Robert T. Hunter

The case concerned challenges to the jurisdiction of non-attorney judges in Washington district and municipal courts to hear misdemeanor cases that could result in imprisonment. The Supreme Court of Washington held that such lay judges do not violate due process under the state or federal constitutions. The court reasoned that the state constitution does not mandate attorney judges for courts of limited jurisdiction, that de novo review is available in superior court before attorney judges, and that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in North v. Russell upheld a similar system against federal constitutional challenges.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Randy Gordon Luoma, a 17.5-year-old juvenile convicted by a jury in superior court of first-degree murder of his girlfriend's young daughter. The Court of Appeals had reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial without the first-degree charge, prompting the state's petition for review; the Supreme Court addressed multiple issues including the sufficiency of evidence and the admissibility of the defendant's statements. The court held that the defendant's custodial statements made to police, even after Miranda warnings, were inadmissible in adult proceedings because the circumstances did not make clear to the juvenile that he faced potential adult criminal prosecution rather than juvenile proceedings. Core reasoning focused on the presence of a juvenile officer assuring protection of rights, creating a non-adversarial context, and the absence of explicit warnings about adult prosecution, though a separate non-custodial statement remained admissible. The case was remanded for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Lois Flanders, a 28-year-old unemployed woman entitled to public assistance under existing state statutes, who was rendered ineligible by a provision in the 1975-77 biennium appropriations bill limiting general assistance to single persons aged 50 or older. Flanders brought an original mandamus action challenging the provision under Const. art. 2, §§ 19 and 37, which require that bills embrace only one subject expressed in the title and that amendments to existing laws be set forth in full rather than by reference. The court held the provision unconstitutional as an improper attempt to enact substantive changes to general public assistance law through an appropriations bill, which violated the constitutional goals of preventing logrolling and ensuring adequate notice to legislators and the public. It overruled prior precedent permitting such conflicts, concluded that appropriations bills cannot suspend or amend codified general laws, and directed the Department of Social and Health Services to provide the assistance under existing statutes.

procedure

In State v. Thompson, the defendant was charged with second-degree assault involving a firearm after shooting at a police car during an incident stemming from marital issues; following a bench trial, the court convicted him but entered a special finding that he was not armed with a deadly weapon or firearm, despite undisputed evidence to the contrary and other findings supporting guilt. The State appealed, arguing the finding conflicted with the evidence and statutes requiring enhanced penalties for such weapons. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the special finding was a manifest abuse of discretion because it was unsupported by the facts, including the defendant's use of a shotgun. The court rejected double jeopardy concerns, noting the finding related only to sentencing enhancement, and upheld the statutory distinctions between firearms and other deadly weapons against an equal protection challenge. It remanded for entry of a finding consistent with the evidence that the defendant was armed.

criminal lawguns

The case concerned a habeas corpus petition filed on behalf of a juvenile, Gerald S. Johnson, who had been adjudicated delinquent in 1974 and committed to DSHS custody until his 18th birthday. Shortly before that birthday in 1975, the juvenile court extended his commitment to age 19 under a newly enacted statute, RCW 13.04.260, which allowed jurisdiction over delinquents up to age 21. DSHS challenged the trial court's ruling that this extension violated ex post facto prohibitions in the state and federal constitutions. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute constituted an amendment to prior law rather than a clarification, and could not be applied retroactively to offenses and commitments that occurred before its enactment in June 1975. The court reasoned that the new law expanded juvenile court authority beyond the 18-year age of majority established in 1971, and applying it to prior conduct would impose additional punishment not authorized at the time of the offenses.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a dispute over a promissory note for a loan made with community funds, payable to Victor Olson or Ethel Olson as joint tenants with rights of survivorship; after Victor's death, his estate claimed the remaining balance as community property subject to his will, while his wife's estate claimed it passed to her by survivorship. The trial court ruled that the note and mortgage created a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, so the balance became the wife's sole property. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that the note's language did not satisfy RCW 64.28.010, which requires a written instrument to expressly declare that the interest created is a joint tenancy. The court reasoned that the statute, enacted to permit but strictly limit joint tenancies, demands clear and unambiguous language beyond merely naming the payees as joint tenants with survivorship rights.

propertyfamily law

This case concerned a 1973 job application by Robert Clark for a railroad brakeman position with the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, and Pacific Railroad, which was rejected based on his history of knee surgeries; Clark then filed a complaint with the Washington State Human Rights Commission alleging discrimination due to a physical handicap under RCW 49.60.180(1). The Commission’s hearing tribunal found an unfair employment practice and ordered relief including back pay and a job offer, but the superior court reversed, holding the statute unconstitutionally vague for lacking a definition of “handicap.” The Washington Supreme Court reversed the superior court on the vagueness issue, ruling that the term has a sufficiently clear common meaning to provide fair notice, but it also held the tribunal proceedings invalid because the Commission’s informal policies for selecting panel members constituted unadopted “rules” under the state Administrative Procedure Act. The court remanded the matter to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with proper rulemaking requirements.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a challenge by AFDC recipients to the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services' treatment of lump-sum payments, such as income tax refunds and inheritances, as countable 'income' that reduced or terminated monthly benefits. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to align state practices with federal AFDC requirements. The court held that the state's statutory and regulatory definition of income was invalid because it conflicted with federal rules requiring that only income actually available for current use on a regular basis be considered. It also ruled that statutory resource exemptions apply to both applicants and recipients. The trial court's dismissal was reversed and the case remanded.

federal powerfamily lawhealthcare

The case concerned a dispute over the continuation and vesting of employee pension benefits under the Poulsbo Rural Telephone Association's profit-sharing plan following its 1972 asset sale and reorganization with Northwest and United. Plaintiff Minnie Williams, a former PRTA employee who continued working for Northwest, challenged aspects of the plan's amendment and administration after the transaction. The court held that United and the beneficiaries of the Poulsbo Plan were necessary parties to the litigation and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice unless they were joined within 90 days. The reasoning centered on the requirement under Washington law that all parties with interests in the trust and retirement plans must be included for a complete adjudication of rights under the reorganization agreement and plan amendments.

business & regulatorylabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved George Rains, who spent over $100 on newspaper ads opposing ballot propositions and school levies but did not file the special expenditure reports required by RCW 42.17.100(1). The Public Disclosure Commission sued for penalties and an injunction, but the trial court dismissed the action, ruling the statute unconstitutionally vague and the Commission's implementing regulation invalid. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to specify any time limit for filing the required reports. The court applied a stricter vagueness standard due to the statute's impact on First Amendment-protected political expression and concluded that the Commission lacked authority to cure the defect through regulation. The court affirmed the dismissal but did not award attorney fees to the Rainses.

electionsfree speech

The case involved a challenge by a preservation association to King County's approval of a preliminary plat for a 198-lot housing subdivision on 52 acres of wooded land without requiring an environmental impact statement under the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA). The superior court upheld the county's decision that no EIS was needed, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the county's threshold determination was clearly erroneous. The court reasoned that the project constituted a major action significantly affecting the environment due to the scale of development from vacant woodland to urban residential use, requiring full environmental information prior to approval. It remanded for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.

environmentproperty

The case involved Diane Beckett, who was acquitted of grand larceny charges for allegedly fraudulently receiving public assistance under the Aid for Dependent Children program but faced a subsequent administrative proceeding by the Department of Social and Health Services to assess and recover a fraudulent overpayment by deducting from her future benefits. The Superior Court affirmed the department's ruling that the prior acquittal did not bar the civil action, and Beckett appealed, arguing that collateral estoppel and double jeopardy precluded the proceeding based on the same facts. The Supreme Court of Washington held that neither doctrine applied, affirming the lower court's order and remanding for further proceedings on the fraud issue. The court reasoned that collateral estoppel requires identical burdens of proof, which were not present here because the criminal case used the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard while the civil fraud recovery under RCW 74.04.300 required only clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, as discussed in prior cases like Standlee v. Smith. Double jeopardy was inapplicable because the overpayment assessment was a civil remedial measure rather than a criminal punishment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a challenge by a 17-year-old applicant to the Seattle Housing Authority's policy, adopted without following formal procedures, of denying public housing to minors who were otherwise eligible. The trial court granted summary judgment to the applicant, holding that the Housing Authority was a state agency subject to the Washington Administrative Procedures Act (WAPA) and that its age-based policy was void as an improperly adopted rule. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the Housing Authority is not an "agency" under RCW 34.04.010(1) because that definition covers only state boards, commissions, departments, or officers involved in statewide programs, not local entities like housing authorities that operate independently on local matters without state funding. The court reached this conclusion through statutory interpretation, noting the narrow language of WAPA compared to broader agency definitions in other statutes and the local, non-statewide character of housing authorities.

procedurecivil rights

The case involved Simpson Timber Company conducting a slash burn under a Department of Natural Resources (DNR) permit for forest fire hazard abatement and reforestation site preparation, which produced smoke and particulate fallout leading to a citation and $250 civil penalty from the Olympic Air Pollution Control Authority for violating its local regulation. The Pollution Control Hearings Board overturned the penalty, and the superior court affirmed that decision. The court ruled that RCW 70.94.660 of the Washington Clean Air Act grants the DNR exclusive authority and responsibility for issuing and regulating permits for the listed activities, including forest fire hazard abatement and silvicultural operations, thereby preempting local air pollution control authorities from enforcing their regulations when burns fully comply with a valid DNR permit. This conclusion followed from statutory interpretation of the 1971 amendments, which repealed prior exemptions and assigned distinct regulatory roles to the DNR versus local authorities or the Department of Ecology for other types of fires.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

This case concerns the extent of the Puyallup Tribe's off-reservation commercial fishing rights for steelhead trout under the Treaty of Medicine Creek, in conflict with Washington state's conservation regulations enforced by the Department of Game. The trial court ruled that these rights do not apply to hatchery-raised steelhead runs, that half of the natural run must escape to perpetuate the species, and that the tribe is entitled to 45 percent of the remaining natural run. The Washington Supreme Court addressed jurisdictional issues, affirming state court authority to determine the balance between treaty rights and state conservation powers, while reviewing the apportionment and scope of the rights following prior U.S. Supreme Court remands. The core reasoning emphasizes that state regulations must not discriminate against Indians and must be necessary for conservation, with the tribe's rights limited to the natural run.

civil rightsfederal powerenvironment

The case Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co. involved a libel claim by William Taskett, a private individual in the advertising business, against a television station for a news report about his business failure and sudden departure that allegedly portrayed him as a swindler. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, requiring Taskett to prove actual malice under prior precedent. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court decided to adopt a negligence standard for libel actions brought by private individuals concerning matters of public interest, consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., rather than requiring proof of actual malice as under the Rosenbloom plurality. The core reasoning was that states may set their own standards for such cases to balance First Amendment protections with the reputational interests of private persons, rejecting the extension of the New York Times actual malice rule to all public concern matters.

free speech

The case involved Bruce Keith Myers's appeal from his robbery conviction after a nonjury trial and from the revocation of his probation following a 1974 hearing. Myers, who had received a deferred sentence and probation for the 1972 robbery of Albert Dahl, argued that joint representation with his codefendant denied him the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, that his diminished capacity defense should have prevailed, and that the revocation improperly relied on convictions under an unconstitutional city prowling ordinance. The court affirmed both the conviction and the revocation, reasoning that both defendants testified at trial so confrontation rights were not impaired, that Adwell's statement was not facially incriminating on the robbery charge, and that the revocation rested on multiple other valid probation violations supported by substantial evidence independent of the prowling ordinance.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether the Multistate Tax Commission, established under the Multistate Tax Compact, could lawfully conduct joint sales and use tax audits of multistate corporations such as Hertz pursuant to article 8 of the compact. Hertz challenged the commission's authority on constitutional grounds, including claims that the compact violated the Compact Clause, the Commerce Clause, equal protection, and Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the commission, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that article 8 was severable from the rest of the compact, that its audit provisions did not infringe on the cited constitutional rights, and that the issues presented were purely legal with no material factual disputes requiring trial. It therefore upheld the commission's authority to perform the audits on behalf of participating states.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

In Miller v. Pacific First Federal, borrowers executed a promissory note and mortgage containing a clause allowing the lender to raise the interest rate by up to two percent if the property was sold or transferred, without requiring proof of actual increased risk. After the borrowers sold the property via real estate contract, the lender increased the rate by half a percent, prompting the borrowers to sue for a declaration that the clause was void as an unreasonable restraint on alienation, plus an injunction and damages. The trial court granted summary judgment to the lender based on the note's language, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the clause was a voluntary, clearly stated contractual term enforceable absent inequitable conduct, distinct from due-on-sale acceleration clauses that might restrain alienation, and that the rate increase was an agreed adjustment rather than a penalty for breach.

property

The case concerned a buyer of a used truck who sued the seller and engine manufacturer for failing to fulfill express warranties to repair the vehicle after an engine explosion and subsequent mechanical issues, seeking damages for repair costs and lost profits. The lower courts awarded damages to the buyer and rejected the seller's contractual exclusion of consequential damages, applying standards requiring negotiation and conspicuousness. The Washington Supreme Court reversed on the consequential damages issue, holding that exclusionary clauses under the UCC are governed by unconscionability standards rather than the rules for warranty disclaimers, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on that question while affirming that the seller had no right to indemnity from the manufacturer.

business & regulatoryprocedure