Robert T. Hunter

The case concerned challenges to the jurisdiction of non-attorney judges in Washington district and municipal courts to hear misdemeanor cases that could result in imprisonment. The Supreme Court of Washington held that such lay judges do not violate due process under the state or federal constitutions. The court reasoned that the state constitution does not mandate attorney judges for courts of limited jurisdiction, that de novo review is available in superior court before attorney judges, and that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in North v. Russell upheld a similar system against federal constitutional challenges.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Randy Gordon Luoma, a 17.5-year-old juvenile convicted by a jury in superior court of first-degree murder of his girlfriend's young daughter. The Court of Appeals had reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial without the first-degree charge, prompting the state's petition for review; the Supreme Court addressed multiple issues including the sufficiency of evidence and the admissibility of the defendant's statements. The court held that the defendant's custodial statements made to police, even after Miranda warnings, were inadmissible in adult proceedings because the circumstances did not make clear to the juvenile that he faced potential adult criminal prosecution rather than juvenile proceedings. Core reasoning focused on the presence of a juvenile officer assuring protection of rights, creating a non-adversarial context, and the absence of explicit warnings about adult prosecution, though a separate non-custodial statement remained admissible. The case was remanded for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Lois Flanders, a 28-year-old unemployed woman entitled to public assistance under existing state statutes, who was rendered ineligible by a provision in the 1975-77 biennium appropriations bill limiting general assistance to single persons aged 50 or older. Flanders brought an original mandamus action challenging the provision under Const. art. 2, §§ 19 and 37, which require that bills embrace only one subject expressed in the title and that amendments to existing laws be set forth in full rather than by reference. The court held the provision unconstitutional as an improper attempt to enact substantive changes to general public assistance law through an appropriations bill, which violated the constitutional goals of preventing logrolling and ensuring adequate notice to legislators and the public. It overruled prior precedent permitting such conflicts, concluded that appropriations bills cannot suspend or amend codified general laws, and directed the Department of Social and Health Services to provide the assistance under existing statutes.

procedure

In State v. Thompson, the defendant was charged with second-degree assault involving a firearm after shooting at a police car during an incident stemming from marital issues; following a bench trial, the court convicted him but entered a special finding that he was not armed with a deadly weapon or firearm, despite undisputed evidence to the contrary and other findings supporting guilt. The State appealed, arguing the finding conflicted with the evidence and statutes requiring enhanced penalties for such weapons. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the special finding was a manifest abuse of discretion because it was unsupported by the facts, including the defendant's use of a shotgun. The court rejected double jeopardy concerns, noting the finding related only to sentencing enhancement, and upheld the statutory distinctions between firearms and other deadly weapons against an equal protection challenge. It remanded for entry of a finding consistent with the evidence that the defendant was armed.

criminal lawguns

The case concerned a habeas corpus petition filed on behalf of a juvenile, Gerald S. Johnson, who had been adjudicated delinquent in 1974 and committed to DSHS custody until his 18th birthday. Shortly before that birthday in 1975, the juvenile court extended his commitment to age 19 under a newly enacted statute, RCW 13.04.260, which allowed jurisdiction over delinquents up to age 21. DSHS challenged the trial court's ruling that this extension violated ex post facto prohibitions in the state and federal constitutions. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute constituted an amendment to prior law rather than a clarification, and could not be applied retroactively to offenses and commitments that occurred before its enactment in June 1975. The court reasoned that the new law expanded juvenile court authority beyond the 18-year age of majority established in 1971, and applying it to prior conduct would impose additional punishment not authorized at the time of the offenses.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a dispute over a promissory note for a loan made with community funds, payable to Victor Olson or Ethel Olson as joint tenants with rights of survivorship; after Victor's death, his estate claimed the remaining balance as community property subject to his will, while his wife's estate claimed it passed to her by survivorship. The trial court ruled that the note and mortgage created a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, so the balance became the wife's sole property. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the note's language did not satisfy RCW 64.28.010, which requires a written instrument to expressly declare that the interest created is a joint tenancy. The court reasoned that the statute, enacted to permit but strictly limit joint tenancies, demands clear and unambiguous language beyond merely naming the payees as joint tenants with survivorship rights.

propertyfamily law