Wakefield Taylor

This case involved a dependency petition filed by the Los Angeles County Department of Children's Services alleging that appellant Dirk S. had sexually and physically abused his four-year-old stepdaughter Ashley, leading to a jurisdictional finding that his son Dirk S. was a dependent child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The father appealed the dispositional order, arguing that the court erred by admitting hearsay statements from Ashley contained in social study reports after she was found incompetent to testify, and by improperly delegating visitation decisions to the Department. The court affirmed the orders, holding that the competency standards for live courtroom testimony differ from those assessing the reliability of a child's statements in a non-adversarial interview setting, and that the visitation order properly specified monitored visits outside the home while delegating only ministerial details such as timing and location. The decision rested on precedents allowing admission of such reports and limiting judicial delegation in dependency matters.

family lawprocedure

In this case, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of multiple serious felonies, including forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, and several residential robberies, some against victims aged 65 or older or under 14. The trial court imposed upper terms on certain counts, fully consecutive sentences under section 667.6, and four full two-year enhancements under section 667.9 for the robberies involving vulnerable victims, resulting in a total sentence of 56 years and 8 months with 18 years attributable to enhancements. The defendant appealed, arguing that the section 667.9 enhancements should have been limited to one-third terms under section 1170.1 for consecutive sentences and could not all be imposed fully. The court examined the plain language of section 667.9, which requires a two-year enhancement for each violation in addition to the sentence under section 667 and does not appear in the list of enhancements subject to the one-third rule in section 1170.1, concluding that full consecutive enhancements were authorized.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the prosecution appealing the superior court's denial of a motion to reinstate a complaint against defendant Jeffrey L. Dethloff for driving under the influence after a magistrate suppressed evidence from a traffic stop and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the superior court lacked jurisdiction because the prosecution's motion under Penal Code section 871.5 was filed more than 15 days after the dismissal. The court reasoned that the 15-day limit is jurisdictional and cannot be waived by consent or lack of prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a mother's appeal of multiple juvenile court orders in a dependency proceeding concerning her son Michael, who had been declared a dependent child of the court. The mother filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition seeking modification of prior custody and visitation orders based on alleged changed circumstances, including her stability and parenting abilities. The court denied the petition after finding no clear and convincing evidence of changed circumstances or that any modification would serve the child's best interests. It awarded joint legal custody to both parents with physical custody to the father, terminated juvenile court jurisdiction, and issued related custody and visitation orders under section 362.4 for use in superior court. The decision rested on evidence from witnesses, including the father's testimony about ongoing issues during visits and expert opinions indicating the current arrangement should continue.

family law

In People v. Armstrong, defendant Vincent Todd Armstrong appealed his jury convictions for assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and use of a destructive device with intent to injure, intimidate, or terrify, along with a prior serious felony finding, arising from an attack on a woman outside a restaurant and an incident in which he threw a gasoline-filled bottle at a residence. The Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions and sentence enhancements. It held there was sufficient evidence to support the assault conviction based on the defendant's actions of grabbing the victim's face and shoving his hand down her throat, causing bleeding and soreness; that the destructive device offense qualified as a serious felony under Penal Code sections 667 and 1192.7; and that consolidation of the two offenses for trial was not an abuse of discretion.

criminal law

In this case, Eugene Jones appealed his conviction for first-degree burglary after a jury trial, along with the sentencing on his admitted prior serious felony convictions and prior prison terms. The trial court imposed a middle-term sentence plus two five-year enhancements and one one-year prior prison term enhancement, while staying the second one-year enhancement. The appellate court concluded that the trial court should have stricken the stayed enhancement rather than staying it, because Penal Code section 1170.1 requires that additional punishment for such enhancements be stricken with reasons stated on the record when not imposed. The judgment was affirmed, but the matter was remanded for resentencing limited to that enhancement allegation.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs suing a medical instruments company after arthroscopic scissors broke during knee surgery, leading to further injury, based on strict products liability for design defect and breach of warranty. The trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiff must prove a reasonable alternative design was possible, and refused warranty instructions, resulting in a defense verdict. The appellate court reversed, holding that under the risk-benefit test for design defects, the burden shifts to the defendant to show the benefits outweigh the risks once the plaintiff establishes proximate causation by the design. The erroneous burden instruction required reversal.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved appellant Simon Duval, who was charged with felony drug possession offenses under Health and Safety Code sections 11351 and 11357(a) after a search of his residence pursuant to a warrant based on information from confidential informants. He moved to quash the warrant, suppress evidence, and obtain discovery or in camera review regarding the informants but those motions were denied; he then entered a nolo contendere plea to one count, with the other dismissed, and was placed on probation including jail time. On appeal, Duval challenged the denial of his pretrial motions, arguing the court should have reviewed the informants' information for veracity. The Court of Appeal affirmed the rulings, holding that no disclosure or in camera hearing was required because the informant was not a material witness on guilt, the plea rendered the issue moot, and Duval offered no evidence casting reasonable doubt on the affiant's statements about the informants.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Elene H. sued three Los Angeles County deputy sheriffs under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, claiming violations of federal civil rights during a child abuse investigation that led to the temporary removal of her two children. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding they were entitled to absolute and qualified immunity. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, holding that the deputies had reasonable cause to believe the child had been abused based on observed bruises, inconsistent explanations, and the child's demeanor, thus qualifying for immunity under the circumstances where officers of reasonable competence could disagree on the need for protective custody.

civil rightsfamily lawcriminal law

The case involved Edward Tessier, a 16-year-old who became a paraplegic after diving into a wave at a City of Newport Beach public beach and striking his head on a concealed sandbar. Tessier sued the City for premises liability and negligence, alleging the sandbar was a dangerous condition created or exacerbated by human alterations to Newport Harbor such as dredging and jetties. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City, and the appellate court affirmed, ruling that Government Code section 831.2 immunizes public entities from liability for injuries caused by natural conditions of unimproved public property like beaches, even when human activity indirectly affects sandbar formation. The court also held that section 831.7 provides immunity because diving into water constitutes a hazardous recreational activity. The decision relied on precedents such as Morin v. County of Los Angeles to conclude there was no triable issue of fact regarding the natural character of the condition or any duty to warn.

torts & liabilityproperty

This case involves a negligence lawsuit arising from a 1983 traffic collision at an unregulated T-intersection in Santa Ana, California, where plaintiff Sesler on a motorcycle attempted a left turn from a southbound left-turn lane and was struck by defendant Ghumman’s northbound vehicle after several oncoming drivers had stopped and waved Sesler through. The trial court instructed the jury using only the language of Vehicle Code section 21801 and BAJI No. 5.21 on the duties of left-turning drivers. Defendant Ghumman had requested a more specific instruction, drawn from Kirk v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., addressing the duty when some but not all oncoming vehicles yield the right-of-way, but the trial judge refused it as duplicative. The Court of Appeal held that the standard instructions were insufficient to guide the jury on Sesler’s potential contributory negligence under the facts presented, reversed the judgment in Sesler’s favor, and remanded for a new trial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Jansen Associates, Inc. v. Codercard, Inc., the case involved sanctions sought against an attorney under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 after the attorney for defendant Codercard, Inc. willfully failed to attend a court-ordered mandatory arbitration hearing, causing the plaintiff unnecessary expense. The trial court imposed $2,950 in sanctions against the attorney personally via a minute order that cited the attorney's bad-faith conduct. On appeal, the court reversed the sanctions order, ruling that it failed to recite in detail the specific conduct or circumstances justifying the award as mandated by section 128.5, subdivision (b), and remanded the matter for entry of a new order complying with that requirement. Although the attorney had not received written notice that sanctions were sought against him personally rather than the client, the court held he waived that objection by failing to raise it during the hearing or by moving for reconsideration.

procedure

Norman Wong sued E. Jan Davidian for breach of contract and reformation of a purchase and sale agreement. After the case remained dormant for more than three years following its filing in 1982, Davidian moved to dismiss under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.420 for failure to bring the action to trial within three years. The trial court granted the motion, dismissed the case, and awarded attorney fees and sanctions to Davidian. The Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that Wong had not shown excusable delay or diligence in prosecution, that a related lawsuit concluded in 1983 did not justify the subsequent inactivity, and that the trial court acted within its discretion in weighing the relevant factors under the statute and court rules.

procedure

The case involved an employee, Gregory Schlick, who sued Comco Management, Inc., the independent claims administrator for his self-insured employer, the City of Anaheim, for failing to pay workers' compensation benefits. He alleged claims including breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duties, conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court held that the employee could not maintain a civil action against the administrator, as the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board has exclusive jurisdiction under Labor Code section 5300, subdivision (a), over proceedings for the recovery of compensation or any rights arising out of or incidental to it. The reasoning emphasized that the exclusive remedy rule protects the integrity of the workers' compensation system, and the claims administrator is not a third party subject to separate suit when the complaint's substance concerns the delay or refusal to pay benefits.

labor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

This case involved whether a security assignment of a leasehold interest qualifies as real property security under Code of Civil Procedure section 726, which would trigger the one-action rule requiring a creditor to exhaust the security before obtaining a personal judgment on the debt. The Bouissieres purchased a business with a promissory note secured by business assets and an assignment of their lease as collateral; after defaulting on the remaining balance, they argued the lease assignment prevented a direct suit on the note. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Taylors, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that a leasehold is a chattel real treated as personal property under California law, so the one-action rule does not apply and the creditor may pursue personal liability without first realizing on the lease security.

propertyprocedure

The case involved Charles Francis McCarnes, who was convicted by a jury of two counts of second-degree murder, two counts of vehicular manslaughter, and other charges including driving under the influence causing injury, after causing a head-on collision while driving with a .27 percent blood alcohol level and multiple prior DUI convictions; two people died and others were injured. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of implied malice for the murder counts, improper admission of prior convictions to prove malice, and that guilty verdicts on both murder and manslaughter counts created reasonable doubt requiring reversal under People v. Dewberry. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the jury's guilty verdicts on the murder counts showed it clearly found malice, the verdicts on manslaughter were properly set aside as lesser offenses, and the procedure did not prejudice the defendant.

criminal law

In People v. Fabert, defendant Jean Fabert was convicted after a jury trial of voluntary manslaughter with firearm use for fatally shooting her husband. She appealed on the ground that the trial court improperly admitted evidence, including testimony from police and a psychiatrist, that she had requested an attorney after receiving Miranda warnings, which the prosecution used to rebut her defense of unconsciousness and diminished capacity due to a dissociative state. The Court of Appeal held that admitting this evidence violated the defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination and was prejudicial error, requiring reversal of the judgment and remand for retrial with appropriate instructions on lesser offenses and diminished capacity.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved PMI Mortgage Insurance and the Morrows, who owned contiguous substandard lots in Pacific Grove that had merged under a 1973 city ordinance into a single building site, seeking variances from minimum lot size and setback requirements to allow separate ownership and rebuilding if needed. The planning commission and city council denied the variances after hearings. The trial court granted a writ of mandate directing approval, finding the city estopped and its decision unsupported by evidence, while also admitting new evidence and applying independent judgment review. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that variances do not involve fundamental vested rights so the substantial evidence standard applies on review, the trial court erred in admitting extra-record evidence and using the wrong standard, and the city council's denial was proper under the ordinance criteria.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Nelson v. Gaunt, a former patient sued a physician for assault and battery, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress after he performed unapproved silicone breast injections in 1968 without disclosing the substance, its risks, or lack of regulatory approval, leading to lumps and medical complications. A jury awarded the plaintiff $450,000 in compensatory damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the claims were not barred by the one-year malpractice statute of limitations because they alleged intentional torts rather than professional negligence, that the evidence supported the verdict and damage awards, and that the trial court committed no reversible errors in evidence admission, jury instructions, or other rulings. The court rejected the defendant's arguments regarding his self-representation and opposing counsel's conduct as lacking merit or prejudice.

torts & liabilityhealthcarecriminal law

The case involved a restaurant operator seeking to maintain a preliminary injunction against unions that had engaged in picketing involving blocking access, threats of violence, intimidation, and disturbances of the peace during a labor dispute over union organizing and alleged unfair labor practices. The unions moved to dissolve the injunction after the enactment of the Moscone Bill (Code Civ. Proc. § 527.3), arguing it removed the court's equitable jurisdiction over such labor activities. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to dissolve, holding that the statute expressly permits injunctions against enumerated unlawful acts like threats, violence, and breaches of the peace, and that the evidence supported the original injunction's restrictions on picketing conduct. The decision was based on the statutory language preserving jurisdiction for such conduct and the factual record of prior violations, without reconsidering unrelated aspects like picket numbers and spacing.

labor & employmentfree speechbusiness & regulatory