Wayne Edward Alley

The case involved Robert Warner challenging Aetna's termination of his long-term disability benefits under an ERISA employee welfare benefit plan sponsored by his former employer. Aetna ended the benefits after determining that Warner had refused to participate in an approved rehabilitation program, as permitted by the plan terms during the initial 24-month period of disability. The court reviewed the decision under an arbitrary and capricious standard adjusted by a sliding scale to account for Aetna's conflict of interest as both claims administrator and insurer. Finding the decision reasonable and supported by the administrative record, the court ruled in favor of the defendants and upheld the termination of benefits.

labor & employmenthealthcare

This case concerns the conduct of plaintiffs' counsel in a civil action against the City of Oklahoma City. Counsel failed to appear at a scheduled status conference despite prior notice, did not contact the court afterward to explain the absence, and submitted an untimely response to the court's show cause order without addressing the delay. The court decided to issue a public reprimand against counsel, to be published in the Federal Supplement and retained for potential future reference. The core reasoning was that the combination of missing the conference, failing to provide a timely explanation or apology, and submitting a late response without justification amounted to inexcusable lapses in professional diligence.

procedure

The case involved Oklahoma hospitals participating in Medicare that sought to reopen their notices of program reimbursement (NPRs) to obtain additional disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments after a prior ruling invalidated a regulation limiting such payments to days of actual Medicaid reimbursement rather than eligibility. The hospitals had timely requested reopening under 42 C.F.R. § 405.1885 but were denied based on HCFA Ruling 97-2, which applied the new interpretation only prospectively to pending appeals. The court determined that it had mandamus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 to compel the Secretary to direct fiscal intermediaries to reopen and reconsider those NPRs falling within the three-year reopening window under 42 C.F.R. § 405.1885(b) when Ruling 97-2 was issued, because the prior regulation was void ab initio and the mandatory reopening provision applied. It rejected arguments based on finality and Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, emphasizing that the hospitals had pursued the available administrative reopening avenue and that only timely NPRs would be affected.

healthcarefederal powerprocedure

The case involves CMI Corporation's motion under Rule 60(b)(6) to reduce an $11.6 million damages award to Standard Havens Products on a patent infringement counterclaim concerning the '146 Patent, based on the Federal Circuit's intervening decision in Lans v. Digital Equip. Corp. The court certified its intent to grant the motion upon remand from the pending appeal, finding that the new precedent applies because it requires actual notice of infringement from the patentee itself under 35 U.S.C. § 287(a). The core reasoning was that notice from a related corporate entity (Cedarapids) did not suffice when Standard Havens Products held the patent rights at the relevant time, and the appeal's pendency allowed reconsideration without finality concerns.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a dispute over insurance coverage under a business owners’ liability policy issued by State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company to Midwest Computers & More. The insured sought coverage to defend and indemnify against a lawsuit alleging negligent computer services that caused loss of use of computers and loss of stored data. The court granted summary judgment to the insurer, holding that it had no duty to defend or indemnify. Although the court found that loss of use of tangible property constituted covered “property damage,” a policy exclusion applied because the damage occurred before the insured’s work was completed, so the completed operations hazard did not provide coverage. The parties agreed the matter was governed by Oklahoma law, and the court resolved the coverage issue as a matter of law on cross-motions for summary judgment.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involves products liability and negligence claims by Jill Hagy, on behalf of herself and her injured husband, against American Honda Motor Co. and related entities, alleging defects in a three-wheeled all-terrain vehicle that caused an accident in 1994. It is the third lawsuit filed after prior state and federal actions (Hagy I and Hagy II) were dismissed without prejudice. The court denied the defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings, to dismiss, to stay, and to strike portions of the complaint. The core reasoning was that undisputed facts from the state court record showed the refiling was timely under Oklahoma's savings statute (12 O.S. § 100) following the dismissal of Hagy II, which had been filed within the original two-year limitations period; federal abstention doctrines did not apply absent a pending state proceeding; and Rule 12(f) does not authorize striking claims or parties based on an alleged prior agreement, which would require a summary judgment motion instead.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involves a law firm's petition challenging guidelines issued by a U.S. Bankruptcy Judge for the Western District of Oklahoma that govern the timing of attorneys' fee payments in Chapter 13 plans. Under the guidelines, fees must generally be paid in installments over at least 24 months, but may be paid over 10 months if the plan provides at least 20% to unsecured creditors. The petitioner sought writs of mandamus and prohibition from the district court, arguing the guidelines improperly favored creditors. The court determined it lacked jurisdiction to issue the writs absent withdrawal of the bankruptcy reference, which was not requested, and that even if jurisdiction existed the petitioner had not shown a clear right to relief because the guidelines comply with the Bankruptcy Code and do not impose an improper per se minimum payment requirement under Tenth Circuit precedent. The petition was therefore denied.

procedurefederal power

In Atherton v. Ward, registered Oklahoma voters affiliated with the Libertarian Party, which had lost its recognized status after its 1996 presidential candidate received under 10% of the vote, challenged state statutes (Okla. Stat. tit. 26, §§ 1-110 and 4-112) that automatically reclassified them as Independents and prevented registration with a non-recognized party. The plaintiffs argued these laws violated their First Amendment rights to political speech and association by denying them the ability to reflect their affiliation in public voter records or obtain lists of like-minded voters. Following a nonjury trial, the court ruled for the plaintiffs under the precedent of Baer v. Meyer and ordered relief creating a temporary "political organization" designation for the decertified party, allowing voters to register their affiliation for up to two election cycles while prohibiting the group from conducting primaries, nominating candidates, or appearing on ballots. The decision required the State Election Board to implement this system, communicate it to county boards, and permit future statutory amendments consistent with the order, effective January 1, 1999.

electionsfree speechcivil rights

This case involved a dispute over whether a law firm's attempt to collect a debt owed by a certified public accountant to a publisher for tax and Medicare publications was subject to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The plaintiff argued that the debt should be covered as it related to her professional education and business activities as a sole proprietor. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, ruling that the Act did not apply because the purchases were made primarily for business purposes rather than personal, family, or household use. The core reasoning was that the statutory definition of "debt" under the Act requires the transaction to be primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, which was not met here based on the plaintiff's testimony.

business & regulatory

The case involved an ERISA-governed employee health and welfare plan, administered by Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance, seeking to enforce its subrogation and reimbursement provisions against defendants who had received over $640,000 in medical benefits following a third-party automobile accident. Defendants had settled their personal injury claims for $1.85 million and argued that the plan should bear a share of attorney fees under the common fund doctrine or be limited by a make-whole rule. The court granted summary judgment in part to the plaintiff, ruling that the plan's unambiguous terms controlled, ERISA preempted state law, and no federal common law make-whole rule applied to bar full reimbursement. It denied full summary judgment on the reimbursement amount, however, holding that the common fund rule required the plan to pay a proportionate share of reasonable attorney fees and costs because defendants' litigation efforts created the recovery fund from which the plan benefited.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

In United States v. Wilson, the defendant moved to dismiss a petition for revocation of supervised release, arguing that a probation officer cannot lawfully initiate such proceedings directly with the court without the United States Attorney, as this would exceed statutory authority and amount to the unauthorized practice of law. The court denied the motion, upholding the established practice in the district of allowing probation officers to present revocation petitions directly. The core reasoning was that the Probation Office operates as an arm of the court itself, not an independent agency, so revocation matters are internal judicial decisions outside the scope of prosecutorial discretion; the petition functions as a statutory report under 18 U.S.C. § 3603(2) rather than a legal filing.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose after Cecil Hutto died in a county jail hours after arrest when a swallowed bag of methamphetamine ruptured, and his widow and son sued the sheriff, undersheriff, and three deputies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, plus a supplemental state negligence claim. The court granted summary judgment in part, ruling that only the widow was a proper plaintiff, that the sheriff, undersheriff, and one deputy were entitled to judgment on all claims, and that the two remaining deputies were entitled to judgment on the negligence claim but not the § 1983 claim. It reasoned that state survivorship law barred the son's claims, that the higher-ranking officers lacked the requisite deliberate indifference, and that the Governmental Tort Claims Act exempted the jail-operation negligence claims, while genuine factual disputes remained about whether the two on-duty jailers had exhibited deliberate indifference.

civil rightscriminal lawproceduretorts & liability

In Loving v. Boren, a University of Oklahoma professor sued the university president alleging that blocking certain Internet newsgroups on the university server violated his First Amendment free speech rights, after the blocks were put in place following concerns that obscene material on those groups could subject the university to state criminal penalties. The court determined that the plaintiff presented no evidence of personal harm from the blocking and thus failed to establish an actual case or controversy necessary for either injunctive or declaratory relief. The university's later policy of maintaining one unrestricted server for approved groups and a second server limited to academic use by verified adults over 18 met constitutional standards, and the existence of alternative access routes to the blocked groups further rendered the claim moot. The court therefore entered judgment for the defendant without reaching the merits of the original blocking decision.

free speechcivil rights

This case involved the United States bringing claims under the False Claims Act and common law theories of unjust enrichment and payment by mistake against Community Psychiatric Centers of Oklahoma, Inc., a psychiatric facility, for allegedly submitting bills to Medicaid for inpatient care while knowingly failing to provide patients with a reasonably safe environment free from unreasonable risks of physical and sexual harm. The defendant moved to dismiss the second amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), contending that the allegations failed to identify an objective billing standard, could not show knowing falsity, and were precluded by the Medicaid program's regulatory scheme and prior compliance certifications. The court denied the motion, holding that the complaint adequately pled the elements of an FCA claim by alleging knowing submission of claims with implied false certifications of compliance with quality-of-care regulations, that difficulties in measuring compliance do not bar such claims, and that the existence of administrative enforcement mechanisms does not displace FCA liability or the equitable claims.

criminal lawhealthcarefederal power

The case involved two white female employees of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission who sued under Title VII and Oklahoma public policy after a black female was selected for an Administrative Assistant II promotion instead of them. The plaintiffs alleged race discrimination and a novel 'third party sexual harassment' theory based on an alleged personal relationship between the selectee and one male member of the three-person selection committee. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case or pretext of race discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and that the third-party harassment claim was not cognizable under Title VII. The state-law tort claim was dismissed as derivative of the failed discrimination claims. The court also denied as moot the plaintiffs' motion to strike references to an adverse administrative decision.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involved a federal lawsuit by plaintiff Poag against the Humane Society of Lawton for alleged trespass and confiscation of his cats, which the court had previously dismissed as barred by statutes of limitation. The underlying dispute stemmed from a state court replevin action that was dismissed on the merits for lack of evidence of ownership. Following the dismissal, the court issued show cause orders and addressed the defendant's motion for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 against plaintiff's counsel for failing to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the timeliness of claims, attempting to relitigate issues barred by res judicata, and presenting frivolous arguments. The court decided to sanction counsel with a formal reprimand and an order to pay $437.50 in defendant's attorney fees, reasoning that counsel ignored well-established doctrines like res judicata and statutes of limitation without providing legal authority or timely responses, and instead made unsupported arguments for modifying existing law.

procedure

This case concerns the validity of a 1988 severance tax imposed by the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma on oil and gas production from lands within the Tribes' territorial jurisdiction, specifically allotted lands held in trust for individual tribal members. Oil companies holding leases challenged the tax, arguing that the Tribes lacked authority over allotted lands and that one plaintiff’s tax violated the Commerce Clause. After the tribal courts upheld the tax following exhaustion of remedies, the federal district court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment, relying on historical treaties, the 1891 Allotment Agreement, and federal Indian law precedents. The court determined that the allotted lands remained part of the Tribes’ reservation and thus within their taxing jurisdiction as Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151, rejecting disestablishment claims and the Commerce Clause challenge for lack of support.

taxesfederal powerpropertybusiness & regulatory

This case is an interpleader action brought by Leader National Insurance Company to determine the distribution of proceeds from an automobile insurance policy following a fatal car accident in Oklahoma involving the insured Shaws and passengers. The court granted summary judgment in part, finding that bodily injury liability limits had been paid and that certain claimants were ineligible for Personal Injury Protection (PIP) or underinsured motorist coverage under Kansas law, but denied summary judgment on underinsured motorist coverage claims because the applicability of Oklahoma versus Kansas law remains unresolved pending further litigation of the facts. The decision hinged on the procedural history of the case's transfer from Kansas to Oklahoma federal court, which affects choice-of-law analysis, and the lack of sufficient facts to resolve all claims at this stage.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involves plaintiff DeFries, a former employee of the Town of Washington, Oklahoma, who was suspended and then terminated in 1992 after an audit revealed approximately $1,400 in missing utility payments he had handled; he sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights, along with related state-law claims for breach of contract and public policy violations arising from the town's disciplinary procedures. The court addressed the defendants' motion for summary judgment on these claims. The court determined that the pre-termination and post-termination hearings satisfied constitutional requirements, that plaintiff failed to present evidence showing unconstitutional bias by decisionmakers such as Mayor Moody or the Board of Trustees, and that dual roles or post-termination statements did not create a due process violation.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

In this case, a former employee of Merrill Lynch sued the company in state court after his termination, asserting claims including tortious breach of contract, constructive discharge, and emotional distress. The defendant removed the case to federal court and moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act based on arbitration provisions in the U-4 forms the plaintiff signed to register with securities exchanges. The court granted the motion to compel, ruling that the U-4 forms constituted contracts involving commerce subject to the Act, that federal law preempts any conflicting Oklahoma constitutional provisions on jury trials or arbitration waivers, and that the trainee agreement did not override the arbitration requirement.

business & regulatorylabor & employmentfederal powerprocedure