Otto M. Kaus

The case concerned whether Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which authorizes attorney fee awards to successful parties in actions enforcing important public rights, could be invoked by a defendant to recover fees after prevailing in a criminal prosecution under a municipal ordinance. Petitioner Fogelson, whose conviction was reversed by the California Supreme Court, moved in municipal court for fees under the statute; the motion was denied, and subsequent attempts to obtain review were dismissed on procedural grounds before the superior court also denied relief. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that section 1021.5 does not apply to criminal cases. The core reasoning was that the statute appears in Title 14 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which governs civil actions, that legislative history and context contain no indication of applicability to criminal prosecutions, and that extending it would create inconsistencies with the statutory scheme and the Penal Code's separate treatment of criminal actions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Teddie's convictions for kidnaping for robbery, robbery, burglary, grand theft auto, and related firearm enhancements after he and an accomplice robbed a liquor store manager at gunpoint, drove him around in his own car, confined him in the trunk, and later burglarized the store using information obtained from the victim. On appeal, the defendant argued insufficient evidence supported the kidnaping-for-robbery conviction because the asportations occurred after the initial robbery was complete, and that the trial court improperly refused to hear his motion for a new trial before sentencing, potentially entitling him to relief under Penal Code section 1202. The court rejected the sufficiency challenge, concluding that a single continuous asportation encompassed the robbery of the victim's wallet. The opinion also examined the procedural handling of the new-trial motion but noted that the trial judge had retired without further resolution of that issue.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a widow's attempt to claim a larger share of her late husband's estate by enforcing alleged Marvin-type agreements or partnerships covering periods of cohabitation before their 1976 marriage, in addition to her rights as a surviving spouse. A jury found that the couple had an implied agreement from 1964 to 1971 and an express agreement from late 1975 onward, but the trial court ruled that claims based on the earlier period were barred by the statute of limitations, waiver, and laches, while recognizing community-property interests only from the marriage onward. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations began to run upon the 1971 separation and that the 1975 agreement was separate and limited to property acquired thereafter. The decision rested on the timing of the claims, the jury's findings of two distinct contracts, and the applicability of equitable defenses to the pre-1975 period.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved codefendants Ramona Brown and James McGinnis, who were charged with the murder of Brown's estranged husband, Raymond Brown, along with allegations that a principal was armed with and used a rifle. Brown initially went to trial, which ended in a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury, after which she pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and admitted the armed allegation, leading to a sentence of eight years; McGinnis was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder with true findings on the allegations and sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the court addressed issues including the admissibility of confessions, jury instructions on provocation and lesser offenses, and procedural matters such as Brown's failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause. The court held that the evidence did not support the requested instructions on provocation or voluntary manslaughter, found no error in the trial court's rulings, and affirmed both judgments.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Keith, defendants Stanley and William Keith were charged with multiple sexual assaults, including forcible rape and oral copulation, against 15-year-old J.R., along with related charges like kidnapping and firearm use; a jury convicted them on several counts after finding they acted in concert. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgments, holding that the trial court made an erroneous key ruling on the admissibility of evidence concerning J.R.'s prior sexual conduct. Under Evidence Code sections 1103 and 782, the trial court improperly barred testimony from non-defendant witnesses about J.R.'s alleged consensual acts with the defendants and others, while also limiting admissible evidence to testimony solely from the defendants themselves. This restriction prevented the defense from fully presenting its consent theory and impeaching the victim's credibility, necessitating reversal despite the condensed facts showing conflicting accounts of events on March 19, 1978.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over the redemption of property sold at a treasurer's improvement bond sale. Plaintiff William Little purchased the property and sought a deed after the redemption period, but the City of Los Angeles accepted a personal check from Frederick Milman, who was not the owner, to redeem it. The court affirmed judgment for the City after sustaining its demurrer, holding that the redemption was valid because a stranger's redemption benefits the owner and that personal checks qualify as "bank checks" under Revenue and Taxation Code sections 2504 and 2505. The plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the form of payment accepted by the City.

propertytaxesprocedure

The case involved a dispute over title to real property after Anna Peyton's conservator sued to quiet title, claiming that a 1968 grant deed to her son James was forged; James had obtained a loan from Allstate secured by the property, and Allstate cross-complained against notary John Lotito for indemnity, alleging he negligently failed to verify the signer's identity. After the conservator obtained summary judgment quieting title based on a later reconveyance of the property, Allstate successfully moved for summary adjudication that the deed was a forgery on collateral estoppel grounds, leading to a directed verdict and judgment against Lotito for negligence in notarizing the deed. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the prior quiet title judgment did not collaterally estop Lotito from contesting the forgery because the judgment rested on a post-deed transfer rather than a finding of forgery, which was not essential to the earlier ruling. The court also addressed but did not resolve the notary's duty under Civil Code section 1185 versus Government Code provisions on jurats.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether Egg City, a large egg production facility, was exempt from air pollution control permit requirements for a manure drying machine and an underground fuel storage tank under Health and Safety Code section 42310, subdivision (e), which exempts equipment used in agricultural operations for raising fowl. The Air Pollution Control District issued an abatement order requiring permits, Egg City challenged it via writ of mandate after an administrative hearing, and the trial court ruled both items exempt. On appeal, the court held that the manure dryer was not exempt because it processed a byproduct rather than being directly used in raising fowl, requiring reversal on that issue, while the fuel tank was exempt as it supplied vehicles used in the ranch operations, leading to affirmance on that point; the court applied strict construction to the statutory exemption.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved defendant Richard Thomas, who was charged with possession of heroin for sale after police executed a search warrant on his apartment and car, finding over 70 grams of heroin. Thomas appealed following his guilty plea, arguing that the warrant lacked probable cause and that the evidence was the fruit of an illegal arrest of a third party named Tapia whose address book led to the investigation. The court affirmed the judgment, ruling that the affidavit provided sufficient probable cause through surveillance observations of brief visits and individuals showing signs of heroin use, along with the defendant's prior record, and that any taint from Tapia's assumed illegal arrest was dissipated by independent acts of the defendant and visitors that broke the causal chain. The court further held that routine police surveillance of public activities does not constitute a search requiring prior justification.

criminal lawprocedure

In Grant v. Marinell, the plaintiff sued a licensed real estate broker for breach of an oral agreement under which the plaintiff would receive a 10 percent finder’s fee for introducing the broker to potential clients, after the broker refused to pay following introductions that allegedly generated $63,800 in income. The trial court sustained the defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend, ruling that the claim was barred by the statute of frauds in Civil Code section 1624, subdivision 5. The Court of Appeal reversed the dismissal order. It held that the statute does not apply to oral finder’s fee agreements between a non-broker and a licensed broker because the statute’s protections extend only to buyers and sellers of real property, not to arrangements among intermediaries, as confirmed by legislative history and prior case law distinguishing such contracts from those directly involving principals.

propertyprocedure

This case was a wrongful death action brought by the family of jockey Alvaro Pineda, who died from head injuries in a starting-gate accident at Santa Anita racetrack, against the track operator and the manufacturer of his helmet. Plaintiffs appealed a defense judgment, arguing that two defense experts (a surgeon and a biomechanics consultant) improperly relied on pretrial eyewitness statements when forming opinions that the horse's head, rather than the helmet or gate, caused the fatal blow. The court held that the experts' testimony was admissible because their core conclusions rested on proper sources such as autopsy reports, photographs, and video footage, and any reliance on witness statements did not require exclusion under Evidence Code section 803. The judgment for defendants was therefore affirmed.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a minor's appeal from a juvenile court finding that he had committed burglary, with the court sustaining the petition and maintaining a prior camp placement order. The minor challenged the admission of his confession, arguing it stemmed from an illegal detention at the police station rather than prompt transfer to a probation officer under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 626 and 628, that officers failed to advise him of rights to contact his existing attorney or make phone calls under section 627, and that due process was violated by having the hearing before a referee instead of a judge. The court examined whether the 16-hour delay before interrogation was permissible, noting that statutes requiring action 'without unnecessary delay' incorporate prior case law interpretations prohibiting detentions solely for the purpose of questioning, with no other justification offered in the record for holding the minor over the weekend.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with murder, kidnapping for robbery, and robbery. After the jury deliberated for several days and returned a not guilty verdict on robbery along with unanimous votes on first-degree murder, kidnapping for robbery, and false imprisonment (while deadlocking on lesser included offenses), the trial court declared a mistrial on unresolved charges. The defendant then pleaded former acquittal and moved to dismiss counts 1 and 2 on double jeopardy grounds; the trial court granted the motion as to count 1, relying on Menjou v. Superior Court. The People appealed, and the court analyzed whether the jury's actions constituted acquittals that barred retrial on second-degree murder or manslaughter under Penal Code section 1023 and constitutional double jeopardy protections.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved three defendants convicted by a jury of robbery and being armed with a firearm during the offense at a Pasadena gas station. The defendants appealed their sentences, challenging the admission of their conflicting extrajudicial statements to police in a joint trial, which the prosecution introduced to show consciousness of guilt, along with objections under People v. Aranda requiring severance or editing to avoid improper references to co-defendants. The trial court allowed edited versions of the statements after Miranda waivers and found them admissible without further Aranda violations, while the facts included inconsistent witness identifications and physical evidence like a gun and money found in the defendants' car.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a deputy sheriff's claims for multiple industrial injuries against his employer, the County of Santa Barbara, including a finding of discrimination under Labor Code section 132a after he was reassigned from Deputy Sheriff II to Deputy Sheriff I, which reduced his compensation under section 4850. The court affirmed the discrimination award, reasoning that the reassignment was based solely on the disability from the industrial injury and thus violated the policy against penalizing injured workers. It annulled the award of vocational rehabilitation benefits, however, because the workers' compensation judge failed to refer the matter to the Rehabilitation Bureau as required by regulation before making that determination. The court also remanded for required findings on issues such as industrial injury, permanent disability, and apportionment, which had been improperly deferred.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved defendant Henderson's convictions after two trials for attempted robbery, assault, burglary, receiving stolen property, and obliterating the identification number on a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 12090. Henderson appealed, arguing that the trial court gave an improper jury instruction on the statutory presumption under section 12091 that possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number constitutes presumptive evidence the possessor performed the obliteration, and that his sentencing violated Penal Code section 654. The court analyzed whether the instruction created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption under due process standards requiring a rational connection between the proved fact of possession and the presumed fact of obliteration, referencing precedents such as Tot v. United States and Leary v. United States, and concluded that the instruction was valid as given. The court also addressed the sentencing claims and ultimately affirmed the judgment in full.

criminal lawprocedureguns

This case involves an appeal from a superior court order granting a motion to vacate a notice of exception to sureties on an undertaking filed to stay enforcement of a sister-state money judgment entered in California. The Williams had obtained a Nevada judgment against Thomas, which was domesticated in California, and Thomas posted an undertaking by individual sureties to obtain a stay pending related Nevada litigation. The superior court had accepted the undertaking and sureties' justifications but later vacated its order; after a writ proceeding, a new undertaking was filed, and the Williams filed an exception more than ten days later without prior notice of filing having been served. The Court of Appeal held the order appealable as a post-judgment order affecting enforcement of the judgment, ruled the exception timely because the statutory ten-day period under Code of Civil Procedure section 922 runs from notice of filing (which was never given), and required the sureties to rejustify under the new undertaking. The court reversed the vacating order and extended the time for justification.

procedure

This case involved a defendant who pleaded no contest to cocaine possession and being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm, after a warrantless search of his home conducted pursuant to a parole condition requiring consent to searches. The search, performed while the defendant was absent, uncovered drugs and a gun in shared areas plus cash in his wife's purse; the defendant moved to suppress the evidence from the purse on the ground that it was her personal property not subject to his parole condition. The court held that the parole search condition did not authorize searching the wife's distinct personal effects absent evidence of joint possession or her own consent, and that the record showed no such consent. It therefore reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, noting that the invalid admission of the purse evidence required reversal even though other evidence existed.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. McDaniels, the defendant, then age 16 and affiliated with the Cripts gang, was convicted of first-degree murder after he and fellow gang members drove to rival gang territory in south central Los Angeles, where a 15-year-old was shot five times at close range. The prosecution presented alternate theories that the defendant was either the shooter or an aider and abettor, supported by eyewitness identifications, companion testimony placing him at the scene, and expert testimony on gang customs from Deputy Sheriff Giron. On appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of the gang expert testimony under Evidence Code section 801. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, holding that substantial evidence supported the verdict on both theories and that the expert testimony was properly based on matters reasonably relied upon by experts in the field and was not unduly prejudicial.

criminal law

The case involved a dispute over $34,988.75 in a joint tenancy savings account that decedent Rose Aiello established with R.R. Moreland, the mortician named as executor in her 1968 will, which otherwise left her estate to her nephew and niece. After Aiello's death, the administratrix petitioned under Probate Code section 851.5 to determine ownership, claiming Aiello did not understand or intend the joint tenancy to pass the funds to Moreland. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment that Moreland held the funds in constructive trust for the estate and must transfer them. The core reasoning was that evidence from Aiello's letters showed she believed her will would control distribution to relatives, rebutting the Financial Code section 852 presumption that the survivor owns the account, and Moreland's testimony confirmed no intent for a present gift.

propertyfamily lawprocedure