This case involved a lawsuit by parents against a doctor, medical group, and hospital for the alleged negligent induction of labor that resulted in the stillbirth of their viable fetus in 1969. The parents sought damages under Rhode Island's Wrongful Death Act, but the Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the claim. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no action lies for the wrongful death of a stillborn fetus. The court reasoned that the statute, being in derogation of common law, must be strictly construed and requires the death of a "person," which does not include a fetus that dies en ventre sa mere; it distinguished prior precedent allowing claims only for live-born children injured prenatally.
In Brown v. Brown, the Rhode Island Family Court issued an interlocutory decree enjoining the respondent husband from proceeding with a divorce action he filed in Maryland while a divorce from bed and board action was pending in Rhode Island, where he was in contempt for failing to pay child support. The respondent appealed, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction to issue the injunction because he had established domicile in Maryland. The court affirmed the injunction, holding that jurisdiction over the respondent had been properly obtained through service and his general appearance in Rhode Island, and that such jurisdiction continued for proceedings arising from the original cause of action regardless of his subsequent change in domicile. The court reasoned that anti-suit injunctions may be issued when the equities warrant, and the respondent's domicile in another state is not determinative but merely one factor to consider.
The case involved a juvenile, Henry Robalewski, who was adjudicated delinquent in Family Court for possession of stolen goods after police seized a camera from his room during a search, leading to his commitment to the Training School; he sought release pending appeal and challenged the seizure. The Rhode Island Supreme Court treated the matter as an appeal from the denial of post-adjudication release and addressed whether juveniles have a right to bail pending appeal. It held that neither the federal nor state constitution provides a right to postconviction or postadjudication bail for adults or juveniles, leaving such release to judicial discretion under factors like appeal grounds and flight risk, with habeas corpus available via statute. On the merits of the underlying adjudication, the court reversed and remanded because the record lacked evidence that officers had probable cause to seize the camera under the plain-view exception before examining it, requiring further findings on consent and search exceptions.
The case involved two gas utility companies, Bristol & Warren Gas Company and South County Gas Company, seeking review of Public Utilities Commission orders that denied their proposed rate increases without holding public hearings as required by G.L. 1956 §39-3-11. The commission based its denials on the companies' failure to comply with earlier May 1976 orders directing them to reconstruct their accounting records, retain approved accountants, and complete audits to correct gross irregularities before any further rate relief would be considered. The companies did not challenge the prior orders or claim full compliance but contended that the lack of hearings rendered the latest orders invalid and entitled them to charge the new rates retroactively. The court upheld the commission's authority, finding that §39-1-38 granted implied powers to require acceptable books of account as a prerequisite for rate filings, and the companies had implicitly accepted those standards by filing new tariffs.
The plaintiff filed a civil action for a writ of mandamus to compel Rhode Island Department of Health officials to provide access to unannounced inspection records of three nursing homes, which a statute required to be open for public inspection. After the defendants complied with the request following the lawsuit's filing, the Superior Court treated the matter as moot, granted costs to the plaintiff, and denied his requests for damages including nominal damages and expenses. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, ruling that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages because no statute authorized their recovery in mandamus actions and the common law rule therefore applied to bar such relief.
The case involved a dispute over uninsured motorist coverage under multiple auto insurance policies after defendant Lori Baker was injured in a motorcycle accident with an uninsured driver. Baker sought coverage from York Insurance under her policy and from Employers' Fire Insurance and American Employers' Insurance under policies issued to her father, but York denied coverage based on an exclusion for injuries while occupying an uninsured vehicle owned by the insured, while the other insurers argued their policies were excess. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for Baker, holding the York exclusion and the "other insurance" clauses void as contrary to public policy under G.L.1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 27-7-2.1, and ruled that all three insurers must share liability proportionately. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the statute requires uninsured motorist coverage to protect insureds and prohibits policy provisions that reduce or limit the mandated protection below the statutory minimum.