Thomas Joseph Paolino

This case involved a lawsuit by parents against a doctor, medical group, and hospital for the alleged negligent induction of labor that resulted in the stillbirth of their viable fetus in 1969. The parents sought damages under Rhode Island's Wrongful Death Act, but the Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the claim. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no action lies for the wrongful death of a stillborn fetus. The court reasoned that the statute, being in derogation of common law, must be strictly construed and requires the death of a "person," which does not include a fetus that dies en ventre sa mere; it distinguished prior precedent allowing claims only for live-born children injured prenatally.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

In Brown v. Brown, the Rhode Island Family Court issued an interlocutory decree enjoining the respondent husband from proceeding with a divorce action he filed in Maryland while a divorce from bed and board action was pending in Rhode Island, where he was in contempt for failing to pay child support. The respondent appealed, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction to issue the injunction because he had established domicile in Maryland. The court affirmed the injunction, holding that jurisdiction over the respondent had been properly obtained through service and his general appearance in Rhode Island, and that such jurisdiction continued for proceedings arising from the original cause of action regardless of his subsequent change in domicile. The court reasoned that anti-suit injunctions may be issued when the equities warrant, and the respondent's domicile in another state is not determinative but merely one factor to consider.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a juvenile, Henry Robalewski, who was adjudicated delinquent in Family Court for possession of stolen goods after police seized a camera from his room during a search, leading to his commitment to the Training School; he sought release pending appeal and challenged the seizure. The Rhode Island Supreme Court treated the matter as an appeal from the denial of post-adjudication release and addressed whether juveniles have a right to bail pending appeal. It held that neither the federal nor state constitution provides a right to postconviction or postadjudication bail for adults or juveniles, leaving such release to judicial discretion under factors like appeal grounds and flight risk, with habeas corpus available via statute. On the merits of the underlying adjudication, the court reversed and remanded because the record lacked evidence that officers had probable cause to seize the camera under the plain-view exception before examining it, requiring further findings on consent and search exceptions.

criminal lawprocedurefamily law

The case involved two gas utility companies, Bristol & Warren Gas Company and South County Gas Company, seeking review of Public Utilities Commission orders that denied their proposed rate increases without holding public hearings as required by G.L. 1956 §39-3-11. The commission based its denials on the companies' failure to comply with earlier May 1976 orders directing them to reconstruct their accounting records, retain approved accountants, and complete audits to correct gross irregularities before any further rate relief would be considered. The companies did not challenge the prior orders or claim full compliance but contended that the lack of hearings rendered the latest orders invalid and entitled them to charge the new rates retroactively. The court upheld the commission's authority, finding that §39-1-38 granted implied powers to require acceptable books of account as a prerequisite for rate filings, and the companies had implicitly accepted those standards by filing new tariffs.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The plaintiff filed a civil action for a writ of mandamus to compel Rhode Island Department of Health officials to provide access to unannounced inspection records of three nursing homes, which a statute required to be open for public inspection. After the defendants complied with the request following the lawsuit's filing, the Superior Court treated the matter as moot, granted costs to the plaintiff, and denied his requests for damages including nominal damages and expenses. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, ruling that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages because no statute authorized their recovery in mandamus actions and the common law rule therefore applied to bar such relief.

procedurecivil rights

The case involved a dispute over uninsured motorist coverage under multiple auto insurance policies after defendant Lori Baker was injured in a motorcycle accident with an uninsured driver. Baker sought coverage from York Insurance under her policy and from Employers' Fire Insurance and American Employers' Insurance under policies issued to her father, but York denied coverage based on an exclusion for injuries while occupying an uninsured vehicle owned by the insured, while the other insurers argued their policies were excess. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for Baker, holding the York exclusion and the "other insurance" clauses void as contrary to public policy under G.L.1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 27-7-2.1, and ruled that all three insurers must share liability proportionately. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the statute requires uninsured motorist coverage to protect insureds and prohibits policy provisions that reduce or limit the mandated protection below the statutory minimum.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved a divorced father's appeal from a Family Court order increasing his weekly child support payments for his two children from $30 to $37.50 each. The court affirmed the modification, finding that the children's needs had increased since the original 1972 divorce decree due to higher costs for clothing, food, activities, and other expenses, as supported by the mother's testimony. Additionally, the father, who owned a profitable corporation and had various assets and income sources, was deemed financially capable of meeting part of the increased needs, and the trial justice's decision was not clearly erroneous based on the totality of circumstances.

family law

This case involves a bill in equity filed by the executors and trustee under Mary M. Tilley's will seeking judicial construction of the will and instructions regarding the exercise of a general testamentary power of appointment over a marital trust created by her late husband and the apportionment of estate taxes and administration expenses. The court first addressed whether the appointment violated the rule against perpetuities, then turned to the tax allocation issue. It held that the appointed property must bear its proportionate share of the death taxes because the will's general direction to pay all taxes lacked the clear contrary intent required to shift the burden to the residuary estate, consistent with prior precedent on appointed assets. The decision rested on the absence of explicit language overriding the default rule that appointed property bears taxes attributable to its inclusion in the taxable estate.

propertytaxes

This case involved neighboring property owners challenging the issuance of building permits for restroom and office facilities at a proposed seasonal campground on land zoned for rural residential use in Coventry, Rhode Island. The zoning board of review upheld the permits as compliant with the local ordinance, and the Superior Court affirmed that decision. The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari, finding that the campground use was explicitly permitted in the zone and that the accessory sanitary facilities had received prior health department approval, providing legally competent evidence supporting the board's action. The court noted that issues regarding actual current uses were not part of this review of the initial permit issuance.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved consolidated appeals from Family Court decrees in a dispute over partitioning real estate owned by parties whose marriage had been declared void, with the property under court-appointed receivers. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to enter the challenged orders, including those appointing an additional receiver, setting attorney fees, and directing the sale of the property, rendering those decrees void. The court reasoned that federal removal statutes automatically stayed state proceedings once a proper removal petition was filed until a remand order, and that once an appeal was docketed in the Supreme Court the trial court could not act without remand of the case papers. The appeals were sustained and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

family lawprocedurepropertyfederal power

In State v. Kachanis, the defendant was convicted by a jury of filing a false police report, conspiracy to obtain money under false pretenses, and attempted larceny from an insurance company after reporting his car stolen and filing a claim, with the convictions resting in part on a self-incriminating statement he gave to police. The trial court denied his pretrial motion to suppress the statement, finding that he had waived his right to counsel despite requesting an attorney during custodial interrogation. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated the convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, ruling that the prosecution had not met its burden to demonstrate a valid waiver because the record contained no evidence contradicting the defendant's account of requesting counsel, as required under Miranda v. Arizona.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a civil action for personal injuries from a rear-end motor vehicle collision in which liability was admitted, leaving only damages at issue before a jury. The plaintiff sought to use a blackboard during closing argument to illustrate mathematical methods such as per diem calculations or multipliers for pain and suffering, but the trial justice sustained the defense objection; the jury awarded $2,300, and the court denied the plaintiff's motion for additur or a new trial limited to damages. On appeal, the court adopted the rule allowing such arguments under proper instructions because they are counsel's permissible suggestions rather than evidence, with existing safeguards like the trial justice's authority to set aside excessive verdicts, and therefore vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial on damages only.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether plaintiffs Antone and Mary Thomas held an easement allowing passage over land owned by defendants James and Kathleen Ross in Little Compton, Rhode Island. The plaintiffs sought damages and an injunction to remove obstructions placed by the defendants, while the defendants counterclaimed for declaratory and injunctive relief asserting no easement existed. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment denying the plaintiffs' claims and granting the defendants' requested relief, a decision appealed by the plaintiffs and certain third-party defendants. The core reasoning centered on the chain of property conveyances originating from a larger tract, with particular attention to deed language that explicitly stated the Grenier plan's depiction of the disputed right-of-way (between lots marked 3 and 4) was erroneous and not intended to be created or granted.

property

The case concerned a dispute over real estate at 453 Charles Street in Providence that Gaetano and Angelina Lancellotti had held as joint tenants; after Gaetano's death, Angelina conveyed the property to their son Enrico, prompting three other children to sue to enjoin the transfer and void the deeds. The plaintiffs claimed that the parents' 1960 joint will created a contractually binding life estate in the survivor with remainder interests to all eight children equally, subject to adjustments for prior advances. The Superior Court, sitting without a jury, interpreted the will's third paragraph to grant the requested equitable relief. On appeal, the court focused on whether the will's language severed the joint tenancy or preserved the survivorship right and whether extrinsic evidence of the testators' intent could be considered in construing the instrument.

family lawproperty

The case involved plaintiffs seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the proposed sale of a 3.426-acre parcel of land in Portsmouth that abuts an existing private road known as Glen Farm Road. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that the sale did not constitute a "subdivision" under state law or local planning board rules, that the road qualified as a "street," and that the planning board therefore lacked jurisdiction over the transaction. After a hearing on an agreed statement of facts, the Superior Court entered a judgment in the plaintiffs' favor on all points, ruling that no board approval was needed and that the court had authority to decide the matter under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. The planning board appealed. The core reasoning was that the parcel exceeded one acre and that the existing road already served the land, so no new street was required under the exemption in the statute and regulations, which define "street" broadly to include roads and other ways.

property

This case involved two consolidated challenges by home builders to use tax assessments by Rhode Island's tax administrator on modular home components purchased from an out-of-state manufacturer. The Superior Court affirmed the tax administrator's decision that the components remained subject to the use tax under state law. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling on certiorari, finding that the modules were personal property when the petitioners took delivery because substantial on-site work by the builders was still required to join the halves, connect utilities, complete the foundation attachment, and finish the structures. The court reasoned that the modules did not become part of the real estate until the petitioners completed that integration work, making the builders liable for the tax on materials used in their in-state construction activities.

taxesproperty

This case is an appeal from the denial of postconviction relief in which Grace C. Crescenzo claimed that the four-year delay between her November 1968 indictment for embezzlement and her December 1972 trial violated her state and federal constitutional rights to a speedy trial. The Rhode Island Supreme Court applied the four-factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo, examining the length of the delay, reasons for delay, the timing of the defendant's assertion of the right, and any prejudice to the defendant. The court determined that the state bore responsibility for some neutral delays such as prosecutorial reassignments but found no deliberate attempt to hinder the defense, noted that the defendant contributed to continuances and asserted her right only belatedly in 1972, and concluded that prejudice was not adequately shown. Pre-indictment matters were held irrelevant because the speedy-trial guarantee attaches upon formal accusation. The court denied and dismissed the appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose from a dispute between parties who had purchased real estate in Rhode Island as tenants by the entirety during a relationship they believed constituted a valid marriage, but which the Family Court later declared void because the wife's prior marriage had never been finalized by decree. After the wife petitioned for divorce and the husband cross-petitioned to declare the marriage void, the court appointed receivers to manage the property, denied claims of fraud by the wife, recognized a de facto marriage based on their joint efforts, and ruled that the wife held her share as a tenant in common. The husband appealed on grounds including lack of jurisdiction to try title, judicial bias, disqualification of receivers, and venue issues, but the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the decree, finding jurisdiction proper under the husband's petition and rejecting the other challenges. The court remanded for further proceedings on the property's disposition.

family lawpropertyprocedure

This case involved a petition for certiorari challenging a Superior Court order that remanded a Coastal Resources Management Council decision approving construction of a high-rise apartment building on Chepiwanoxet Island. The council had granted approval after public hearings, prompting complaints from the East Greenwich Yacht Club, Save the Bay, Inc., the town of East Greenwich, and the city of Warwick seeking judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act. The Supreme Court addressed issues including whether the plaintiffs were aggrieved persons with standing, the timeliness of filings, and the sufficiency of the council's findings. It held that the organizational and municipal plaintiffs had standing because they alleged and supported an injury in fact to their members' or citizens' use of the surrounding coastal waters and environment, satisfying the requirements after exhaustion of administrative remedies.

environmentprocedure

This case concerned whether Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2) barred discovery of an expert report prepared by one party in anticipation of litigation. In a negligence action arising from the 1972 collapse of a school walkway canopy, third-party defendant Plantations sought production of expert reports obtained by the original defendants after the collapse; Johnson objected, claiming absolute immunity for its expert's conclusions. The Superior Court granted Plantations' motion to compel, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld that order on certiorari. The court held that Rule 26(b)(2) provides only qualified immunity for expert conclusions, which may be overcome by a showing of injustice or undue hardship, and that absolute protection is reserved for an attorney's own mental impressions and legal theories. On the facts, the trial justice did not abuse discretion because Plantations had no opportunity to examine the site before evidence was removed.

proceduretorts & liability