William W. Kilgarlin

This case concerns attorney John M. O'Quinn's request for injunctive relief to halt State Bar of Texas disciplinary proceedings against him under the State Bar Act and related rules that bar lawyers from using non-lawyers to solicit clients or sharing fees with them. The trial court denied the injunction and upheld the constitutionality of the statute and rules. On direct appeal, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the denial of injunctive relief. The court first confirmed its jurisdiction by treating the disciplinary rules as equivalent to statutes, then limited its review to pure questions of law regarding alleged violations of commercial free speech, equal protection, and court access rights, without resolving any factual issues in the underlying allegations.

free speechbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case arose from a medical malpractice claim where a child suffered permanent paralysis from a negligently administered injection at a U.S. Army hospital, leading to a damages award that the plaintiffs sought to protect from statutory caps. The Texas Supreme Court, responding to certified questions from the Fifth Circuit, held that the statutory limitations on medical malpractice damages in Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i §§ 11.02 and 11.03 violate the open courts provision of article I, § 13 of the Texas Constitution. The court reasoned that these caps unreasonably restrict a claimant's right to recover damages for injuries caused by others without providing adequate alternatives or justification under the police power. It was unnecessary to address whether the caps apply per defendant or per claimant.

healthcaretorts & liability

This case concerned whether negotiations between Foreca, a Belgian company, and GRD, a Texas company, for the purchase of six amusement park rides produced an enforceable contract. The trial court entered judgment for Foreca based on a jury verdict finding that the September 2 and October 19, 1983 writings constituted an agreement that GRD breached. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the phrase 'subject to legal documentation' created an unfulfilled condition precedent to contract formation. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court, reasoning that whether the contemplated formal document was a condition precedent or merely a memorial of an already binding agreement presented a question of fact properly left to the jury under the circumstances.

business & regulatory

In Willis v. Maverick, Yvonne Willis sued her divorce attorney Chilton Maverick for legal malpractice arising from a settlement agreement that permitted her ex-husband to seek partition and sale of the marital home, after the attorney had assured her otherwise. The jury found negligence and awarded damages, but the trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the court of appeals affirmed on statute-of-limitations grounds. The Texas Supreme Court ruled that the two-year limitations period for legal malpractice does not begin until the client discovers or should have discovered the facts supporting the claim, but affirmed the take-nothing judgment because Willis failed to preserve error by not submitting jury issues in proper form.

family lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a condemnation proceeding in which Brazos Electric Power Cooperative sought an easement across Callejo's land to upgrade an electric transmission line from 69,000 to 138,000 volts. The jury found the pre-taking value of the easement strip to be $456,161 and the post-taking value to be $364,928.80, resulting in damages of $91,232.20, but the trial court disregarded the post-taking finding as unsupported by evidence, substituted a value of $33,541 drawn from expert testimony, and awarded Callejo $422,620. The court of appeals reinstated the jury's post-taking value, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court held that no evidence in the record supported a post-taking value higher than $33,541 and rejected the argument that a jury could blend pre- and post-taking testimony to arrive at a figure outside the range of the evidence presented.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a former City of San Antonio employee, Morris Davis, who sued the City for malicious prosecution (along with other claims) after being fired and indicted on official misconduct charges that were later dismissed. The trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the City on governmental immunity grounds despite the City's failure to plead that defense, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City waived governmental immunity by not affirmatively pleading it as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 94. The Court reasoned that governmental entities must follow the same pleading rules as other litigants and cannot raise unpleaded affirmative defenses like immunity after trial to avoid liability.

proceduretorts & liabilitycivil rights

In this case, Dorothy Herbert sued her ex-husband Hansel Kay Herbert to enforce a divorce decree's property settlement requiring him to pay her half of his military retirement benefits; he defended by claiming she had materially breached the agreement by withholding his personal property. A jury found that she had not substantially complied with her obligations, leading the trial court to enter a take-nothing judgment against her. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the jury's failure to find substantial compliance was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case, holding that appellate courts may review jury non-findings for factual insufficiency but must follow established guidelines that respect the sanctity of jury verdicts under the Texas Constitution's provisions for both trial by jury and conclusive appellate fact jurisdiction.

family lawprocedure

This case involved two lawsuits by oil and gas equipment suppliers against Western International Petroleum Corporation and Ulrich Muhr for unpaid materials and services on drilling operations, plus foreclosure of mechanics’ and materialmen’s liens. The trial court entered default judgments after the defendants failed to answer, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the petitions did not give Muhr fair notice of the claims against him personally. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and upheld the default judgments, reasoning that the petitions sufficiently alleged agency relationships, joint liability, concert of action, and the underlying debts through detailed factual assertions, supporting both liability and the awards of damages, attorney’s fees, and lien validity.

procedurepropertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a homebuyer who sued the seller under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and for fraud after the city demolished her newly purchased house pursuant to a preexisting demolition order that had been recorded in county deed records. The trial court awarded damages to the buyer based on jury findings that the seller knowingly failed to disclose the order to induce the sale. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the recorded order provided constructive notice that defeated the claims as a matter of law. The Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision, ruling that imputed notice under real property recording statutes does not serve as a defense to DTPA or fraud actions against a seller who intentionally withheld known information. The court reasoned that the purpose of recording laws is to protect innocent purchasers from undisclosed claims, not to shield sellers from liability for their own deceptive conduct, and found no legislative intent to create such a bar.

business & regulatoryproperty

In this mandamus action, relators Lunsford and Dail, who had sued their former employer for conspiracy and malicious defamation seeking both actual and punitive damages, challenged a trial court's denial of pretrial discovery into the defendants' net worth and financial documents. The Texas Supreme Court held that a defendant's net worth is discoverable under Tex.R.Civ.P. 166b(2) because it is relevant to the assessment of punitive damages. The court reasoned that punitive damages serve to punish wrongdoers and deter future misconduct, making evidence of the defendant's financial condition necessary to calibrate an appropriate award, and therefore overruled prior precedent barring such discovery or admission. It noted that the overwhelming majority of states and federal courts permit this evidence for that limited purpose.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a stepfather's claim for damages for mental anguish after his stepsons were injured (one fatally) in an automobile accident in Pasadena, Texas. The stepfather was at home when the accident occurred, learned of it from a visitor, and arrived at the scene afterward to see the aftermath, including one injured stepson in an ambulance. The trial court awarded damages based on a jury verdict, but the court of appeals reversed, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. The court held as a matter of law that the stepfather had no cause of action, applying foreseeability factors from Dillon v. Legg that require a plaintiff to have been near the scene and to have directly and contemporaneously perceived the accident through sensory observation, rather than learning of it afterward from others.

torts & liability

This case concerned whether a plaintiff had provided proper pre-suit notice under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA) in a dispute over defective irrigation pipe sold by the defendant. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff on its DTPA claims, but the court of appeals reversed, finding insufficient proof of notice. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case, holding that the attorney's unobjected-to testimony that notice was given pursuant to the DTPA constituted some evidence of compliance, and that under Tex.R.Civ.P. 279 the omitted notice issue was deemed found by the trial court in support of the judgment because the defendant had not objected to its non-submission to the jury.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this mandamus action, Manuel Garcia, the survivor of a 1983 car accident involving a fuel-fed fire in his 1982 Buick, sought to challenge a pretrial protective order issued by Judge David Peeples that restricted his use and dissemination of documents obtained from General Motors Corporation during discovery in his strict product liability suit alleging a design defect in the vehicle's fuel system. The Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted the writ, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an overly broad order that prevented Garcia from sharing relevant information with other litigants and failed to account for the age and reduced sensitivity of the proprietary documents. The core reasoning was that Rule 166b-4 protective orders for trade secrets require a specific factual showing of harm but do not mandate in-camera review if affidavits suffice, and that shared discovery among non-competitor plaintiffs does not constitute an unconstitutional taking of property while serving the interests of judicial efficiency and consistent outcomes.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned the enforceability of covenants not to compete in the employment contracts of four hair stylists who resigned from Norris of Houston and began working at a competing salon three miles away. The trial court issued a permanent injunction barring the former employees from competing within a 15-mile radius for three years, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and dissolved the injunction, holding that the stylists were engaged in a common calling and that non-compete covenants are unenforceable against employees in such roles absent a sale of business or specialized training. The court applied its recent precedent from Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., concluding that barbering qualifies as a common calling regardless of one employee's managerial title.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

In Price v. Price, a wife sued her husband for negligence after a pre-marriage motorcycle accident caused her injuries, but the trial court granted summary judgment based on the common-law doctrine of interspousal immunity, which the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the doctrine is abolished for all causes of action. The court reasoned that the doctrine originated from outdated notions of spousal unity and coverture that were undermined by Married Women's Acts granting wives independent legal rights, and that remaining justifications such as preserving marital harmony or preventing collusion lack merit and conflict with the constitutional right to equal protection. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the negligence claims.

family lawtorts & liability

In Rodriguez v. American Home Assurance Co., a worker injured on the job settled her workers' compensation claim believing she had only a back sprain, but later tests revealed a herniated disc requiring surgery and leaving permanent disability; she then sued to set aside the settlement agreement. The trial court entered judgment setting aside the agreement after a jury trial, but the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the insurer. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings, holding that more than a scintilla of evidence supported the jury's findings that the insurer made doctors its agents by using their reports in the settlement process and that the worker relied on their representations about her condition in agreeing to settle. The court reasoned that agency could arise from the carrier's use of a doctor's reports even if the worker initially chose the doctor, and that the evidence viewed favorably to the verdict showed reliance on diagnoses from both the carrier's agent and the utilized doctor.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a claim by homeowners Norman and Carol Reddell against Jasper Federal Savings & Loan Association for wrongful foreclosure of their home after repeated defaults on a note secured by a deed of trust. The trial court ruled in favor of Jasper, finding the Reddells were estopped from claiming lack of proper notice because they had actual knowledge of their rights through their attorney. The court of appeals reversed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision and affirmed the trial court's judgment that the Reddells take nothing. The core reasoning was that while strict compliance is required for statutory notice provisions under Texas Property Code section 51.002, actual notice suffices for additional contractual requirements in the deed of trust regarding rights to reinstate after acceleration or to bring a court action, especially absent any prejudice from the omitted language in the notice.

propertyprocedure

In American Teachers Life Insurance Co. v. Brugette, the plaintiff sued the insurance company to recover disability benefits under a policy provided by his employer after suffering a work injury, but had not submitted the required proof of loss forms detailing the injury and treatment. The trial court ruled in favor of Brugette, and the court of appeals affirmed on grounds of substantial compliance, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment and rendered judgment for the insurer. The court reasoned that proof of loss is a condition precedent to recovery on the policy, and with a verified denial by the insurer, the claimant had the burden to secure jury findings supporting his theories of waiver or substantial compliance, which he failed to obtain, nor did he prove those theories as a matter of law.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned a dispute between co-owners Larson and Gentry of Cactus Utility Company over the valuation and division of corporate assets after they decided to end their business relationship, with Larson suing for an accounting and receiving a jury verdict of over $837,000 that the trial court reduced by $350,000 via remittitur. The court of appeals affirmed the remittitur under an abuse of discretion standard, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed that affirmance and remanded for reconsideration of the remittitur issue. The court held that both trial courts and courts of appeals must apply a factual insufficiency of the evidence standard when ordering or reviewing remittiturs, rather than an abuse of discretion test, because no court may substitute its judgment for the jury's. The decision also addressed an evidentiary objection to a stock purchase agreement but focused primarily on clarifying the remittitur standard from prior precedent like Pope v. Moore.

procedurepropertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Mobile Auto Trim seeking a temporary injunction against former franchisee Joel Hill to enforce a covenant not to compete in their franchise agreement, which prohibited Hill from competing in seven Texas counties for three years after termination and from contacting certain car dealership managers. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' affirmance of the injunction and held the covenant void in all respects. The court reasoned that covenants not to compete are restraints on trade enforceable only if reasonable, requiring that they be necessary to protect legitimate interests like goodwill, not oppressive to the restricted party in time, territory, or scope, and not injurious to the public. It applied these standards to the franchise context after reviewing precedents on both business-sale and employment covenants.

business & regulatory