William Stein

The case involved Ventas Finance I, LLC, a Delaware company that registered in California and owned a few facilities there, challenging the state's former Revenue and Taxation Code section 17942 levy on LLCs, which was calculated on total nationwide income without any apportionment to California sources. The trial court ruled the levy violated the Commerce Clause as applied to Ventas and ordered a full refund of the amounts paid plus attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The Court of Appeal agreed that the unapportioned levy was not fairly apportioned and therefore unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, but held that the proper remedy was a partial refund limited to the excess over the amount that would have been due using a fair apportionment method based on California-source income; it rejected full judicial reformation of the statute and remanded for recalculation of the refund and potential redetermination of fees. The court further held that section 19717 is not the exclusive attorney-fee provision in tax refund actions and that fees may be awarded under section 1021.5 when its criteria are met.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

In Koponen v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., property owners sued PG&E, a public utility, alleging that it exceeded the scope of easements on their land by leasing or licensing rights-of-way to telecommunications companies for installing and operating fiber-optic lines, and they asserted claims including trespass, unjust enrichment, and unfair business practices. The trial court sustained PG&E’s demurrer and dismissed the complaint without leave to amend, holding that Public Utilities Code section 1759 deprived it of jurisdiction. On appeal, the court held that section 1759 bars some but not all of the plaintiffs’ claims because it prevents superior courts from reviewing, reversing, or interfering with orders or decisions of the Public Utilities Commission, while claims that do not require such interference may proceed.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved a private water ski club that purchased a five-acre island zoned for agricultural and open space use outside the county's urban limit line and, without obtaining required land use permits, constructed 28 residential dwelling units, docks, and related structures over several decades in violation of zoning ordinances, health codes, and floodplain rules. After the county issued a notice of violation and an abatement order declaring the development a public nuisance, the club petitioned for a writ of mandate and filed related civil claims seeking to block enforcement. The trial court denied the petition and dismissed the complaint, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that code violations constitute a public nuisance subject to abatement and rejecting defenses such as laches due to the club's ongoing unlawful construction and lack of sufficient prejudice from any delay. The court also found no viable equitable basis for relief given the absence of permits or vested rights.

propertyenvironment

The case involved the administrators of Jean M. Simes's estate seeking to rescind a life annuity contract purchased from United of Omaha Life Insurance Company, claiming a unilateral mistake of fact because Simes was unaware she had terminal cancer at the time of purchase and died shortly afterward without recovering the premium through payments. The trial court granted summary judgment for United on both the breach of contract and declaratory relief claims. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the contract terms limited payments to Simes's lifetime only and that her undetected illness did not qualify as a mistake of fact that would justify rescission, because annuity purchasers assume the risk of dying before recouping their investment and it was reasonable to allocate the risk of unknown health conditions to Simes.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned the respective roles of California's Department of Pesticide Regulation (DPR) and Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) in setting regulations for methyl bromide field fumigation, including permissible subchronic exposure levels for agricultural workers and nearby residents. Plaintiffs, including farmworkers and an environmental group, sued DPR after it issued regulations without jointly developing health-risk assessments with OEHHA. The court held that DPR violated its statutory duties under article 10.5 of the Food and Agricultural Code by independently determining health effects and only soliciting OEHHA comments after drafting rules, rather than collaborating jointly from the outset. It affirmed the trial court's order requiring DPR to develop the regulations jointly with OEHHA and to use OEHHA's health-risk recommendations.

environmentlabor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute arising from a 1994 marital settlement agreement in which Terry Kwong agreed to pay child support and half of his children's college expenses following his divorce from Monica Gong. After Kwong fell behind on payments, Gong obtained a charging order directing payments from his partnership interest in a shopping mall, and years later Kwong moved to terminate further payments, arguing that a 2001 court order had fixed his obligations as of its filing date and that he had overpaid. The trial court rejected this interpretation, finding that the order reflected the amount owed at the time of the earlier hearing and that the underlying 1994 support order remained in effect. On appeal, the court dismissed the case as frivolous, imposed sanctions on Kwong and his counsel totaling $21,000 plus attorney fees, and remanded for further fee calculations, reasoning that Kwong's arguments misread the plain language and context of the prior order and lacked any reasonable basis.

family lawprocedure

The case involved the California Labor Commissioner and intervenors suing the owners, officers, and managers of several closely held garment manufacturing corporations for personal liability on unpaid wages and related penalties after the businesses failed to meet payroll in 2001 due to financial difficulties. The complaints relied on an Industrial Welfare Commission wage order broadly defining "employer," alter ego doctrine, and specific Labor Code provisions applicable to garment manufacturers. The trial court entered judgment for the defendants, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the wage order does not impose personal liability on corporate principals, there was no factual basis for alter ego findings, and defendants were not guarantors or employers under the cited statutes.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

Plaintiffs who invested in promissory notes issued by trusts that purchased health care receivables sued multiple defendants, including indenture trustee BNY, alleging improper transfers of funds between trusts, purchases of ineligible receivables, and concealment of a collapsing investment scheme that resulted in over $50 million in losses. A jury found BNY liable on some claims but not others, after which the trial court granted a new trial unless plaintiffs accepted a large damages reduction and denied both sides' motions for partial JNOV or JNOV. On appeal, the court affirmed the new-trial order and the denials of JNOV motions while reversing the costs award to plaintiffs, primarily because the evidence supported the jury's findings on BNY's contractual duties and because plaintiffs' acceptance of a remittitur was unavailable after they appealed.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case arose from a 1994 marital settlement agreement in a 21-year divorce that required Terry Kwong to pay monthly child support until his children reached ages 27 and 25, plus half their college expenses. After Kwong repeatedly failed to pay, the trial court entered a 2000 order finding substantial arrearages, appointing a receiver, and issuing a charging order against his partnership interest in a shopping mall to satisfy the obligations directly. Years later Kwong moved to terminate further payments, arguing that a nine-month delay between the 2000 hearing and entry of the written order relieved him of support and interest obligations during that period. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as frivolous, holding that the motion and appeal rested on an untenable reading of the order that contradicted the trial court's clear intent and the parties' prior conduct, and it imposed sanctions on Kwong and his attorneys.

family lawprocedure

In Panoutsopoulos v. Chambliss, restaurant owners sued their landlord's general manager for an alleged scheme of harassment involving repeated claims of lease breaches and threats of termination, intended to force higher rent or eviction. They petitioned under Civil Code section 1714.10 for leave to add civil conspiracy claims against the attorneys representing the manager and partnership. The trial court granted the petition, but the Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the attorneys' letters, notices, and communications were sent in a representative capacity and were not actionable, while an alleged attempt to induce a plumber to misrepresent responsibility caused no harm because it was refused and produced no reliance or damages.

procedurepropertytorts & liability

In Garcia v. Duro Dyne Corporation, the plaintiffs sued multiple defendants, including Duro Dyne, alleging that Genaro Garcia developed mesothelioma from workplace exposure to asbestos-containing products in the sheet metal industry. After settling with several defendants, the case went to trial against Duro Dyne and another party; the jury found Duro Dyne 3 percent at fault under theories of strict liability and negligence, awarding over $1.9 million in total damages including future medical expenses. The trial court applied Civil Code section 1431.2 to allocate joint and several liability for economic damages and several liability for noneconomic damages, then offset the verdict based on prior settlements (including cost waivers) while denying offsets for certain unpaid settlements. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment with minor modifications to the offset calculations, rejecting challenges to the future damages award and the handling of settlement credits under Proposition 51. The core reasoning centered on statutory rules for damage allocation in multi-defendant tort cases and the evidence supporting the jury's findings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a challenge to a 2001 disposition and development agreement between the Eureka Redevelopment Agency and a private developer, on grounds that a member of the agency's advisory board had a prohibited financial interest in violation of Government Code sections 1090 and 1092 and related Health and Safety Code provisions. Plaintiff Sue Brandenburg filed suit in September 2005 seeking to void the agreement and enjoin performance. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer without leave to amend, holding the claims time-barred. The Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that the causes of action accrued no later than December 2001 and were governed by the three-year limitations period in Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a) for liabilities created by statute, rather than the four-year catch-all period in section 343.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In this marital dissolution case, Sylvia West appealed an order reducing the spousal support she received from her ex-husband Til after their 20-year marriage. The trial court had lowered support based on Sylvia's receipt of substantial assets from the sale of the community business, her decision to pursue real estate instead of teaching, and the length of the marriage relative to guidelines for becoming self-supporting. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court's stated reasons were invalid because the marital settlement agreement did not require Sylvia to invest her assets in a particular way without prior notice, and the one-half-the-length-of-marriage guideline in Family Code section 4320(l) does not apply to marriages of long duration like this one. The court took no position on whether other unarticulated factors might support a reduction.

family law

The case involved two Comcast cable subscribers in Sonoma County, one legally blind, who sued the company over its policy of requiring purchase of a basic cable tier that bundled television service with FM/music audio services. Plaintiffs alleged this practice violated the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200), the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code § 51) by discriminating against the blind subscriber, and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act through misrepresentations about the necessity of the bundle. The trial court granted Comcast summary adjudication on the first two claims and dismissed the third under Civil Code section 1781(c)(3). The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the uniform policy applied to all residential customers, plaintiffs understood the requirement when subscribing, no false or misleading statements were shown, and alternatives like internet streaming or radio existed.

business & regulatorycivil rights

In People v. Mendez, the defendant had been committed to Napa State Hospital after a 1992 not guilty by reason of insanity finding, with that commitment set to expire in November 2005. While hospitalized, he was charged in 2003 with assaulting another patient, found mentally incompetent to stand trial, and committed to the hospital under Penal Code section 1370 until his competency was restored; he was later deemed competent, pleaded guilty to the new charge, and was sentenced to prison. The trial court awarded him 534 days of presentence custody credit for his time in the hospital on the new charge, but the People appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that section 2900.5 does not authorize credit because the defendant's hospital confinement during that period was not attributable solely to the new proceedings—he would have remained confined anyway under his prior civil insanity commitment. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that section 1375.5 independently required the credit, reasoning that the statute applies only to confinement resulting from the incompetency commitment itself.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the City of Berkeley's attempt to merge two contiguous substandard parcels owned by Maarten Kalway in a high-risk fire area under the Subdivision Map Act and local zoning rules requiring minimum lot sizes and adequate access for safety reasons. After receiving informal notice of the planned merger, Kalway transferred one undeveloped parcel to his wife to prevent the action, but the City proceeded with the merger following a hearing, finding the transfer was an evasion. The trial court denied the Kalways' petition for a writ of mandamus and cancelled the deed, but on appeal the court affirmed the denial of the writ while reversing the deed cancellation, reasoning that the statutory timing rule for determining ownership did not invalidate the merger proceedings or authorize cancelling a completed conveyance. The decision focused on the validity of the administrative merger process and limits on remedies against the transfer.

propertyenvironment

This case involves an appeal by a mother from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her newborn child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The Sonoma County Human Services Department filed a dependency petition alleging failure to protect and lack of support, based on the mother's homelessness, recent methamphetamine use, mental health issues including psychosis, prior termination of rights to another child, and inconsistent statements about housing and prenatal care. The court appointed a guardian ad litem for the mother, found jurisdiction after she submitted on the social worker's report, suspended visitation due to safety concerns, and proceeded to termination after she failed to appear at later hearings. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order, holding that any error in the guardian ad litem appointment was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the mother did not actively participate, provide helpful evidence, or demonstrate prejudice from the appointment.

family law

This case concerns a petition for writ of mandate by voting rights and prisoner rights organizations and individuals on felony probation seeking to compel election officials to allow registration and voting by those confined in local facilities for felony convictions or as probation conditions. The court held that article II, section 4 of the California Constitution disqualifies only those imprisoned in state prison or on parole for a felony conviction, not probationers or those in local jails under certain sentencing provisions. The reasoning is that "conviction" requires a final judgment including sentence imposition, and confinement as a probation condition does not constitute imprisonment for a felony conviction; additionally, certain felony offenses reduced to misdemeanors under Penal Code sections do not trigger disqualification.

electionscriminal lawcivil rights

The case involved defendant Farooq A. Aleem's appeal from convictions on multiple counts of sexual and related offenses against two victims, with charges arising from conduct in several California counties including San Francisco, San Mateo, Alameda, and Solano. The key issue on appeal concerned venue, specifically whether counts 17 and 18 (forcible oral copulation with kidnapping allegations) could properly be tried in San Mateo County without written consent from the district attorneys of Alameda and Solano Counties under Penal Code section 784.7, even though the underlying acts occurred partly in San Francisco. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that section 784.7 permits trial in a county where at least one offense occurred and does not require agreements from other counties when the crimes were committed in the trial county's jurisdiction; the statute's purpose is to facilitate consolidation of related cases to spare victims from multiple trials. The court also noted that venue was proper under sections 777, 781, and 784, and that the defendant had not timely objected at the consolidation hearing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a personal injury lawsuit by Joseph Weber and his wife against John Crane, Inc., alleging that Weber developed mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos products manufactured or supplied by the defendant during his naval work from 1960 to 1964. John Crane moved for summary judgment based solely on Weber's deposition testimony, in which he stated he did not recall the defendant's name, any products associated with it, or any exposure resulting from the defendant's actions. The trial court granted the motion, finding the testimony sufficient to shift the burden to plaintiffs to show a triable issue on causation. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a defendant's evidence must affirmatively demonstrate that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence of causation before the burden shifts, and that the deposition testimony alone did not meet this initial burden.

torts & liabilityprocedure