This case involved a dependency petition filed by the Los Angeles County Department of Children's Services alleging that appellant Dirk S. had sexually and physically abused his four-year-old stepdaughter Ashley, leading to a jurisdictional finding that his son Dirk S. was a dependent child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The father appealed the dispositional order, arguing that the court erred by admitting hearsay statements from Ashley contained in social study reports after she was found incompetent to testify, and by improperly delegating visitation decisions to the Department. The court affirmed the orders, holding that the competency standards for live courtroom testimony differ from those assessing the reliability of a child's statements in a non-adversarial interview setting, and that the visitation order properly specified monitored visits outside the home while delegating only ministerial details such as timing and location. The decision rested on precedents allowing admission of such reports and limiting judicial delegation in dependency matters.
In this case, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of multiple serious felonies, including forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, and several residential robberies, some against victims aged 65 or older or under 14. The trial court imposed upper terms on certain counts, fully consecutive sentences under section 667.6, and four full two-year enhancements under section 667.9 for the robberies involving vulnerable victims, resulting in a total sentence of 56 years and 8 months with 18 years attributable to enhancements. The defendant appealed, arguing that the section 667.9 enhancements should have been limited to one-third terms under section 1170.1 for consecutive sentences and could not all be imposed fully. The court examined the plain language of section 667.9, which requires a two-year enhancement for each violation in addition to the sentence under section 667 and does not appear in the list of enhancements subject to the one-third rule in section 1170.1, concluding that full consecutive enhancements were authorized.
The case involved the prosecution appealing the superior court's denial of a motion to reinstate a complaint against defendant Jeffrey L. Dethloff for driving under the influence after a magistrate suppressed evidence from a traffic stop and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the superior court lacked jurisdiction because the prosecution's motion under Penal Code section 871.5 was filed more than 15 days after the dismissal. The court reasoned that the 15-day limit is jurisdictional and cannot be waived by consent or lack of prejudice.
This case involved a mother's appeal of multiple juvenile court orders in a dependency proceeding concerning her son Michael, who had been declared a dependent child of the court. The mother filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition seeking modification of prior custody and visitation orders based on alleged changed circumstances, including her stability and parenting abilities. The court denied the petition after finding no clear and convincing evidence of changed circumstances or that any modification would serve the child's best interests. It awarded joint legal custody to both parents with physical custody to the father, terminated juvenile court jurisdiction, and issued related custody and visitation orders under section 362.4 for use in superior court. The decision rested on evidence from witnesses, including the father's testimony about ongoing issues during visits and expert opinions indicating the current arrangement should continue.
In People v. Armstrong, defendant Vincent Todd Armstrong appealed his jury convictions for assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and use of a destructive device with intent to injure, intimidate, or terrify, along with a prior serious felony finding, arising from an attack on a woman outside a restaurant and an incident in which he threw a gasoline-filled bottle at a residence. The Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions and sentence enhancements. It held there was sufficient evidence to support the assault conviction based on the defendant's actions of grabbing the victim's face and shoving his hand down her throat, causing bleeding and soreness; that the destructive device offense qualified as a serious felony under Penal Code sections 667 and 1192.7; and that consolidation of the two offenses for trial was not an abuse of discretion.
In this case, Eugene Jones appealed his conviction for first-degree burglary after a jury trial, along with the sentencing on his admitted prior serious felony convictions and prior prison terms. The trial court imposed a middle-term sentence plus two five-year enhancements and one one-year prior prison term enhancement, while staying the second one-year enhancement. The appellate court concluded that the trial court should have stricken the stayed enhancement rather than staying it, because Penal Code section 1170.1 requires that additional punishment for such enhancements be stricken with reasons stated on the record when not imposed. The judgment was affirmed, but the matter was remanded for resentencing limited to that enhancement allegation.