This case concerns attorney John M. O'Quinn's request for injunctive relief to halt State Bar of Texas disciplinary proceedings against him under the State Bar Act and related rules that bar lawyers from using non-lawyers to solicit clients or sharing fees with them. The trial court denied the injunction and upheld the constitutionality of the statute and rules. On direct appeal, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the denial of injunctive relief. The court first confirmed its jurisdiction by treating the disciplinary rules as equivalent to statutes, then limited its review to pure questions of law regarding alleged violations of commercial free speech, equal protection, and court access rights, without resolving any factual issues in the underlying allegations.
This case arose from a medical malpractice claim where a child suffered permanent paralysis from a negligently administered injection at a U.S. Army hospital, leading to a damages award that the plaintiffs sought to protect from statutory caps. The Texas Supreme Court, responding to certified questions from the Fifth Circuit, held that the statutory limitations on medical malpractice damages in Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i §§ 11.02 and 11.03 violate the open courts provision of article I, § 13 of the Texas Constitution. The court reasoned that these caps unreasonably restrict a claimant's right to recover damages for injuries caused by others without providing adequate alternatives or justification under the police power. It was unnecessary to address whether the caps apply per defendant or per claimant.
This case concerned whether negotiations between Foreca, a Belgian company, and GRD, a Texas company, for the purchase of six amusement park rides produced an enforceable contract. The trial court entered judgment for Foreca based on a jury verdict finding that the September 2 and October 19, 1983 writings constituted an agreement that GRD breached. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the phrase 'subject to legal documentation' created an unfulfilled condition precedent to contract formation. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court, reasoning that whether the contemplated formal document was a condition precedent or merely a memorial of an already binding agreement presented a question of fact properly left to the jury under the circumstances.
In Willis v. Maverick, Yvonne Willis sued her divorce attorney Chilton Maverick for legal malpractice arising from a settlement agreement that permitted her ex-husband to seek partition and sale of the marital home, after the attorney had assured her otherwise. The jury found negligence and awarded damages, but the trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the court of appeals affirmed on statute-of-limitations grounds. The Texas Supreme Court ruled that the two-year limitations period for legal malpractice does not begin until the client discovers or should have discovered the facts supporting the claim, but affirmed the take-nothing judgment because Willis failed to preserve error by not submitting jury issues in proper form.
This case involved a condemnation proceeding in which Brazos Electric Power Cooperative sought an easement across Callejo's land to upgrade an electric transmission line from 69,000 to 138,000 volts. The jury found the pre-taking value of the easement strip to be $456,161 and the post-taking value to be $364,928.80, resulting in damages of $91,232.20, but the trial court disregarded the post-taking finding as unsupported by evidence, substituted a value of $33,541 drawn from expert testimony, and awarded Callejo $422,620. The court of appeals reinstated the jury's post-taking value, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court held that no evidence in the record supported a post-taking value higher than $33,541 and rejected the argument that a jury could blend pre- and post-taking testimony to arrive at a figure outside the range of the evidence presented.
This case involved a former City of San Antonio employee, Morris Davis, who sued the City for malicious prosecution (along with other claims) after being fired and indicted on official misconduct charges that were later dismissed. The trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the City on governmental immunity grounds despite the City's failure to plead that defense, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City waived governmental immunity by not affirmatively pleading it as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 94. The Court reasoned that governmental entities must follow the same pleading rules as other litigants and cannot raise unpleaded affirmative defenses like immunity after trial to avoid liability.