In this case, construction workers sued Harris Builders, Essential Quality Construction, and its manager for unpaid wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Louisiana Wage Payment Act, and for breach of contract, alleging they performed painting and drywall work on a project but were not compensated for most days worked despite agreed daily rates; they also claimed retaliation after Harris called police during a meeting about the wages. Harris moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing it was not the plaintiffs' employer and had no direct contractual relationship with them. The court denied the motion, holding that the complaint's allegations—such as Harris's superintendent monitoring work, providing supplies, approving pay rates, and acting as general contractor—were sufficient to plausibly allege that Harris was a joint employer under the FLSA's broad definition and that a verbal contract existed. The court applied the Twombly pleading standard, accepting the facts as true and finding they raised the claims above the speculative level without requiring detailed proof at this stage.
The case involves William Hardy suing his former employer, Shell Chemical LP, alleging age discrimination under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Louisiana Anti-Discrimination Law, as well as retaliation claims under Louisiana whistleblower statutes, after he was passed over for promotions and training, received lower compensation, and was terminated in 2008 following complaints about age bias and environmental compliance issues. Shell moved for summary judgment, contending that Hardy's termination stemmed from documented poor job performance rather than discrimination or retaliation and that his internal complaints did not qualify as protected activity. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, determining that some claims lacked evidence of pretext or protected conduct while others raised genuine issues of material fact. The analysis applied summary judgment standards under Rule 56, examined evidence of performance reviews and timing of complaints relative to termination, and assessed whether the employer's stated reasons were legitimate and non-discriminatory.
This case involves a declaratory judgment action filed by excess insurers (the Underwriters) against the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans, seeking a ruling that their bumbershoot insurance policy does not cover a $2.65 million state court judgment for personal injuries from a 2001 pothole accident because the Board failed to provide timely notice of the claim as required by the policy. The Underwriters moved for summary judgment, arguing that notice was not given until after the judgment was entered and amended, while the Board and its brokers (Aon) disputed when notice occurred and raised issues about policy interpretation. The court applied New York law after determining the policy was a maritime contract and granted the motion in part, entering declaratory judgment that St. Paul and AHAC have no coverage obligation due to the late notice, but denied the motion as to INA. The core reasoning focused on the policy's 'as soon as practicable' notice requirement, the absence of any genuine issue of material fact regarding when notice was provided to each insurer, and the lack of prejudice analysis under the applicable state law.
This case involves a maritime tort claim where Combo Maritime alleged that its vessel was damaged by drifting barges that broke free from United's fleeting area on the Mississippi River due to United's negligence in securing them. United filed a third-party complaint against Carnival, claiming that the cruise ship FANTASY's excessive speed and proximity created wave action that caused the breakaway. Carnival moved for partial summary judgment, seeking to hold United liable for Combo's damages and to dismiss the claims against it. The court granted the motion in part, applying the presumption of fault from James v. River Parishes Co. against the custodian of a drifting vessel and finding that United failed to rebut it with evidence of an adequate mooring system or improper navigation by the FANTASY. As a result, United was held liable, and its indemnity and contribution claims against Carnival were dismissed.
The case involved a longshoreman, John Jones, who was injured while unloading cargo from a ship onto a barge using a crane operated by his employer, Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Company. Jones sued Cooper under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), claiming vessel negligence after his Jones Act claims had already been dismissed. The court granted Cooper's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the remaining claim with prejudice. The core reasoning was that Jones's injury resulted from the negligence of persons providing stevedoring services during cargo operations, for which §905(b) does not permit a tort action against the employer, who is instead liable only for workers' compensation benefits under the LHWCA.
In United States v. Petal, Malcolm Petal pled guilty to conspiracy to bribe a state official in connection with obtaining tax credits for his company Break Beat LLC. Four individuals submitted claims for restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, alleging financial losses from Petal's actions. The court denied the claims, finding that the MVRA requires restitution only for direct and proximate harm caused by the specific conduct underlying the conviction. The conspiracy was limited in scope and duration to the bribery for Break Beat's tax credits, and the claimants were not victims of that offense. Additionally, resolving the claims would involve complex factual issues that would unduly burden the sentencing process.
