Cites Jenkins v. Anderson — APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Sonoma County denying admission of a will to probate. George H. Cabaniss, Judge. Reversed.
The case concerned whether Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which authorizes attorney fee awards to successful parties in actions enforcing important public rights, could be invoked by a defendant to recover fees after prevailing in a criminal prosecution under a municipal ordinance. Petitioner Fogelson, whose conviction was reversed by the California Supreme Court, moved in municipal court for fees under the statute; the motion was denied, and subsequent attempts to obtain review were dismissed on procedural grounds before the superior court also denied relief. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that section 1021.5 does not apply to criminal cases. The core reasoning was that the statute appears in Title 14 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which governs civil actions, that legislative history and context contain no indication of applicability to criminal prosecutions, and that extending it would create inconsistencies with the statutory scheme and the Penal Code's separate treatment of criminal actions.
The case involved defendant Teddie's convictions for kidnaping for robbery, robbery, burglary, grand theft auto, and related firearm enhancements after he and an accomplice robbed a liquor store manager at gunpoint, drove him around in his own car, confined him in the trunk, and later burglarized the store using information obtained from the victim. On appeal, the defendant argued insufficient evidence supported the kidnaping-for-robbery conviction because the asportations occurred after the initial robbery was complete, and that the trial court improperly refused to hear his motion for a new trial before sentencing, potentially entitling him to relief under Penal Code section 1202. The court rejected the sufficiency challenge, concluding that a single continuous asportation encompassed the robbery of the victim's wallet. The opinion also examined the procedural handling of the new-trial motion but noted that the trial judge had retired without further resolution of that issue.
The case involved a widow's attempt to claim a larger share of her late husband's estate by enforcing alleged Marvin-type agreements or partnerships covering periods of cohabitation before their 1976 marriage, in addition to her rights as a surviving spouse. A jury found that the couple had an implied agreement from 1964 to 1971 and an express agreement from late 1975 onward, but the trial court ruled that claims based on the earlier period were barred by the statute of limitations, waiver, and laches, while recognizing community-property interests only from the marriage onward. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations began to run upon the 1971 separation and that the 1975 agreement was separate and limited to property acquired thereafter. The decision rested on the timing of the claims, the jury's findings of two distinct contracts, and the applicability of equitable defenses to the pre-1975 period.
The case involved codefendants Ramona Brown and James McGinnis, who were charged with the murder of Brown's estranged husband, Raymond Brown, along with allegations that a principal was armed with and used a rifle. Brown initially went to trial, which ended in a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury, after which she pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and admitted the armed allegation, leading to a sentence of eight years; McGinnis was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder with true findings on the allegations and sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the court addressed issues including the admissibility of confessions, jury instructions on provocation and lesser offenses, and procedural matters such as Brown's failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause. The court held that the evidence did not support the requested instructions on provocation or voluntary manslaughter, found no error in the trial court's rulings, and affirmed both judgments.
In People v. Keith, defendants Stanley and William Keith were charged with multiple sexual assaults, including forcible rape and oral copulation, against 15-year-old J.R., along with related charges like kidnapping and firearm use; a jury convicted them on several counts after finding they acted in concert. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgments, holding that the trial court made an erroneous key ruling on the admissibility of evidence concerning J.R.'s prior sexual conduct. Under Evidence Code sections 1103 and 782, the trial court improperly barred testimony from non-defendant witnesses about J.R.'s alleged consensual acts with the defendants and others, while also limiting admissible evidence to testimony solely from the defendants themselves. This restriction prevented the defense from fully presenting its consent theory and impeaching the victim's credibility, necessitating reversal despite the condensed facts showing conflicting accounts of events on March 19, 1978.
The case involved a dispute over the redemption of property sold at a treasurer's improvement bond sale. Plaintiff William Little purchased the property and sought a deed after the redemption period, but the City of Los Angeles accepted a personal check from Frederick Milman, who was not the owner, to redeem it. The court affirmed judgment for the City after sustaining its demurrer, holding that the redemption was valid because a stranger's redemption benefits the owner and that personal checks qualify as "bank checks" under Revenue and Taxation Code sections 2504 and 2505. The plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the form of payment accepted by the City.