Don R. Willett

The case concerned whether an open-enrollment charter school could pursue an interlocutory appeal from a trial court's denial of its plea to the jurisdiction asserting immunity from suit in a breach-of-contract action brought by a construction company. The Texas Supreme Court held that such schools qualify as "governmental units" under the Tort Claims Act's definition of any institution, agency, or organ of government whose status and authority derive from legislative enactments. The court reasoned that Chapter 12 of the Education Code expressly incorporates charter schools into the public-education system, subjects them to state testing and accountability requirements, and grants them powers and immunities through statutes, thereby satisfying the statutory criteria for interlocutory appeal under Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(8). The court reversed the court of appeals' dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remanded for consideration of the immunity claim on the merits.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involves challenges by the State of Texas, utility companies, municipal groups, consumer groups, and others to the Public Utility Commission of Texas's interpretations of cost-recovery provisions in Chapter 39 of the Utilities Code, which governs the deregulation of the electric power industry. The restructuring required utilities to unbundle into separate generation, retail, and transmission/distribution entities, with mechanisms like stranded-cost estimates via the ECOM model, competition transition charges, capacity auctions, and true-up proceedings to reconcile projected and actual costs. The court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded to the PUC for further proceedings on specific issues including adjustments to nonbypassable charges and true-up calculations. The core reasoning centered on statutory interpretation of PURA sections such as 39.201, 39.262, and related rules to determine proper application of recovery formulas and auction requirements.

business & regulatory

In Fresh Coat, Inc. v. K-2, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court addressed whether a manufacturer of synthetic stucco (EIFS) must indemnify a contractor under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 82 for payments made in settling homeowners' claims of defective construction causing water damage. The Court held that EIFS qualifies as a "product" and the installing contractor as a "seller," so the manufacturer has a duty to indemnify the contractor for losses from the products liability action, including a settlement with the homebuilder. The reasoning centered on the statutory definitions, finding no exclusion for items integrated into real property like homes, and that contractual obligations do not negate the statutory indemnity duty unless the seller's independent fault is shown.

torts & liabilitypropertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Alfredo Herrera, a University of Texas at El Paso employee, who sued under the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act after being terminated following medical leave for an on-the-job injury; he also raised a First Amendment claim. The Texas Supreme Court held that UTEP's sovereign immunity barred the FMLA claim, reversing the lower courts' denial of the university's plea to the jurisdiction. The court reasoned that Congress lacked authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state immunity via the self-care provision, as it was not aimed at remedying identified state constitutional violations in the manner of the family-care provision upheld in Hibbs. The court further concluded that a single sentence in UTEP's employee handbook did not constitute a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity under state law.

labor & employmentfederal powercivil rights

This case arose from a dispute between neighboring cattle ranchers in Texas where the defendant Bennett and the Bonham Corporation auctioned thirteen head of the plaintiff's stray cattle during a drought, leading to a civil suit for conversion after Bennett's acquittal on criminal theft charges. The jury awarded the plaintiff actual damages of $5,327.11 plus $1.25 million in exemplary damages against Bennett and the Corporation. The Texas Supreme Court held that exemplary damages were justified due to the reprehensible conduct but that the ratios of exemplary to compensatory damages (47:1 and 188:1) violated due process under the Fourteenth Amendment as established by U.S. Supreme Court precedents, requiring remittitur on remand.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedure

This case arose from an intra-family dispute in Texas probate court over the ownership and control of family-owned food and beverage businesses following the death of the family patriarch. After the defendants removed the case to federal court and it was remanded, the key issues were whether hand-filing the federal remand order was sufficient to revest jurisdiction in the state court and how to define a “tertiary recusal motion” under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 30.016 for purposes of multiple recusal filings against judges. The Texas Supreme Court held that hand-delivery of the certified remand order to the state court clerk transfers jurisdiction back to the state court, and that a tertiary recusal motion encompasses any third recusal motion filed in the case rather than being limited to a third motion by the same party against the same judge. The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its interpretation of the recusal statute.

procedurefamily lawproperty

In Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, an employee sued her employer for sexual harassment under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) and for common-law negligent supervision and retention after being harassed by a coworker. The jury found for the employee on both claims, and she elected to recover on the negligence claim for greater damages. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the TCHRA preempts common-law negligence claims when the alleged negligence is based on the same facts as the harassment covered by the statute. The court reasoned that the TCHRA provides a comprehensive remedial scheme with specific procedures, standards, elements, defenses, and remedies that would be undermined by allowing dual-track claims, and here the claims stemmed from the same conduct, with the employer's duties embedded in the TCHRA inquiry. The court reversed the judgment on the negligence claim and remanded for consideration of the TCHRA claim.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

The case involved Bradley Smith, who was injured during a large fight at the Grandstand Bar on the Del Lago resort after ninety minutes of escalating verbal confrontations, cursing, and shoving between two groups of intoxicated patrons. The jury found the bar owner 51 percent liable for failing to act, resulting in a roughly $1.48 million award that the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the judgment, reasoning that a reasonable person in the owner's position would have foreseen the potential for assaultive conduct given the known ongoing heated altercations and should have taken action to make the premises reasonably safe. The Court rejected arguments that the danger was open and obvious or that no duty existed under premises-liability principles.

torts & liability

This case involves a medical malpractice claim by Tangie Walters against Cleveland Regional Medical Center and others, alleging that a surgical sponge was left inside her during a 1995 tubal ligation, discovered only in 2005 after years of pain. The trial court and court of appeals granted summary judgment to the defendants based on the two-year statute of limitations for healthcare liability claims. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that Walters raised a fact issue regarding the applicability of the Open Courts provision of the Texas Constitution as an exception to the limitations period. The court reasoned that foreign-object cases like retained sponges are uniquely difficult to discover promptly, making an absolute two-year cutoff inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of access to courts and rendering the ten-year repose statute superfluous.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

This case involved a contract dispute between Apache Corporation, a gas producer, and Versado Gas Processors (affiliated with Dynegy), a processor, over whether Apache was owed payment for volumes of gas that entered Versado's gathering system at wellheads but could not be accounted for at the plant tailgates where residue gas was sold. Apache sued for breach of contract and related claims, arguing it should be compensated for the unaccounted-for gas under the parties' percentage-of-proceeds agreements. The court held that the contracts unambiguously required payment based only on the volume of gas actually sold to third parties at the tailgate, not on gas delivered at the wellhead or on any losses during processing and transport. Because Apache admitted it had been fully paid for all gas sold, the court concluded Versado had no further payment obligation. The court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for entry of a conforming judgment.

business & regulatory

In this breach-of-contract case, KB Home sued Intercontinental Group Partnership after the developer sold subdivision lots to third parties instead of KB Home, seeking damages and attorney's fees under a contract clause awarding fees to the prevailing party. The jury found that Intercontinental breached the contract but awarded KB Home zero dollars in damages. The Texas Supreme Court held that KB Home did not qualify as the prevailing party because it obtained no actual or meaningful relief, such as damages or equitable relief, that materially altered the parties' legal relationship. The court therefore reversed the fee award and rendered a take-nothing judgment.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerned a suit by Louis Ditta, guardian of Doris Conte’s estate, to remove Susan Conte as co-trustee of the Joseph P. Conte Family Trust due to alleged mismanagement and violations of the trust terms, including improper use of trust assets. The probate court granted removal, modified the trust’s succession provisions, and appointed a successor trustee, but the court of appeals reversed, holding the action barred by the four-year statute of limitations that applies to breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, ruling that no statutory limitations period applies to trustee-removal actions. The Court reasoned that while limitations periods govern suits seeking damages for fiduciary breaches, they do not constrain a court’s equitable discretion to remove a trustee when the focus is on protecting the trust relationship rather than obtaining monetary recovery.

propertyprocedure

The case involved an inmate who objected to trial court orders directing withdrawal of funds from his prison trust account to pay assessed court costs and appointed-counsel fees from prior criminal convictions, claiming a lack of due process before the money was taken. The Texas Supreme Court held that proceedings under Government Code section 501.014(e) to collect such fees are civil in nature rather than part of the underlying criminal case, and thus within the court's jurisdiction. The court decided that due process is satisfied by providing the inmate notice and an opportunity to be heard after the withdrawal occurs, because these post-judgment efforts aim to reimburse the state and resemble civil collection actions like garnishment. It therefore reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court's denial of the inmate's objections to the orders.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rightsproperty

The case involved a dispute over whether John Kappus, the independent executor of his brother James's estate, should be removed due to a conflict of interest arising from co-ownership of estate property and differing views on how to divide sale proceeds. The trial court denied removal and divided the property 58.59% to the estate and 41.41% to John. The court of appeals reversed on the removal issue, but the Texas Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's order, holding that Probate Code section 149C does not list conflict of interest as a ground for removal and no statutory grounds were met.

family lawpropertyprocedure

This case involved a premises liability claim against Denton County after a minor passenger was injured when her car skidded off a rural two-lane road at night and was struck by a seventeen-foot unsecured floodgate arm positioned about three feet off the pavement. The plaintiffs sued on both premise-defect and special-defect theories under the Texas Tort Claims Act, but the trial court dismissed the premise-defect claim while allowing the special-defect claim to proceed. The Texas Supreme Court held that the floodgate arm was not a special defect because it was neither an excavation nor an obstruction on the roadway and did not pose a threat to ordinary users traveling on the road surface. The court reasoned that the TTCA's special-defect category is narrow, limited to conditions like those expressly mentioned in the statute, and that an off-road hazard does not meet this standard when drivers are not expected to leave the pavement. The Court therefore reversed the court of appeals and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case arose when the Tanner family was injured in a car accident caused by Richard Gibbons, who fled police at high speeds after a traffic stop and collided with the Tanners' vehicle. Gibbons' insurer, Nationwide, refused to cover the resulting default judgment against him and filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing that the policy's intentional-injury exclusion barred coverage because Gibbons intentionally evaded police. A jury found that Gibbons did not intentionally cause the Tanners' injuries, but the trial court granted Nationwide judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusion requires intentional injury or damage rather than merely intentional conduct that foreseeably leads to harm, and that the evidence supported the jury's verdict in favor of coverage. The court rendered judgment on the jury's findings for the Tanners.

torts & liability

Pine Oak Builders was sued by five homeowners for water damage to their homes caused by alleged construction defects, including improper installation of EIFS synthetic stucco and faulty design of columns and balconies, and it sought a defense under its occurrence-based CGL policies from insurers including Great American. The insurers denied coverage and sought declaratory relief, leading to cross-motions for summary judgment that the trial court granted in the insurers' favor. Applying precedents from Lamar Homes, Don’s Building Supply, and GuideOne Elite, the Texas Supreme Court held that faulty workmanship claims allege property damage caused by an occurrence, coverage is triggered under the actual-injury rule when physical damage occurs during the policy period, and the duty to defend is determined by the eight-corners rule without extrinsic evidence unless collusion is shown. The Court affirmed the judgment for Mid-Continent due to an EIFS exclusion and for Great American on the Glass suit under the your-work exclusion, but reversed on the duty to defend the other four suits and on application of the Prompt Payment of Claims statute, remanding for further proceedings under the actual-injury rule.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

This case involves a Jones Act lawsuit filed by John Lopez against GlobalSantaFe Corp. in state court for injuries from silica and asbestos exposure while working on a vessel. The silica MDL pretrial court remanded the case back to the original trial court, ruling that Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 90, which sets procedures for silica claims including expert reports and a minimal-impairment requirement, was preempted by the federal Jones Act. The Texas Supreme Court held that Chapter 90's general procedural framework is not preempted by the Jones Act, but its minimal-impairment provision for silica claims is preempted because it imposes a substantive requirement not found in federal law. Accordingly, the Court conditionally granted mandamus relief directing the pretrial court to vacate its remand order.

procedurefederal powertorts & liability

This case was an insurance-coverage dispute certified from the Fifth Circuit concerning when property damage occurs under Texas law for purposes of occurrence-based commercial general liability policies. Homeowners sued Don's Building Supply for defects in synthetic stucco installed during the policy periods that allowed hidden moisture damage to develop, and the insurer sought a declaration that it had no duty to defend because the damage was not discoverable until after the policies expired. The Texas Supreme Court held that the insurer's duty to defend is triggered if the physical injury to tangible property occurred during the policy period, regardless of when it became identifiable or discoverable. The court reasoned that the unambiguous policy language conditions coverage on the timing of the actual injury caused by an occurrence, not on its visibility or discovery by the insured or third parties.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

This case involved a dispute between Forest Oil Corporation and McAllen over whether environmental and personal injury claims related to oil and gas operations should be arbitrated under a 1999 settlement agreement resolving prior royalty and lease disputes. The settlement included broad releases of claims, a waiver-of-reliance provision disclaiming any reliance on representations by either party, and an arbitration clause for environmental liability and related matters under the Texas General Arbitration Act. McAllen sued in 2004 alleging environmental damage from buried contaminants and radioactive material, arguing that the arbitration provision was fraudulently induced by assurances during negotiations that no environmental issues existed. The Texas Supreme Court held that the unambiguous waiver-of-reliance language, negotiated by sophisticated parties with counsel in an arm's-length transaction, conclusively negated reliance and thus barred the fraudulent-inducement claim as a matter of law, requiring the claims to proceed to arbitration.

business & regulatoryprocedure