The case involved Ventas Finance I, LLC, a Delaware company that registered in California and owned a few facilities there, challenging the state's former Revenue and Taxation Code section 17942 levy on LLCs, which was calculated on total nationwide income without any apportionment to California sources. The trial court ruled the levy violated the Commerce Clause as applied to Ventas and ordered a full refund of the amounts paid plus attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The Court of Appeal agreed that the unapportioned levy was not fairly apportioned and therefore unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, but held that the proper remedy was a partial refund limited to the excess over the amount that would have been due using a fair apportionment method based on California-source income; it rejected full judicial reformation of the statute and remanded for recalculation of the refund and potential redetermination of fees. The court further held that section 19717 is not the exclusive attorney-fee provision in tax refund actions and that fees may be awarded under section 1021.5 when its criteria are met.
In Koponen v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., property owners sued PG&E, a public utility, alleging that it exceeded the scope of easements on their land by leasing or licensing rights-of-way to telecommunications companies for installing and operating fiber-optic lines, and they asserted claims including trespass, unjust enrichment, and unfair business practices. The trial court sustained PG&E’s demurrer and dismissed the complaint without leave to amend, holding that Public Utilities Code section 1759 deprived it of jurisdiction. On appeal, the court held that section 1759 bars some but not all of the plaintiffs’ claims because it prevents superior courts from reviewing, reversing, or interfering with orders or decisions of the Public Utilities Commission, while claims that do not require such interference may proceed.
The case involved a private water ski club that purchased a five-acre island zoned for agricultural and open space use outside the county's urban limit line and, without obtaining required land use permits, constructed 28 residential dwelling units, docks, and related structures over several decades in violation of zoning ordinances, health codes, and floodplain rules. After the county issued a notice of violation and an abatement order declaring the development a public nuisance, the club petitioned for a writ of mandate and filed related civil claims seeking to block enforcement. The trial court denied the petition and dismissed the complaint, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that code violations constitute a public nuisance subject to abatement and rejecting defenses such as laches due to the club's ongoing unlawful construction and lack of sufficient prejudice from any delay. The court also found no viable equitable basis for relief given the absence of permits or vested rights.
The case involved the administrators of Jean M. Simes's estate seeking to rescind a life annuity contract purchased from United of Omaha Life Insurance Company, claiming a unilateral mistake of fact because Simes was unaware she had terminal cancer at the time of purchase and died shortly afterward without recovering the premium through payments. The trial court granted summary judgment for United on both the breach of contract and declaratory relief claims. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the contract terms limited payments to Simes's lifetime only and that her undetected illness did not qualify as a mistake of fact that would justify rescission, because annuity purchasers assume the risk of dying before recouping their investment and it was reasonable to allocate the risk of unknown health conditions to Simes.
The case concerned the respective roles of California's Department of Pesticide Regulation (DPR) and Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) in setting regulations for methyl bromide field fumigation, including permissible subchronic exposure levels for agricultural workers and nearby residents. Plaintiffs, including farmworkers and an environmental group, sued DPR after it issued regulations without jointly developing health-risk assessments with OEHHA. The court held that DPR violated its statutory duties under article 10.5 of the Food and Agricultural Code by independently determining health effects and only soliciting OEHHA comments after drafting rules, rather than collaborating jointly from the outset. It affirmed the trial court's order requiring DPR to develop the regulations jointly with OEHHA and to use OEHHA's health-risk recommendations.
This case involved a dispute arising from a 1994 marital settlement agreement in which Terry Kwong agreed to pay child support and half of his children's college expenses following his divorce from Monica Gong. After Kwong fell behind on payments, Gong obtained a charging order directing payments from his partnership interest in a shopping mall, and years later Kwong moved to terminate further payments, arguing that a 2001 court order had fixed his obligations as of its filing date and that he had overpaid. The trial court rejected this interpretation, finding that the order reflected the amount owed at the time of the earlier hearing and that the underlying 1994 support order remained in effect. On appeal, the court dismissed the case as frivolous, imposed sanctions on Kwong and his counsel totaling $21,000 plus attorney fees, and remanded for further fee calculations, reasoning that Kwong's arguments misread the plain language and context of the prior order and lacked any reasonable basis.