directing further compliance steps under the ordinance, while declining to resolve ancillary issues such as riparian rights or the precise operation of the ordinance's deemed-approved timeline.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved Robert Ratsamy's conviction for possession with intent to deliver crack cocaine, along with related drug and weapons offenses, based on evidence from an undercover police surveillance operation where he was found with a handgun, cash, and a rock of cocaine, while his associate possessed unused plastic bags. The trial court credited the testimony of a narcotics expert and an observing officer to find sufficient evidence of intent to deliver. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the PWID conviction after re-weighing the evidence and finding it insufficient. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Superior Court had misapplied the proper standard of review, which requires viewing all evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner without re-weighing facts. The Court therefore vacated the Superior Court's order and remanded to reinstate the original judgment of sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

These consolidated cases addressed whether Pennsylvania trial courts may vacate and correct illegal criminal sentences after the thirty-day statutory period for modifying orders under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 has expired. In Holmes, the trial court had resentenced the defendant for a parole violation as if it were a probation violation, resulting in an improper minimum and maximum term; in Whitfield, a similar unauthorized resentencing occurred. The Supreme Court held that trial courts possess inherent authority to correct patent and obvious errors in sentencing orders even after the modification window closes, reversing the Superior Court in Holmes and affirming it in Whitfield. The core reasoning rested on prior precedent recognizing this judicial power to address clear internal inconsistencies or illegalities that do not require further fact-finding.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a challenge by Derry Township to regulations issued by the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry that broadly defined "state-owned buildings" to include facilities at the Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, thereby removing local authority over building permits, plan reviews, and fees for certain construction projects under the Pennsylvania Construction Code Act. The Township sought declaratory relief in 2006, arguing the regulations improperly displaced municipal powers, while the Department and other respondents raised preliminary objections. The Commonwealth Court dismissed the petition sua sponte as unripe, citing insufficient harm and unresolved factual issues. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding the dispute ripe for review because it presented a primarily legal question about a formally promulgated and actively enforced regulation, with clear antagonistic positions and hardship from ongoing construction bypassing local processes. The matter was remanded to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned the removal of Magisterial District Judge Allan Clifford Berkhimer from office after the Judicial Conduct Board charged him with violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court of Judicial Discipline found that Berkhimer made repeated sexually offensive and inappropriate comments to female staff members, displayed pornographic images on his office computer (including evidence from a pending child pornography case), and directed staff to send congratulatory "Quickie Notes" to constituents solely to advance his reelection prospects. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the removal, holding that the conduct violated Article V, § 18 by bringing the judicial office into disrepute and breached rules requiring judges to act with patience, dignity, and courtesy while prohibiting partisan political activity using court resources. The court credited the consistent testimony of the staff members and rejected the judge's denials and medical mitigation arguments.

electionsprocedure

The case concerned whether the Dauphin County General Authority's current board could terminate without cause two program administration agreements for school financing pools that its predecessor board had entered in 1986 and 1997. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the contracts were enforceable against successor boards and could not be terminated outside the termination provisions specified in the agreements themselves. The Court reasoned that the Municipality Authorities Act expressly authorized the Authority to make agreements with others in connection with its bond issues, thereby removing the need to classify the contracts as governmental or proprietary functions. Because the agreements fell within this statutory power and contained explicit termination conditions, the current board lacked authority to end them unilaterally.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Solebury and Buckingham Townships challenging the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection's issuance of a Section 401 water quality certification to the Department of Transportation for a proposed highway bypass project under the federal Clean Water Act. After PennDOT requested and obtained revocation of the certification, the Environmental Hearing Board dismissed the challenge as moot without reaching the merits. The Townships then sought attorneys' fees under Section 307(b) of the Clean Streams Law and the Costs Act, leading the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to consider whether fee awards are available when an underlying administrative action becomes moot due to voluntary revocation. The court analyzed statutory interpretation of fee-shifting provisions, the definition of prevailing parties, and related precedents to determine the propriety of such awards in the absence of a decision on the merits.

environmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In this case, two codefendants were tried jointly for murder; a redacted version of one nontestifying codefendant's confession was admitted against him alone, but during closing argument the prosecutor referred to the other defendant by name in connection with that confession. The trial court denied a motion for severance and offered a cautionary jury instruction, which defense counsel declined. The Superior Court reversed the conviction, holding that the prosecutor's comment violated Bruton v. United States and that the error required a new trial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the comment, while improper, did not trigger Bruton's per se rule requiring severance or a mistrial, and that any potential prejudice could have been cured by the proposed cautionary instruction. The court therefore reinstated the judgment of sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether prior convictions for indirect criminal contempt arising from violations of a Protection from Abuse (PFA) order could be used to grade a defendant's first stalking conviction as a third-degree felony under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709.1. Thomas Bortz was convicted of stalking his former romantic partner after multiple violations of a PFA order she obtained against him, and the trial court imposed a felony sentence based on those prior adjudications. The Superior Court affirmed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court likewise affirmed, holding that the stalking statute's grading provision expressly encompasses violations of orders issued under 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108 involving the same victim. The Court reached this result through straightforward statutory interpretation, rejecting arguments that the prior contempt findings were merely civil or did not qualify as crimes of violence.

criminal lawfamily law

This case involved an insurance coverage dispute in which Kvaerner sought defense and indemnification from National Union under commercial general liability policies for a breach of contract and warranty lawsuit filed by Bethlehem Steel. Bethlehem alleged that Kvaerner failed to build a coke oven battery according to contract specifications and warranties, resulting in numerous defects such as cracked bricks, shifting structures, and other construction flaws. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court and held that National Union had no duty to defend or indemnify, reasoning that the policies only covered property damage caused by an "occurrence" defined as an accident, and claims arising from faulty workmanship on the insured's own product do not qualify as such an occurrence. The court explained that CGL policies are designed to address tort liability for damage to third-party property, not contractual liability for defects in the completed work itself.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved former law partners and business associates who, after federal bankruptcy proceedings and related state litigation over real estate investments, partnership debts, and counterclaims alleging breach of fiduciary duty, brought state-law claims for wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of process under Pennsylvania's Dragonetti Act. The trial court dismissed the claims on preemption grounds, and the Superior Court affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the comprehensive federal Bankruptcy Code preempts the state tort claims because its provisions for handling adversary proceedings and sanctions reflect congressional intent to occupy the field, and treating decisions of lower federal courts on this issue as persuasive but not binding authority.

federal powerprocedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved a medical negligence lawsuit filed by Garth Womer against Dr. Jan K. Hilliker after eye surgery, in which Womer failed to file the certificate of merit required by Pa.R.C.P. No. 1042.3 within the 60-day period. After a judgment of non pros was entered against Womer for the omission, he sought to open the judgment by arguing that an expert report served during discovery substantially complied with the rule and that any failure was due to counsel's oversight. The trial court denied relief under Pa.R.C.P. No. 3051, finding no reasonable explanation for the default. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court's decision to grant relief, holding that discovery materials cannot substitute for the formal filing of a certificate of merit and that Womer's mistaken belief did not excuse the procedural default.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned a class action filed by Allegheny County homeowners challenging the county Board of Property Assessment Appeals and Review's procedures for handling tax assessment appeals. The plaintiffs alleged that the Board improperly considered evidence outside the hearing record, including post-hearing notes and external data, without notice to taxpayers, in violation of due process; they sought declaratory and injunctive relief plus damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the common pleas court lacked equity jurisdiction to grant the requested relief because an adequate legal remedy existed in the form of de novo appeals of individual assessments. The court reasoned that longstanding principles against judicial interference with state tax collection, as articulated in National Private Truck Council v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, limit § 1983 actions seeking to enjoin tax assessments when state remedies suffice.

taxescivil rightsprocedure

This case involved trustees and beneficiaries of a life insurance policy who sued Phoenix Home Life Mutual Insurance Company in Pennsylvania after a New York class action settlement regarding misleading "vanishing premium" policies. The trial court granted summary judgment to Phoenix on res judicata grounds, but the Superior Court reversed, finding the class notice inadequate. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the New York settlement was binding because the notice satisfied due process requirements, including opportunity to opt out, and thus barred the Pennsylvania action under full faith and credit principles. The court reinstated the dismissal of the suit.

procedurebusiness & regulatory