The case concerned whether an open-enrollment charter school could pursue an interlocutory appeal from a trial court's denial of its plea to the jurisdiction asserting immunity from suit in a breach-of-contract action brought by a construction company. The Texas Supreme Court held that such schools qualify as "governmental units" under the Tort Claims Act's definition of any institution, agency, or organ of government whose status and authority derive from legislative enactments. The court reasoned that Chapter 12 of the Education Code expressly incorporates charter schools into the public-education system, subjects them to state testing and accountability requirements, and grants them powers and immunities through statutes, thereby satisfying the statutory criteria for interlocutory appeal under Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(8). The court reversed the court of appeals' dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remanded for consideration of the immunity claim on the merits.
This case involves challenges by the State of Texas, utility companies, municipal groups, consumer groups, and others to the Public Utility Commission of Texas's interpretations of cost-recovery provisions in Chapter 39 of the Utilities Code, which governs the deregulation of the electric power industry. The restructuring required utilities to unbundle into separate generation, retail, and transmission/distribution entities, with mechanisms like stranded-cost estimates via the ECOM model, competition transition charges, capacity auctions, and true-up proceedings to reconcile projected and actual costs. The court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded to the PUC for further proceedings on specific issues including adjustments to nonbypassable charges and true-up calculations. The core reasoning centered on statutory interpretation of PURA sections such as 39.201, 39.262, and related rules to determine proper application of recovery formulas and auction requirements.
In Fresh Coat, Inc. v. K-2, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court addressed whether a manufacturer of synthetic stucco (EIFS) must indemnify a contractor under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 82 for payments made in settling homeowners' claims of defective construction causing water damage. The Court held that EIFS qualifies as a "product" and the installing contractor as a "seller," so the manufacturer has a duty to indemnify the contractor for losses from the products liability action, including a settlement with the homebuilder. The reasoning centered on the statutory definitions, finding no exclusion for items integrated into real property like homes, and that contractual obligations do not negate the statutory indemnity duty unless the seller's independent fault is shown.
The case involved Alfredo Herrera, a University of Texas at El Paso employee, who sued under the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act after being terminated following medical leave for an on-the-job injury; he also raised a First Amendment claim. The Texas Supreme Court held that UTEP's sovereign immunity barred the FMLA claim, reversing the lower courts' denial of the university's plea to the jurisdiction. The court reasoned that Congress lacked authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state immunity via the self-care provision, as it was not aimed at remedying identified state constitutional violations in the manner of the family-care provision upheld in Hibbs. The court further concluded that a single sentence in UTEP's employee handbook did not constitute a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity under state law.
This case arose from a dispute between neighboring cattle ranchers in Texas where the defendant Bennett and the Bonham Corporation auctioned thirteen head of the plaintiff's stray cattle during a drought, leading to a civil suit for conversion after Bennett's acquittal on criminal theft charges. The jury awarded the plaintiff actual damages of $5,327.11 plus $1.25 million in exemplary damages against Bennett and the Corporation. The Texas Supreme Court held that exemplary damages were justified due to the reprehensible conduct but that the ratios of exemplary to compensatory damages (47:1 and 188:1) violated due process under the Fourteenth Amendment as established by U.S. Supreme Court precedents, requiring remittitur on remand.
This case arose from an intra-family dispute in Texas probate court over the ownership and control of family-owned food and beverage businesses following the death of the family patriarch. After the defendants removed the case to federal court and it was remanded, the key issues were whether hand-filing the federal remand order was sufficient to revest jurisdiction in the state court and how to define a “tertiary recusal motion” under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 30.016 for purposes of multiple recusal filings against judges. The Texas Supreme Court held that hand-delivery of the certified remand order to the state court clerk transfers jurisdiction back to the state court, and that a tertiary recusal motion encompasses any third recusal motion filed in the case rather than being limited to a third motion by the same party against the same judge. The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its interpretation of the recusal statute.